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Preface
Traditional trade theory does not pay much attention to the behavior of rms in
global markets. However, the emergence of a wide range of micro level datasets
has changed the way economists conduct research in international trade. While in
traditional trade models, the emphasis is placed on industries and countries, the
majority of recent research focuses rather on rms and products. In the mid-1990s,
a series of empirical papers based on a rst wave of microdata demonstrated that
rms are heterogenous within industries. Beginning with Bernard and Jensen (1995,
1999), this literature documents that even within narrowly dened industries, some
rms are much larger and make higher prots than others because they are more
productive. Furthermore, it is documented that these most productive rms drive
international trade ows. The fact that exporting rms are di¤erent and more
productive than rms that operate only domestically is widely documented and has
been proven to be robust to many control variables (see Bernard et al. (2007) and
Bernard et al. (2012)).1 According to this, the participation in exporting is not
random but crucially depends on rm characteristics.
This thesis is inspired by more recent micro level data which shows large di¤erences
in the characteristics of rms even within the fraction of rms that participate in
export markets. One of the striking features of this data is that the majority of
international trade is concentrated on a small number of very large rms. For the
year 2000, Bernard et al. (2009) report that the top one percent of trading rms
account for 81 percent of U.S. trade. Trade economists explain this concentration
1Next to the reported di¤erences in productivity, Bernard et al. (2007) document a number of
further dimensions in which exporters di¤er from nonexporters. Exporters are signicantly larger
in terms of employment and shipments. Furthermore, exporters pay higher wages and are relatively
more capital- and skill-intensive than nonexporters.
1
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by the fact that large rms are engaged in multi-product trade. Empirical obser-
vations document that rms producing multiple products play a dominant role in
both domestic and international businesses and in many cases their dominance has
increased with globalization. Detailed micro level data reveals interesting charac-
teristics of exporting rms as it links rms to the number of products they produce
and to their foreign export destinations.2 For US exporters, Bernard et al. (2007)
show that about 26 percent of rms export ve or more products, and that these
rms account for about 98 percent of the total value of exports. A similar pattern
is reported by Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) for French exporters. In their dataset,
roughly 34 percent of French rms export more than ve products and these rms
account for 91 percent of total exports.3 These ndings highlight the dominance of
multi-product rms (MPFs) in global markets and motivated a fast growing liter-
ature on MPFs and international trade. This avenue of research and its promising
developments are the starting point of my thesis, which aims to provide theoretical
and empirical contributions to a better understanding of how rms behave in global
markets. Crucially, all new insights gained from the analysis in the di¤erent chapters
are only enabled due to the fact that the underlying frameworks allow for MPFs.
On the theoretical side, MPFs have received attention for some years in the indus-
trial organization literature (e.g. Brander and Eaton (1984), Shaked and Sutton
(1990), Eaton and Schmidt (1994), Johnson and Myatt (2003), and Allanson and
Montagna (2005)). Existing theoretical research on MPFs in international trade is
concerned mainly with the product market side of the economy, where the main
research question is how MPFs absorb trade shocks. This fast growing literature
can be divided roughly into two strands regarding the assumptions made about the
underlying market structure. In the rst strand of models, research is concentrated
on monopolistically competitive MPFs (see Bernard et al. (2011), Arkolakis and
Muendler (2012), Nocke and Yeaple (2013), and Mayer et al. (2014)). Assuming
a continuum of rms implies that rms are implicitly negligible to the market and,
therefore, demand linkages among products within the rm are excluded. These
2See also World Trade Organisation (2008).
3The dominance of multi-product rms in export markets is not only true for developed coun-
tries. For Peru, Martinicus and Carballo (2008) report that the average exporter sells 7.5 products.
For other country studies, see Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) for Mexico, and Goldberg et al. (2010)
for India.
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linkages are highlighted in the second strand of the literature, where the assump-
tion of monopolistic competition is dropped and rms are considered to attain a
nite mass in an oligopolistic market structure. In models such as Ju (2003), Eckel
and Neary (2010), and Eckel et al. (2011), rms are large relative to the market
and hence internalize demand linkages within their product portfolio, the so called
"cannibalization" e¤ect.4 In this context, cannibalization means that widening the
product range by one additional variety exerts a negative externality on the products
initially o¤ered by the rm and reduces their respective market shares. This e¤ect
plays an important role in my thesis which is therefore more related to the second
strand of the literature. Indeed, I will show that allowing for rms which internal-
ize cannibalization e¤ects across their products will provide novel and interesting
insights into the adjustment processes of rms to globalization.
A commonality in many papers on MPFs and international trade is the emphasis
of the product range as a new margin of adjustment to globalization. Economists
have analyzed the e¤ects of globalization on this new margin which Eckel and Neary
(2010) refer to as responses at the "intra-rm extensive margin". Indeed, as several
recent papers document, this margin of adjustment is of great importance. Broda
and Weinstein (2010) nd that 82 percent of the new product creation occurs within
existing rms and thus only 18 percent of the value of overall consumption goes
back to new products of entering rms. Bernard et al. (2010) report a somewhat
lower gure of about half of the US output of new products stemming from within-
rm product expansion. Furthermore, they document changing product ranges for
more than 50 percent of US rms within ve years. Since the seminal work of
Krugman (1979), product variety has played an important role in many trade models.
Throughout this thesis, the question of how globalization a¤ects the product range
of MPFs will be discussed in great detail. From a welfare perspective, this question
is of central importance because of the great contribution of varieties from within-
rm product expansion to the overall number of available varieties in an economy.
Therefore, I argue that analyzing the product range of MPFs and understanding the
determinants, which may have an inuence on it, is a crucial aspect to have in mind
when studying the variety gains from international trade.
4Two papers that assume monopolistic competition but yet feature the cannibalization e¤ect
are Feenstra and Ma (2008) and Dhingra (2013).
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Among heterogenous rms, globalization creates both winners and losers: On the one
hand, markets expand but, on the other hand, the degree of competition intensies.
The literature has shown that while for low-performing rms the competition e¤ect
dominates, better-performing rms benet from better access to foreign markets
(see e.g., Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003)).5 I concentrate my analysis
on large MPFs, for whom a more integrated world market brings forth a number
of new challenges and opportunities, in addition to better prospects for exporting.
In particular, I focus on two important issues: (1) o¤shoring and (2) the positive
impacts of larger markets on innovation. Both issues have obtained a lot of attention
in the existing international trade literature, however, there are only few insights on
these topics in the context of MPFs. Therefore, my dissertation aims to establish
a connection between the literature on o¤shoring and innovation, on the one hand,
and recent achievements on MPFs, on the other hand. By doing so, I focus on issues
that cannot be explained in models based on single-product rms.
This thesis consists of three main chapters, all contributing to the literature on MPFs
and international trade. In these chapters, I show, for example, how the opportunity
to relocate entire production lines a¤ects the product range of an MPF. This type
of international expansion is labeled as "multi-product o¤shoring" and is shown to
bring forth labor market implications that are crucially di¤erent from models on
o¤shoring with single-product rms (Chapter 1). In Chapters 2 and 3, I analyze
the impact of larger markets on innovation, where the modelling of MPFs allows
me to di¤erentiate between di¤erent types of innovation. In Chapter 2, the focus
is on a trade-o¤ between process and product innovation, which is created by cost
and demand linkages. These linkages are specic to MPFs and can both be related
to the degree of product di¤erentiation in an industry. It is theoretically shown
and later on empirically conrmed that rms in more di¤erentiated sectors will do
more product innovation, whereas rms in more homogeneous sectors will invest
more in better processes. Chapter 3 takes up again the two types of investments
from Chapter 2 and adds investments in the degree of product di¤erentiation as a
third strategic variable an MPF may choose. The focus of Chapter 3 is to show how
unbundling the di¤erent types of innovation leads to new insights into the welfare
gains from trade liberalization. In the following, I provide a brief overview of the
5For recent surveys, see also Melitz and Treer (2012) and Melitz and Redding (2013).
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lines of argumentation in each chapter and highlight the main results as well as the
contributions to the literature.
In Chapter 1, which is joint work with Carsten Eckel, we incorporate o¤shoring of
labor-intensive goods in a multi-product framework. Although the internationaliza-
tion of production has been discussed extensively in the literature, there is not yet
a framework to study the relocation of whole varieties within the boundaries of a
rm. We refer to this phenomenon as "multi-product o¤shoring" and emphasize that
our analysis brings forth new insights into the labor market outcomes of o¤shoring.
Prior academic research on international production has identied two main channels
through which o¤shoring a¤ects domestic labor demand. Firstly, there is a relocation
e¤ect from the displacement of tasks that formerly were carried out domestically.
Secondly, there are e¢ ciency gains from vertical specialization that benet domestic
workers and increase domestic demand for labor (see Eckel (2003), Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008), Rodriguez-Clare (2010), and Egger et al. (2013)). We argue
that the e¢ ciency e¤ect of o¤shoring can only occur if the production of a single
good is linked sequentially in two or more countries. Moreover, at least part of the
production stages have to remain in the home country so that domestic employment
can benet from the higher productivity. If, however, the complete production line
is relocated, the latter e¤ect vanishes. On top of that, multi-product o¤shoring not
only prevents the e¢ ciency e¤ect but causes a cannibalization e¤ect of o¤shoring
which has not been discussed in the literature, yet.
In our multi-product framework, we investigate how improvements in the oppor-
tunities for o¤shoring a¤ect the geographic organization and the product range of
an MPF. A rm which produces a range of products can decide for each product
where it is produced most e¢ ciently: In the home country or in a low-wage o¤shore
destination. Therefore, it is the labor intensity of each product that determines its
optimal production location. As a main result in partial equilibrium, we show that
lower o¤shoring costs will lead to a relocation of labor-intensive products and to an
extension of the product range with additional products. These operations cause
the cannibalization e¤ect of o¤shoring as the increasing output of foreign-produced
varieties crowds out demand for domestically produced goods. Therefore, as a result
of the relocation and the cannibalization e¤ect, our analysis in partial equilibrium
clearly indicates that domestic labor demand will decrease in the presence of more
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o¤shoring. In general equilibrium, our analysis highlights adjustments through factor
markets as an important transmission channel of external shocks. Assuming factor
market clearing, domestic wages decrease as a response to the pressure on domestic
labor. Therefore, endogenizing wages, our model is able to predict patterns in which
rms even "re-relocate" entire product lines following a decline in o¤shoring costs
and a delayed fall in wages.
From a theoretical point of view, the way we are thinking about o¤shoring as a
relocation of production lines within MPFs is novel. However, the way o¤shoring
is measured in the broad empirical literature on international production is in line
with our denition. In a seminal contribution by Feenstra and Hanson (1996), nal
goods next to imported intermediates are directly included in the measurement of
o¤shoring. Therefore, this way of measuring o¤shoring is directly related to our idea.
Other empirical papers, such as Head and Ries (2002), Ebenstein et al. (2012),
and Becker et al. (2013) measure o¤shoring activity in an industry by the total
employment in foreign a¢ liates. We show that this empirical approach is consistent
with our model.
Chapter 2 of this thesis is joint work with Lisandra Flach. In this chapter, we inves-
tigate, theoretically and empirically, the innovation strategies of MPFs, where we
distinguish between investments in product and process innovation. This research
is motivated by recent contributions to the international trade literature, which em-
phasize the importance of intra-rm adjustments through innovation in explaining
the welfare gains from trade liberalization. The relevance of within-rm product ex-
pansion has already been highlighted earlier in this preface (see papers by Broda and
Weinstein (2010) and Bernard et al. (2010), which highlight the importance of new
product creations within existing rms). In addition, other empirical studies point
out the relevance of rms investments in cost-reducing process innovation as a large
fraction of aggregate changes in industry-level productivity. For Spanish rms, Do-
raszelski and Jaumandreu (2013) show that, within sectors, between 65 percent and
90 percent of productivity growth arises through intra-rm productivity enhancing
activities. These ndings document the importance of innovation activities within
rms next to the well-established intra-industry gains from entry and exit of rms.
The theoretical contribution of Chapter 2 is the modelling of a new framework of
MPFs, which captures two types of innovation. Firms may decide to expand their
PREFACE 7
product range or to lower production costs, and the net e¤ect in terms of returns
to innovation is a priori unclear. Our framework predicts that in a larger market,
rms will invest more in both types of innovation as they can exploit economies of
scale. However, the key feature of our theory is that the returns to both types of
innovation are determined by industry-specic cost and demand linkages. We stress
that these linkages can only occur in a multi-product setting. As a novel feature of
our model, the strength of the demand and costs linkages varies across industries,
which are distinguished according to the degree of product di¤erentiation. To un-
derstand the role played by the degree of di¤erentiation, one may consider rms in
two industries with di¤erent scope for product di¤erentiation - one industry with
homogeneous products and one industry with highly di¤erentiated products. Firms
producing multiple products in the homogeneous industry have rather low returns
from investing in new products as doing so crowds out demand for their existing
products. Earlier in this preface, this e¤ect has been described as the cannibaliza-
tion e¤ect. Contrary, investments in process-optimizing technologies may generate
larger returns, since a rm can internalize spillover e¤ects across production lines.
Homogeneous products imply similar production processes and thus investments in
the production process of one variety are applicable to a large fraction on the en-
tire product portfolio of the rm. Obviously, for rms in a highly di¤erentiated
industry, the mechanism works exactly the other way round. Following this intu-
ition, our model predicts that rms in homogeneous industries will invest more in
process innovation, while rms in di¤erentiated industries will focus more on product
innovation.
We test the main predictions from the model using Brazilian rm-level data. This
data has two important features. First, it contains detailed information on invest-
ments in product and process innovation in the period 1998-2000. Second, in this
period, a major and unexpected exchange rate shock makes it possible to evaluate
changes in market size. In January 1999, the Brazilian real devaluated unexpectedly
by 25 percent within a month. We use this event and exploit it as a highly exogenous
source of variation. Our empirical results reveal that rms increased their innovation
e¤orts in both product and process innovation following the exchange rate devalu-
ation. We argue that this is because the shock can be compared to an increase in
market size as the currency devaluation made Brazilian products more competitive
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at home and abroad. Furthermore, we apply a continuous measure of the degree of
di¤erentiation at the industry-level and evaluate di¤erential e¤ects across industries.
We conrm the predictions from our theory that rms in more di¤erentiated indus-
tries invest more in product innovation, while rms in more homogeneous industries
invest more in process innovation.
In Chapter 3, I address again the R&D portfolio of an MPF, focusing on the welfare
implications of intra-rm adjustments. I show how distinguishing between di¤erent
kinds of innovation in a multi-product setting can help to disentangle the welfare
gains from trade. The motivation for this chapter is similar to the motivation for
the previous chapter. There, I have already pointed out the relevance of within-rm
innovations for aggregate changes in variety and productivity at the industry-level.
In addition to the two types of innovation mentioned in Chapter 2, I introduce
investments in the degree of product di¤erentiation as a third important strategic
variable that rms may want to determine. Next to the welfare analysis, this third
component of innovation is the main theoretical contribution to the literature.
In most studies, the degree of product di¤erentiation is regarded as a main compo-
nent of the industry structure, which is treated as an exogenous variable. However, I
show that, in contrast to single-product rms, MPFs have higher incentives to invest
in product di¤erentiation. The reason for this behavior has already been given in
Chapter 2. There, it was shown that as a result of less cannibalization, the returns
to product innovation rise in the degree of product di¤erentiation. Hence, the inno-
vating rm can dampen the negative externality of product innovation by investing
in the degree of product di¤erentiation. To avoid cannibalization among products,
rms invest in new blueprints or product specic attributes such as di¤erences in
functional features or design. Furthermore, promotion activities such as advertise-
ment or marketing campaigns help to highlight the di¤erences between products.
All these measures come along with xed costs, however, they are implemented to
di¤erentiate the products within the portfolio and to reduce the cannibalization ef-
fect across these varieties. I show that consumers appreciate these investments as
they value choosing from a broad and diversied product range.
In order to analyze welfare implications, I follow Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and
compute the indirect utility function for a quadratic specication of preferences. I
show that consumers benet from more variety (love of variety), lower prices, and,
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notably, from a higher degree of product di¤erentiation. As the degree of product
di¤erentiation is endogenously chosen in my model, I stress the latter property of
the utility function and refer to it as love of diversity. This implies that consumers
value a given product range more when products are more di¤erentiated. I argue
that endogenizing the degree of product di¤erentiation reveals an important channel
through which globalization may a¤ect the variety gains. Crucially, consumer welfare
is not only determined by the absolute number of available products in an economy
but also by the individual product features that distinguish these varieties. Having
disentangled these three individual welfare channels helps me to discuss the gains
from trade liberalization arising from intra-rm adjustments. A rising market size or
falling trade costs enable rms to exploit economies of scale in innovation. This gives
rise to increasing optimal investment levels as investment costs can be spread over
more units of output. Therefore, economies of scale induce an MPF to enlarge and
diversify its product range. Given the love of variety and love of diversity channels,
this improves consumer welfare. Furthermore, I show that a higher volume of sales in
a larger market is associated with technology upgrading. The resulting cost savings
are passed on to consumers, leading to welfare gains from lower prices.
All three chapters of this dissertation are self-contained and include their own intro-
ductions and appendices such that they can be read separately. Hence, to facilitate
reading within chapters, footnotes and equations are numbered independently in
each chapter.
Chapter 1
Multi-Product O¤shoring
1.1 Introduction
In the last decades, progress in communication and information technologies has
changed the international organization of production. Markets are dominated by
large multinational rms that control and manage production lines on a global scale.
Global production networks enable rms to benet from the generally lower labor
costs in emerging countries. Against this background, industrialized countries fear
a decline of jobs and pressure on wages. Recent academic research has identied
two main channels by which o¤shoring a¤ects domestic labor demand. Firstly, there
is a relocation e¤ect from the displacement of tasks that formerly were carried out
domestically. Secondly, there are e¢ ciency gains from vertical specialization that
benet domestic workers and increase domestic labor demand.1
In this chapter, we study the consequences of a di¤erent kind of o¤shoring: O¤-
0This chapter is based on joint work with Carsten Eckel. When working on this chapter, we
have beneted from comments by Daniel Baumgarten, Lisandra Flach, J. Peter Neary, Tobias
Seidel, Mirjam Wuggenig, Stephen Yeaple, and participants at the IO and Trade Seminar at the
University of Munich, the Workshop "Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen" in Goettingen 2012,
the European Trade Study Group in Leuven 2012, the O¤shoring and International Production
Conference in Tuebingen 2013, the Midwest Economic Theory and International Trade Meetings in
Ann Arbor 2013, the Economic Geography and International Trade Meeting at CESifo 2014, and
the SFB TR 15 Conference in Mannheim 2014.
1The e¢ ciency or productivity e¤ect of o¤shoring is stressed in recent contributions to the
o¤shoring literature, such as Eckel (2003), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), Rodriguez-Clare
(2010), and Egger et al. (2013).
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shoring of production lines within multi-product rms (MPFs). Analyzing rms
that o¤er a bundle of horizontally linked products leads to important new insights
into the e¤ects of o¤shoring. Our results are crucially di¤erent from the well-known
e¤ects of relocating just parts of a production process of a single product. In partic-
ular, we argue that the e¢ ciency e¤ect of o¤shoring can only occur if the production
of a single good is linked sequentially in two or more countries. Moreover, at least
part of the production stages have to remain in the home country so that domestic
employment can benet from the higher productivity. If, however, the total pro-
duction line is relocated, the latter e¤ect vanishes. A rm, which produces a range
of products, can decide for each product where it is produced most e¢ ciently. We
will show that it is the labor intensity of each product, which determines its optimal
production location.
The relocation of a complete production process not only prevents the e¢ ciency
e¤ect of o¤shoring but causes a cannibalization e¤ect of o¤shoring that has not been
discussed in the literature. If the products within the product range of an MPF are
horizontally di¤erentiated, the introduction of a new product will create a negative
demand externality on all other products of this rm. This is typically referred to
as the cannibalization e¤ect and plays a big role in our analysis. Giving a rm
the opportunity to o¤shore production will lead to a relocation of labor-intensive
products and to an extension of the product range with additional products. We
show that both operations will cannibalize output of domestically produced goods
and reduce demand for labor in the home country.
A growing literature on MPFs stresses horizontal relationships between products
within the boundaries of a single rm and analyzes the e¤ects of globalization on
the product range of a rm. Bernard et al. (2010) emphasize this as a new margin
of rm adjustment, which Eckel and Neary (2010) refer to as intra-rm extensive
margin. Within a multi-product framework, we investigate how improvements in
the opportunities for o¤shoring a¤ect the geographic organization and the product
range of an MPF. For this purpose, we set up a general oligopolistic equilibrium
(GOLE) model with MPFs and enrich this framework by introducing the rms
opportunity to o¤shore the production of multiple varieties to a low-wage emerging
country. Varieties within a rms product line are linked on the cost side through
a exible manufacturing technology, which captures the idea that - besides a core
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competence - an MPF can expand its portfolio with varieties that are less e¢ cient in
production. When producing abroad, a rm can use the same production technology
as in the home country but additionally it has to bear o¤shoring costs.
We derive our results in partial and in general equilibrium. As a main result in par-
tial equilibrium, we nd that more products are produced abroad when prospects
for o¤shoring improve. Furthermore, savings from lower o¤shoring costs lead to
an extension of the product portfolio as the opportunity to produce labor-intensive
products abroad enlarges the prot maximizing product range of an MPF. In a model
where rms internalize demand linkages, rising outputs of foreign-produced varieties
and additional varieties in the portfolio are crowding out domestic production, that
does not benet from lower o¤shoring costs. We stress this cannibalization e¤ect
as an important transmission channel that is specic to MPFs. In our model, in
addition to the well-established relocation e¤ect, cannibalization hits domestic pro-
duction. For this reason, the analysis in partial equilibrium clearly indicates that
domestic labor demand will decrease in the presence of more o¤shoring.
In general equilibrium, our analysis highlights adjustments through factor markets
as an important transmission channel of external shocks on both the cuto¤ variety
and the product range.2 With endogenous domestic wages the results are not as
clear cut anymore. It is no longer apparent that more products will be produced
o¤shore with falling o¤shoring costs. We show that the more domestic production
benets from falling domestic wages the more likely is the partial result reversed in
general equilibrium. Therefore, our model is able to predict patterns in which rms
"re-relocate" entire product lines following a decline in o¤shoring costs and a delayed
fall in wages.
Our model builds on and extends two strands of the existing literature in interna-
tional trade on both MPFs and o¤shoring. Particularly with regard to the connection
of both strands, Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001) come up with a multi-product set-
ting where oligopolistic rms may produce some varieties in one country and other
varieties in another. However, they explain intra-rm trade patterns akin to recipro-
cal dumping à la Brander and Krugman (1983) and not via factor price di¤erences
2The cuto¤variety is dened as the product where the rm is indi¤erent concerning the optimal
production location. It is characterized by equal production costs in the home country and the
o¤shore destination.
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across countries. Hence, their approach is not associated with o¤shoringper se.
In a recent paper, Yeaple (2012) extends a framework by Bernard et al. (2011) with
a proximity-concentration trade-o¤. In his setting, rms produce multiple products
for multiple countries and choose whether to export from the home country or to
manufacture locally. Unlike to our model, his focus is not on wage di¤erentials
between countries but on rm heterogeneity with respect to managerial expertise.
Managers deliver expertise to foreign a¢ liates, which means that rms with a higher
manager e¢ ciency tend to build foreign a¢ liates rather than to export to foreign
countries. In an empirical analysis, McCalman and Spearot (2013) examine the role
of vertical product di¤erentiation in the decision where to produce a specic variety.
Using a dataset of light truck sales in the US, Canada and Mexico, they study the
location decision of nal assembly. The patterns of o¤shoring that they nd can be
explained by the labor intensity in the automobile production. Furthermore, it is
consistent with one of our theoretical predictions that foreign output is produced at
a lower scale.
We also contribute to the large literature on international production. Our way
to determine the cuto¤ variety between domestic and foreign production is remi-
niscent of a key contribution to the o¤shoring literature by Feenstra and Hanson
(1996). While in their theoretical model, o¤shoring takes the form of relocating
labor-intensive activities of a single manufactured good, they adopt a more general
denition of o¤shoring in the empirical part.3 Next to imports of intermediate goods,
they further include nal goods that are sold under the brandname of a rm in their
denition of o¤shoring. Therefore, this measurement of o¤shoring is directly related
to our way of dening o¤shoring as the relocation of complete production lines. By
including nal goods in their measure of o¤shoring, Feenstra and Hanson do better
at explaining wage patterns and employment changes for the United States.4 Other
empirical papers measure o¤shore activity by the total employment of foreign a¢ li-
ates. Using this kind of measure, authors typically think of capturing the relocation
of vertically related tasks or the replication of domestic production abroad (hori-
zontal FDI). However, we show that this way of measuring international activity is
3Feenstra and Hanson (1996) refer to this phenomenon as outsourcing.
4Feenstra and Hanson (1996) argue that previous studies like Berman et al. (1994) and
Lawrence (1994) did not nd an impact of o¤shoring on U.S. wages because of their narrow den-
ition of o¤shoring.
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perfectly consistent to what we call multi-product o¤shoring.
Existing theoretical research on MPFs is concerned mainly with the product market
side of the economy. The main question which is tried to be answered is how MPFs
absorb international trade. Intra-rm product switching is frequent and contributes
like rm entry and exit to the evolution of aggregate outcomes in an industry.5 The
literature di¤ers in the way of modelling the demand for and the decision to supply
multiple products and in the assumptions about market structure. Most recent
models assume that markets can be characterized by monopolistic competition, in
which rms produce a large number of products but are themselves innitesimal
small in scale in the economy (see Arkolakis and Muendler (2010), Bernard et al.
(2011), Nocke and Yeaple (2013), and Mayer et al. (2014)). Our model is built along
the lines of Eckel and Neary (2010) who set up a di¤erent approach and assume
that markets are oligopolistic. Their underlying market structure highlights as an
important feature the cannibalization e¤ect, which also plays a crucial role in our
model.6 Next to these demand linkages, Eckel and Nearys approach incorporates
cost linkages between varieties in the form of exible manufacturing.7
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 recaps the basic
model of Eckel and Neary (2010) and incorporates o¤shoring into this framework.
Subsequently, we provide comparative static results of falling o¤shoring costs. Sec-
tion 3 shows how these results transform when wages are endogenized in general
equilibrium. Section 4 concludes and summarizes results. Mathematical derivations
and a numerical simulation of our model are presented in the Appendix.
1.2 The Model
To conduct our analysis, we rely on the multi-product framework with exible man-
ufacturing proposed by Eckel and Neary (2010). We introduce a model where rms
on grounds of e¢ ciency seeking can relocate the production of labor-intensive goods
5Bernard et al. (2010) report changing product ranges for more than 50 percent of US rms
within ve years whereby one-half of those rm both added and dropped at least one product.
6The cannibalization e¤ect is also considered in recent articles by Feenstra and Ma (2008) and
Dhingra (2013).
7The concept of exible manufacturing is also used in Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Eaton and
Schmitt (1994), Norman and Thisse (1999), and Eckel (2009).
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abroad. Our setup consists of two countries, Home and Foreign, and a large world
market. There is a continuum of identical industries in Home, whereby the output
produced in each of these industries is sold on the world market. Foreign is a low
wage emerging country and acts as a potential destination for an a¢ liate. We begin
this section with the analysis of one single sector by considering the behavior of the
consumers in the world market and the optimal rm behavior in this industry.
1.2.1 Consumer Behavior: Preferences and Consumer De-
mand
We assume that LW consumers in the world market maximize their utility dened
over the consumption of di¤erentiated products. Referring to the model of Eckel
and Neary (2010), we maintain the specication of preferences in the form a two-tier
utility function.8 The upper tier is an additive function of a continuum of sub-utility
functions over industries z, where z varies over the interval [0; 1], given by
U [u (z)] =
Z 1
0
u (z) dz. (1.1)
The representative consumers sub-utility is dened over per variety consumption
q(i; z) with i 2 
 and total consumption Q  R
i2
 q(i; z)di, where 
 is a set of
di¤erentiated goods o¤ered in industry z. To be more specic, we assume
u (z) = aQ  1
2
b

(1  e)
Z
i2

q(i; z)2di+ eQ2

. (1.2)
Eq. (1.2) has a standard quadratic form, where a, b denote non-negative preference
parameters and e is an inverse measure of product di¤erentiation, which lies between
0 and 1. Lower values of e imply that products are more di¤erentiated and hence less
substitutable. In the event of e = 1, consumers have no taste for diversity in products
and demand depends on aggregate output only. Consumers maximize utility in Eqs.
(1.1) and (1.2) subject to the budget constraint
R 1
0
R
i2
 p(i; z)q(i; z)didz  I, where
p (i; z) denotes the price for variety i in industry z and I is individual income. This
8These preferences combine the continuum quadratic approach to symmetric horizontal product
di¤erentiation of Ottaviano et al. (2002) with the preferences in Neary (2009).
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yields the following linear inverse individual demand function:
p(i; z) = a  b [(1  e)q(i; z) + eQ] , (1.3)
where  is the marginal utility of income, the Lagrange multiplier attached to the
budget constraint. Market-clearing imposes that each rm faces a market demand
x(i; z) that consists of the aggregated demand of all consumers in the world market
LW q(i; z). For the inverse world market demand, we get
p(i; z) = a0   b0 [(1  e)x(i; z) + eX] , (1.4)
where a0  a

is the consumersmaximum willingness to pay and b0  b
LW
is an
inverse measure for the market size. Finally, X  R 
0
x (i; z) di represents the total
volume of varieties produced and consumed in industry z. Note that X is dened
over the goods actually consumed with i 2 [0; ], which is a subset of the potential
products 
. With no quasi-linear term in Eq. (1.2), the value of  is not constant,
which implies that a0 and b0 are endogenously determined in general equilibrium.
However, with a continuum of industries, we may assume that each rm takes these
parameters as given. Hence, each rm has market power in its own market but it
is small in the economy as a whole. This assumption permits a consistent analysis
of oligopoly in general equilibrium. As it has become standard in the literature, we
choose the marginal utility of income as the numeraire and set  equal to one (see
Neary (2009) for further discussion).
1.2.2 Firm Behavior: Costs and Technology of MPFs
This section considers technology and optimal rm behavior in industry z.9 We focus
on intra-rm adjustments, so competition between rms plays only a second-order
role. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we focus on the monopoly case.
Extending the analysis to oligopoly is straightforward.10 According to that, each
industry z is characterized by exactly one rm whose objective it is to maximize
9We concentrate on symmetric industries and drop the industry index z in the following analysis.
We consider this index again when we aggregate over all industries and turn to the level of the
economy as a whole in general equilibrium.
10The interested reader is referred to the Appendix in Eckel et al. (2011).
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prots by choosing both the scale and scope of production, as well as choosing
the optimal location for producing each specic variety. When choosing the optimal
location for production, rms seek to reduce costs by producing labor-intensive goods
o¤shore where a comparative advantage exists due to lower wages. For simplicity,
we assume no xed costs for both domestic and foreign production.
In our model, an MPF is characterized by a core competence and exible manufac-
turing. Technology is rm-specic and, therefore, it can be applied correspondingly
in Home and in Foreign. As in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), technology
is transferable as a home rm will use its own technology when performing a task
abroad. Flexible manufacturing is characterized by one core competence, in which
the rm is most e¢ cient in fabrication. Furthermore, an MPF can produce addi-
tional varieties with rising marginal costs.
Production costs in our model comprise both a product-specic and a monitoring
component (managerial e¤ort), which we assume to be zero for production at home.
This assumption implies that the ability to monitor varies with distance. Manage-
rial e¤ort is needed to supervise production and to provide the rms technology
abroad.11 By incorporating these costs, we try to capture the more general idea that
aggravated monitoring through managers, less skilled workers, worse infrastructure,
or inferior contractual enforcement, a¤ect production in emerging countries. In the
following analysis, we refer to this cost component as o¤shoring costs. To put it for-
mally, we assume a Ricardian technology where domestic (foreign) production costs
c(i) (c(i)) are given by
c(i) = w(i) and (1.5)
c(i) = w((i) + t), (1.6)
with (i) denoting the labor input coe¢ cient for variety i, w (w) being the wage
level in Home (Foreign) and nally t representing the o¤shoring costs.12 Latter is
measured in labor costs and is the same for all products assembled abroad. As we
are analyzing the relocation of total production lines and not the relocation of just
parts of a production process, the assumption that t is identical for all o¤shored
11See for example Grossman and Helpman (2004). They assume that a principal is able to
observe the managers e¤orts at a lower cost when the managers division is located near to the
rms headquarters as compared with when it is located across national borders.
12Foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk throughout.
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varieties seems fair. Technology is rm- and not country-specic, therefore (i) is
the same in both countries. We assume the following properties:  (0) = 0 and
@c
@i
= @
@i
w > 0.
Closed Economy Without o¤shoring, optimal rm behavior is composed of max-
imizing total rm prots both with regard to scale and to scope. Considering the
technology assumptions above and denoting the scope of the product portfolio by ,
prots are given by
 =
Z 
0
[p(i)  c(i)]x(i)di. (1.7)
Firms simultaneously choose the quantity produced of each good and the mass of
products produced. Maximizing prots in Eq. (1.7) with respect to scale x (i) implies
the rst-order condition for scale:
@
@x(i)
= p(i)  c(i)  b0 [(1  e)x(i) + eX] = 0 (1.8)
that leads to the optimal output of a single variety
x(i) =
a0   w(i)  2b0eX
2b0(1  e) (1.9)
with X  R 
0
x(i)di denoting total rm scale.13 The negative impact of total rm
scale X on the output of a single variety displays the cannibalization e¤ect: @x(i)
@X
=
  e
(1 e) < 0. An MPF internalizes the e¤ect that increasing output of a certain
variety lowers prices for this, as well as, for all other varieties in the rms product
range. This e¤ect only exists if e > 0, i.e. if products are not perfectly di¤erentiated.
Furthermore, Eq. (1.9) shows that, given its total output, a rm produces less of
each variety the further away it is from its core competence. Given the symmetric
structure of demand, this means that a rm charges higher prices for products that
are further away from its core competence (see Eckel and Neary (2010), p.193 for a
detailed analysis).
13The second-order condition of this maximization problem is: @
2
@x(i)2
= @p(i)@x(i)   b0 (1  e)  
b0e @X@x(i) < 0.
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In the next step, we consider the rms optimal choice of product line. MPFs add
new products as long as marginal prots are positive. Maximizing Eq. (1.7) with
respect to scope implies the respective rst-order condition14
@
@
= [p()  c()]x() = 0. (1.10)
From Eq. (1.8), we know that the prot on the marginal variety [p()  c()] cannot
be zero. The rm adds new varieties up to the point where the marginal cost of
producing the marginal variety equals the marginal revenue at zero output. The
prot maximizing product range implies that the output of the marginal variety
x() is zero. Using Eq. (1.9) and setting x () equal to zero yields
c() = a0   2b0eX. (1.11)
Comparing Eqs. (1.9) and (1.11), we see that rms add new varieties to their product
portfolio until optimal output of the marginal variety falls to zero. Inspecting Eq.
(1.11) reveals the cannibalization e¤ect, which inuences the scope of production:
@
@X
=   b0e
@c()=@
< 0. Figure 1.1 illustrates the rst-order condition for scope and
determines the prot-maximizing product range.
Open Economy So far, we have implicitly assumed that the o¤shoring costs t
were prohibitively high, so that all production was located in the home country.
As globalization leads to improvements in information technology and reductions in
communication costs, we analyze a decrease in the parameter t, which implies that
rms can enjoy benets of lower factor prices and thus gains from relocating labor-
intensive products to a low-wage location. In our model, the motive for o¤shoring
is e¢ ciency-seeking, which means that the necessary condition for o¤shoring is:
w < w. The su¢ cient condition for o¤shoring is that the o¤shoring costs are below
a critical value: t < tcrit. The critical value of o¤shoring costs can be calculated as
tcrit =
(a0   2beX)(w   w)
ww
. (1.12)
14The second-order condition of this maximization problem is: @
2
@2
= [p ()  c ()]@x()@ < 0, as
@c()
@ > 0 and, thus,
@x()
@ =   12b0(1 e) @c()@ < 0.
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Figure 1.1: Prot Maximizing Product Range
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It is straightforward to see that the critical value of o¤shoring costs is rising in the
wage di¤erential between Home and Foreign.
In the analysis below, we refer to cases in which o¤shoring cost are su¢ ciently low, so
there is a fragmentation of production into domestic and foreign-produced varieties.
We dene e as the cuto¤ variety. For variety e, the rm is indi¤erent concerning
its optimal production location. Varieties with a lower labor input coe¢ cient thane are produced onshore, whereas varieties with a higher labor input coe¢ cient are
produced o¤shore. Combining Eqs. (1.6) and (1.9), gives the optimal scale of a
foreign-produced variety:
x(i) =
a0   w((i) + t)  2b0eX
2b0(1  e) . (1.13)
Given that the marginal variety is produced in Foreign, the prot maximizing prod-
uct range is dened by
w(() + t) = a0   2b0eX. (1.14)
In the open economy, an MPF faces a third maximization problem, next to optimal
scale and scope of production. Now, the rm has also to determine the prot max-
imizing geographic location of production. Analogous to Eq. (1.7), total prots in
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the open economy are given by
 =
eZ
0
(p(i)  c(i))x(i)di+
Z
e
(p(i)  c(i))x(i)di, (1.15)
with the rst integral being total prots from domestic production and the second
integral being the equivalent for foreign production. With Eq. (1.8) and total rm
output X being composed of domestically and foreign-produced goods as
X =
eZ
0
x(i)di+
Z
e
x(i)di, (1.16)
we can rearrange Eq. (1.15):
 = (1  e)b0
264 eZ
0
x(i)2di+
Z
e
x(i)2di
375+ b0eX2. (1.17)
Maximizing Eq. (1.17) with respect to the optimal cuto¤ of production e leads to
x(e) = x(e). (1.18)
Formal details of the derivation can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 1.1 An MPF chooses the optimal cuto¤ level of production e exactly at that
product where optimal scale in Home and in Foreign are the same. Combining Eqs.
(1.9) and (1.13), this means that for variety e the rm is just indi¤erent concerning
the location of production because costs are identical, i.e.
w(e) = w((e) + t). (1.19)
To visualize our analysis, we illustrate the e¤ects of falling o¤shoring costs in Figure
1.2. In Figure 1.2a), production of the whole portfolio is accomplished in Home as
o¤shoring costs are prohibitively high. In Figure 1.2b), o¤shoring cost are below the
critical value in Eq. (1.12). We observe that varieties i 2 [0;e] are still produced in
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Home, as their production is e¢ cient enough, so the benets of lower foreign wages
do not prevail the o¤shoring costs. Production of varieties i 2]e; old[ is relocated,
as these goods can be produced at a lower cost in Foreign. Products i 2]old; [
constitute an extension of the rms product range. The MPF adds these varieties
at the intra-rm extensive margin, whereby these goods would not be o¤ered in case
of producing exclusively in Home. The specication of our model suggests that an
MPF produces exactly those varieties o¤shore, where its e¢ ciency is relatively low.
Figure 1.2: E¤ects of Falling O¤shoring Costs
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We conclude this section with a graphical illustration of the main properties of
our model in Figure 1.3. The graph portrays optimal scale of production for the
entire portfolio across the two production locations. We will use this graph in the
next section as a useful tool in the comparative statics analysis. Figure 1.3 shows
that due to the underlying exible manufacturing technology, output of the core
competence is the highest. At the cuto¤ e xe = x e the rm switches to
foreign production. Therefore, the slope of the curve changes at this point. Finally,
the prot maximizing product range is pinned down at x () = 0.
1.2.3 Comparative Statics
We still assume that t is below its critical value determined in Eq. (1.12), so the
rm engages in foreign production. In the comparative statics, we analyze the e¤ect
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Figure 1.3: Output Schedule
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of better prospects for o¤shoring on the geographic organization (optimal cuto¤)
and on the prot-maximizing product range. Furthermore, we investigate the im-
pact of reduced costs of o¤shoring on the output of domestic and foreign-produced
varieties, as well as on total rm output. These endogenous variables of our model
x(i), x(i), , X, and, e are determined in Eqs. (1.9), (1.13), (1.14), (1.16), and,
(1.19) respectively. Totally di¤erentiating this system of equations generates the
comparative-static e¤ects of decreasing o¤shoring costs t.
Recent academic research on MPFs brings forth varying results on the e¤ects of
globalization on the product range of a rm. A set of papers, including Eckel and
Neary (2010), Bernard et al. (2011), and Mayer et al. (2014) show that MPFs will
reduce their product ranges in response to trade liberalization. Increased competition
forces rms to drop their worst performing products. In Feenstra and Ma (2008),
increasing the market size leads to an expansion of the product range. Very recently,
Qiu and Zhou (2013) show that the most productive rms in an economy may
expand their product scope after globalization. In this chapter, we do not focus
on the competition and market size e¤ects of globalization. Globalization does also
mean that access to foreign production locations is facilitated. Having the latter
interpretation in mind, we can clearly show that the product scope increases in
response to globalization.
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Proposition 1.1 If t is below the critical value determined in Eq. (1.12), falling
o¤shoring costs induce an MPF to add new products at the intra-rm extensive
margin, i.e.
d ln 
d ln t
=   2t
10 () 
< 0, (1.20)
where: 1 = (1  e+ e) > 0 and 2 =

1  e+ e~

.
This result can be visualized in Figure 1.2b). A decrease in t corresponds to a
downward shift of the c-curve, which indicates an extension of the product range.
In a next step, we want to discuss the e¤ects of globalization on the domestic prod-
uct range ~. With respect to the large literature on international production, this
aspect has been neglected so far in theoretical models. We nd that better prospects
for o¤shoring reduce the domestic product range and incentivize a rm to relocate
marginal varieties.
Proposition 1.2 Falling o¤shoring costs make foreign production more attractive
and thus lead to an e¢ ciency-seeking relocation of production from the high-wage
country to the low-wage country, i.e.
d ln ~
d ln t
=
wt
(w   w) 0

~

~
> 0. (1.21)
As the wage rate in the home country w is higher than abroad w, the expression is
strictly positive. The magnitude of this e¤ect can be shown to depend on the point
elasticity of the cost curve at the marginal variety: (~)  0

~

~=

~

. The latter
stands for an inverse measure of exibility of an MPF. High values of (~) imply that
a change in ~ will cause a large change in marginal costs. Hence, the change in the
domestic product range following globalization will be smaller, the stronger domestic
production costs react to a marginal decrease in ~. To see this, we can rewrite Eq.
(1.21) in d ln ~=d ln t = 1=(~) using the indi¤erence condition in Eq. (1.19). In
Figure 1.2b), a decrease in t corresponds to a downward shift of the c (i)-curve,
which is equivalent to shifting production abroad (e falls). Former domestically
produced goods are now produced abroad. Referring to previous discussion, the
e¤ect is less pronounced in the case of steep cost curves.
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So far, we have analyzed within-rm adjustments at the intra-rm extensive margin.
In the next step, we focus on the output proles (intensive margin) of domestically
and foreign-produced varieties. Following a fall in t, o¤shore production gets cheaper
and, therefore, foreign varieties are produced at a larger scale.
Proposition 1.3 If t is below the critical value determined in Eq. (1.12), falling
o¤shoring costs induce the rm to increase outputs of all foreign-produced varieties,
i.e.
d lnx (i)
d ln t
=   w
t
2b0 (1  e)x (i)
2
1
< 0. (1.22)
As an important feature in our model, we emphasize demand linkages between va-
rieties in the product portfolio of a rm. Falling o¤shoring costs do not reduce
domestic production costs but indirectly a¤ect domestic output through the canni-
balization e¤ect. Rising output of foreign production crowds out domestic produc-
tion as domestic varieties internalize the cannibalization e¤ect.
Proposition 1.4 The cannibalization e¤ect induces an MPF to reduce outputs of
all domestically produced varieties in consequence of falling o¤shoring costs, i.e.
d lnx (i)
d ln t
=
e

   ~

1
wt
2b0 (1  e)x (i) > 0. (1.23)
In the case of perfectly di¤erentiated varieties, i.e. e = 0, domestic output is inde-
pendent of foreign production and hence, the derivative in Eq. (1.23) is zero. With
e being positive, varieties become substitutable and domestic output is crowded out
by foreign production. However, it is straightforward to show that despite lower
domestic output, total rm output X is increasing with falling o¤shoring cost. The
positive impact of rising foreign output combined with the extension of the product
range outweighs the negative impact of falling domestic output on total rm scale.
Proposition 1.5 With falling o¤shoring costs, an MPF increases total rm output
because of the higher scale of foreign-produced varieties and the extension of the
product portfolio, i.e.
d lnX
d ln t
=  
w

   ~

t
2b01X
< 0. (1.24)
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Formal details of all the derivations can be found in the Appendix of this chapter.
To illustrate the e¤ects of falling o¤shoring costs, we draw on the graphical tool
developed in Figure 1.3. In Figure 1.4, the dotted line represents the situation after
the reduction in t. Inspecting this graph reveals two negative e¤ects on domestic
production: A relocation e¤ect from shifting production abroad and a cannibaliza-
tion e¤ect from rising foreign output. The latter e¤ect is a new transmission channel
specic to MPFs that we want to highlight. It results from the fact that with lower
production costs abroad, output of foreign varieties and the foreign product range
will increase. These intra-rm adjustments crowd out the production of domestic
varieties, which does not benet from lower production costs abroad. The main
comparative static results are indicated by the arrows in Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.4: Output Schedule and Comparative Statics
i
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1.2.4 Implications for the Measurement of O¤shoring
From a theoretical point of view, the way we are thinking about o¤shoring as a
relocation of production lines within MPFs is novel. However, the manner how
o¤shoring is measured in the broad empirical literature on international production
is similar to our denition. The measure of outsourcing which is used in Feenstra
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and Hanson (1996) is directly related to our denition, as it includes also nal goods
next to imported intermediates. The authors argue that this "must be included in
any valid measure of outsourcing" (Feenstra and Hanson (1996), p.107). Many other
papers that discuss o¤shoring from an empirical perspective use measurements of
o¤shoring that respond not only to a relocation of vertically related processes, but
also respond to what we call multi-product o¤shoring. Papers such as Head and Ries
(2002), Ebenstein et al. (2012), and Becker et al. (2013) measure o¤shoring activity
in an industry by the total employment of foreign a¢ liates. Using employment in
foreign a¢ liates as a measure for o¤shoring is perfectly in-line with our model. To
underline that measuring o¤shoring like this could also mean the type of o¤shoring
that we have in mind, we calculate the total employment in foreign a¢ liates and
show how it responds to better o¤shoring opportunities. In industry z, labor demand
l for foreign-produced varieties is given by
l (z) =
(z)Z
e(z)
(i)x(i)di. (1.25)
It is determined by the scale and scope of foreign-produced varieties i 2 [e; ]. We
derive total labor demand in the o¤shore destination L by integrating over all
industries z 2 (0; 1)
L =
1Z
0
l (z) dz =
1Z
0
(z)Z
e(z)
(i; z)x(i; z)didz. (1.26)
By substituting for x (i) and evaluating the integral, we come up with the following
equation
L =

   ~
 
(a0   2b0eX   wt)0   w00

2b0 (1  e) ; (1.27)
where 0  1 ~
R 
~
 (i) di is the mean labor input of foreign-produced varieties and
00  1 ~
R 
~
 (i)2 di is the second moment around zero of the distribution of labor
requirements. We totally di¤erentiate Eq. (1.27) and analyze again the e¤ects of
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better prospects for o¤shoring:
d lnL
d ln t
=   w
t
2b0 (1  e)L
8<:

   ~

02
1
+
~w

()  

~

(w   w) (~)
9=; < 0. (1.28)
The latter expression clearly indicates that the total employment of foreign a¢ liates
is increasing in falling o¤shoring costs. Therefore, measuring o¤shore activity by
total employment of foreign a¢ liates captures the type of o¤shoring that we have in
mind.
Lemma 1.2 Falling o¤shoring costs increase total employment in the o¤shoring
destination.
1.3 General Equilibrium
The previous section analyzed the e¤ects of falling o¤shoring costs on the product
range, per variety output, total rm output and the optimal location of production.
Up to this point, the approach was partial, since we did not consider endogenous
changes in wages. Our analysis in partial equilibrium clearly yields a fall in domes-
tic production, because, on the one hand, per variety output of domestic varieties
gets crowded out and, on the other hand, varieties close to the cuto¤ are relocated
with falling o¤shoring costs. In the next steps, we focus on new insights into the
labor market e¤ects from o¤shoring, which arise from the framework that we have
presented so far. For this purpose, we introduce a simple labor market and show
how domestic labor demand is a¤ected by multi-product o¤shoring. Subsequently,
we analyze again the comparative statics exercise of falling o¤shoring costs under
consideration of labor market clearing.
1.3.1 Labor Market Clearing
In this section, we turn to the level of the economy as a whole and explore the general
equilibrium e¤ects of falling o¤shoring costs. To simplify the analysis, we assume
that all industries are identical. In a rst step, we need to specify how wages are
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determined. We assume a total labor supply LS, that is supplied inelastically by the
households in Home. Domestic labor demand in industry z is given by
l (z) =
Z e(z)
0
 (i)x (i) di. (1.29)
It is determined by the scale and scope of domestically produced varieties i 2 [0;e].
We derive total labor demand L in our economy by integrating over all industries
z 2 (0; 1):
L =
1Z
0
l (z) dz =
1Z
0
e(z)Z
0
(i; z)x(i; z)didz: (1.30)
Our main interest in this section is to determine the labor market e¤ects of o¤-
shoring. In the previous section we have identied two e¤ects of falling o¤shoring
costs: A relocation e¤ect and a cannibalization e¤ect. The relocation e¤ect a¤ects
the marginal variety e and the cannibalization e¤ect a¤ects the scale of domestic
production x (i). Totally di¤erentiating domestic labor demand in Eq. (1.30) with
respect to t yields:15
dL
dt
= 
e xe de
dt| {z }
relocation e¤ect
+
eZ
0
 (i)
dx (i)
dt
di
| {z }
cannibalization e¤ect
> 0. (1.31)
The rst part of Eq. (1.31) describes the relocation e¤ect and the second part stands
for the cannibalization e¤ect. Latter e¤ect is new and is specic to MPFs. With
falling o¤shoring costs, scale of foreign production rises because of lower production
costs abroad. This behavior cannibalizes domestic production and reduces domestic
labor demand.
Lemma 1.3 For a given domestic wage, falling o¤shoring costs reduce domestic
demand for labor through two channels. A relocation e¤ect leads to a shift of labor-
intensive domestic products abroad. Furthermore, domestic production internalizes
a cannibalization e¤ect of rising foreign output and is crowded out.
15From inspection of propositions 1.2 and 1.4, we know that: d
e
dt > 0 and
dx(i)
dt > 0.
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In equilibrium, wages must adjust to ensure that total labor supply LS equals total
labor demand determined by the cuto¤ of domestic production e in all industries
z 2 (0; 1). This is reected by the following labor-market equilibrium condition for
the home country:
LS =
1Z
0
l (z) dz =
1Z
0
e(z)Z
0
(i; z)x(i; z)didz. (1.32)
We can now substitute for x(i) and evaluate the integral to obtain
LS =
e (a0   2b0eX)0   w00
2b0(1  e) , (1.33)
with 0  1e
R e
0
(i)di being the mean labor input of domestically produced varieties
and 00  1e
R e
0
(i)2di stands for the second moment around zero of the distribu-
tion of labor requirements. Combining Eq. (1.33) with the system of equations
from the analysis in partial equilibrium, we can use the respective equations for
investigating how rm-level adjustments respond to declining o¤shoring costs with
endogenous wages. We derive the comparative statics results by totally di¤erentiat-
ing all equations of the system. Formal details of all the derivations can be found in
the Appendix.
1.3.2 Comparative Statics in General Equilibrium
One important issue in general equilibrium, which we want to analyze in the rst
place, is the e¤ect of better prospects for o¤shoring on domestic factor prices w.
In the previous sections, we have identied two negative impacts of o¤shoring on
domestic labor demand: The relocation and the cannibalization e¤ect. However, in
equilibrium, total labor supply must equal total demand for labor. To ensure this
equality, domestic wages must fall.
Proposition 1.6 With falling o¤shoring costs, ceteris paribus, foreign production
gets more attractive. To ensure labor market clearing in equilibrium, there are ad-
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justments on the labor market in the form of falling domestic wages, i.e.16
w
wt
d lnw
d ln t
=
n
e (w   w) 0

~

   ~

~0 +1w

h
()  

~
i


~
o
> 0.
(1.34)
Considering these labor market adjustments reveals that in general equilibrium
falling o¤shoring costs not only make foreign production cheaper but also reduce
production costs in the home country. The latter has important implications on the
main variables of interest in our model, which we point out in the following.
With lower production costs in both countries, it is apparent that an MPF will
increase its total scale:
d lnX
d ln t
=  
w

   ~

t
2b01X
  w
~0
2b01X
d lnw
d ln t
< 0. (1.35)
The mathematical derivation and an expression where the change in wages is substi-
tuted can be found in the Appendix. Eq. (1.35) is the general equilibrium equivalent
of Eq. (1.24). Comparing both equations immediately points out that due to the ad-
justment of factor prices (represented by the second fraction), the general equilibrium
e¤ect will be of greater magnitude than the partial equilibrium e¤ect (represented
by the rst fraction). Within our framework, a larger rm scale X enhances can-
nibalization between varieties. Caused by falling domestic wages, the latter e¤ect
leads to a new channel that we have to consider when analyzing the repercussions
of falling o¤shoring costs on the product range of a rm. We illustrate this channel
in the following equation:
d ln 
d ln t
=   2t
10 () 
+
ew~0
1w0 () 
d lnw
d ln t
< 0, (1.36)
where the rst part of Eq. (1.36) represents the partial e¤ect, which is clearly
of a negative sign. The second part of Eq. (1.36) is the additional channel in
general equilibrium arising from the adjustment of wages. This e¤ect is positive
16 =
nh
(1  e) + e

   ~
i
~00 + e~
2
2
o
(w   w) 0

~

+ 1

~

w
h
()  

~
i


~

is the determinant of the system of equations. It is positive which ensures that the equilibrium is
unique and stable.
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and, therefore, works in the opposite direction as it induces the rm to increase its
total output X. Inspecting Eq. (1.36) reveals that the general equilibrium e¤ect is
switched o¤ for e being zero. With products being perfectly di¤erentiated, there is
no cannibalization of the rising total rm output X on the marginal varieties within
the product range. However, we can analytically show that the result from partial
equilibrium is reconrmed even for e > 0. Therefore, the adjustments in general
equilibrium only have a dampening e¤ect on the product range, which is driven by
the intensity of cannibalization determined by the di¤erentiation parameter e. A
proof for this result is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 1.7 Falling o¤shoring costs reduce costs in both production sites and
hence enlarge total rm output X to a larger extend compared to partial equilibrium.
Latter result dampens but does not reverse the e¤ect of falling o¤shoring costs on the
product range in general equilibrium. The dampening e¤ect depends on the strength
of cannibalization.
In the next step, we focus our attention on the optimal geographic organization of an
MPF. Regarding the optimal cuto¤ of production, we identify two opposing forces
in general equilibrium following a fall in the parameter t. On the one hand, there
is the direct e¤ect of lower o¤shoring costs, which tends to shift production abroad
(observed e¤ect in partial equilibrium, see Eq. (1.21)). On the other hand, we nd
decreasing domestic wages, which brings forth an inventive to pull back production
into the home country. The latter causes an ambiguity on the total e¤ect of falling
o¤shoring costs in general equilibrium, which can be seen in the following derivative:

wt
d ln ~
d ln t
= 1
00
   e
h
   ~



~

+ ~0
i
0 ? 0. (1.37)
We now focus on this ambiguity and investigate the causes that lie behind it. To
begin with, Eq. (1.37) is positive for e being zero. With perfectly di¤erentiated
products, domestic varieties do not internalize cannibalization through rising out-
puts of foreign varieties (compare Eq. (1.23)). Thus, there is no reducing force
on domestic labor demand via a lower scale of domestically produced varieties (the
cannibalization e¤ect of o¤shoring, stressed in Eq. (1.31)). Thereby, to ensure labor
market clearing, domestic wages will decline less and the wage-e¤ect will not dom-
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inate the better opportunities to o¤shore. With 0 < e < 1, there is the possibility
that Eq. (1.37) gets negative, i.e. with falling o¤shoring costs even more products
are produced in Home. This happens if the general equilibrium adjustment of factor
prices prevails the foreign cost reduction via lower o¤shoring costs.
To get some further intuition for this ambiguity, we investigate the e¤ect of an
exogenous change in domestic wages on domestic output. Di¤erentiating optimal
scale x (i) in Eq. (1.9) with respect to the wage rate w yields:17
d lnx (i)
d lnw
=
w
2b0 (1  e)x (i)
h
ee0  1(i)i
1
7 0. (1.38)
The algebraic sign of Eq. (1.38) behaves ambiguously. Outputs of varieties with a
labor input coe¢ cient (i) far below the average 0 may even fall with falling wages
(i.e. for these varieties d lnx(i)
d lnw
> 0). The reason for this is that varieties, which are
very e¢ cient in production, require just sparse labor input and hence, benet slightly
from falling wages. However, these varieties fully internalize the cannibalization
e¤ect through rising outputs of labor-intensive varieties, which benet a lot from
lower factor prices.18 Latter results imply that varieties benet more from falling
wages the higher is their respective labor input. These insights are important features
of our model, which can help to explain the ambiguous e¤ects of lower o¤shoring
costs on the cuto¤ variety e.
From the total derivatives of our system of equations, we obtain two equations in
d lne
d ln t
and d lnw
d ln t
, given by19
d ln ~
d ln t
=
wt
(w   w) 0

~

~
 
w

~

(w   w) 0

~

~
d lnw
d ln t
? 0 (1.39)
17The interested reader nds the e¤ects of an exogenous change in domestic wages on all en-
dogenous variables in the Appendix.
18The condition for the output of the core competence to fall with falling wages is : (0) <
ee0
1
.
The cuto¤ variety e has the highest labor input coe¢ cient (e) in the domestic product range. The
output of this variety x(e) rises with falling wages: d ln x(e)d lnw < 0.
193 =

(a0   2b0eX)  w(~)

> 0. From the rst-order condition of scope it becomes obvious
that this expression is positive.
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and
d ln ~
d ln t
=  
wt

   ~

e0
13

~
 + w
3

~
  00   e~021
!
d lnw
d ln t
? 0. (1.40)
Eq. (1.39) follows immediately from the determination of the prot maximizing
cuto¤ in Eq. (1.19). Eq. (1.40) is derived after some mathematical conversion from
the labor market clearing condition in Eq. (1.33). Inspecting Eq. (1.39) reveals
that the partial equilibrium result (the rst part of the expression) is more likely
to be reversed, the higher the adjustment in wages is weighted. From the analysis
of Eq. (1.38), we know that varieties with high labor inputs will benet more from
reductions in factor prices. This insight can be reapplied to Eq. (1.39), where we
observe the wage e¤ect to be of greater impact, the higher is the labor input at the
marginal variety 

~

. By analogy, we apply this intuition to Eq. (1.40), where it
becomes apparent that the higher is the mean labor input of domestic production 0,
the more likely the domestic wage reduction outweighs the cost advantage through
lower o¤shoring costs. We summarize these insights in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.8 In partial equilibrium, lower o¤shoring costs t lead to a distinct
fall in e (i.e. d lne
d ln t
> 0). This result does not necessarily hold in general equilibrium,
which implies that it is possible that even more products are produced onshore with
better opportunities of o¤shoring (i.e. d lne
d ln t
< 0). This ambiguity is caused by the
general equilibrium result of falling domestic wages. We show that the result in
partial equilibrium is more likely to be reversed, the higher are the benets of falling
wages in the domestic production.
We conclude this section by illustrating the ambiguity on e in a nd lne
d ln t
, d lnw
d ln t
o
space.
Figure 1.5 illustrates Eqs. (1.39) and (1.40). For Eq. (1.39), the slope is clearly
negative, whereas the slope of Eq. (1.40) depends on the sign of

00  
ee(0)2
1

.
We take away from the graph that the more do domestic wages respond to changes
in the o¤shoring costs, the more likely is a result contrary to the partial equilibrium
case (an intersection of the two curves below the x-axis).
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Figure 1.5: Cuto¤ Variety in General Equilibrium
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By all means d lne
d ln t
< 0, for 00 
ee(0)2
1
, which implies Eq. (1.40) to be horizontal
or to be negatively sloped. If 00 >
ee(0)2
1
, Figure 1.5 illustrates that the algebraic
sign of d lne
d ln t
can be both negative or positive.
In the Appendix, we provide a numerical simulation of our model where we show
that in fact, the result in partial equilibrium can be reversed in general equilib-
rium. Assuming specic parameter values and a linear cost function, we are able to
document that there are cases in which d lne
d ln t
< 0.
1.4 Conclusion
Although globalization of production has been discussed extensively in the literature,
there is not yet a framework to study the relocation of whole varieties within the
boundaries of a rm. In this chapter, we show that the relocation of entire production
lines leads to new insights into the labor market outcomes of o¤shoring. Reversing
the assumptions that processes within a rm are vertically related and that part of
the production of a variety stays in the home country we have highlighted new multi-
product specic transmission channels of o¤shoring. We set up a general oligopolistic
equilibriummodel of MPFs and o¤shoring, which allows us to study the consequences
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of globalization in the sense of declining costs of o¤shoring. We show that better
prospects for o¤shoring a¤ect the geographic organization and the product range of
an MPF. Giving a rm the opportunity to o¤shore the production of labor-intensive
products will lead to a broader product range. Considering the o¤shoring impacts on
domestic employment, we highlight the cannibalization e¤ect of foreign on domestic
output, which hits domestic employment next to the well established relocation
e¤ect. Having wages endogenized, our model suggests ambiguous tendencies on the
cuto¤ of production. The more do domestic wages respond to changes in o¤shoring
costs and the higher are the benets from lower wages in domestic production, the
more likely is an even extended domestic production in an economy with increasing
globalization. Therefore, our model is able to predict patterns in which rms re-
relocate entire product lines following globalization and a decline in o¤shoring costs.
One issue we did not consider in our model is welfare of workers. As our specication
considers domestic production only and consumption takes place on a third market,
workers su¤er from declining wages and do not benet from lower prices of nal
goods. Due to this construction it does not make sense to assess welfare as we can
not make any statements concerning the real wages in our model.
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1.5 Appendix
1.5.1 Proof of Lemma 1.1
In the open economy scenario, an MPF has to determine the prot maximizing
geographic location of production. In the following, we will sketch this maximization
problem. From the rst-order condition for scale in Eq. (1.8), we know:
p(i)  c(i) = b0(1  e)x(i) + b0eX, (1.41)
which inserted in the open economy total prots in Eq. (1.15) leads to

b0
= (1  e)
eZ
0
x(i)2di+ eX
eZ
0
x(i)di+ (1  e)
Z
e
x(i)2di+ eX
Z
e
x(i)di. (1.42)
Given that X =
eR
0
x(i)di +
R
e x
(i)di, we derive Eq. (1.17). To identify a condition
for an optimally chosen cuto¤ variety e, we maximize Eq. (1.17) with respect to e.
This implies the following rst-order condition:
1
b0
d
de = (1  e)
264 eZ
0
2x(i)
dx(i)
de di+
Z
e
2x(i)
dx
de di
375 (1.43)
+(1  e)
h
x(e)2   x(e)2i+ (1  e)x()d
de + 2eX dXde = 0.
With x() = 0, dx(i)
de = dx(i)de =   e1 e dXde , and some mathematical conversion, we
derive
1
b0
d
de = (1  e)
h
x(e)2   x(e)2i = 0. (1.44)
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1.5.2 Comparative Statics in Partial Equilibrium
In the following, we show how to derive the comparative static results of the model.
In our model, the equilibrium is determined by the following system of equations:
w(e) = w((e) + t) (1.45)
x(i) =
a0   w(i)  2b0eX
2b0(1  e) (1.46)
x(i) =
a0   w((i) + t)  2b0eX
2b0(1  e) (1.47)
X =
eZ
0
x(i)di+
Z
e
x(i)di (1.48)
w(() + t) = a0   2b0eX (1.49)
We can reduce this system of equations to two equations in e and . In a rst step,
we substitute Eqs.(1.46) and (1.47) in Eq.(1.48) and derive total output as
X =
1
2b01
8><>:a0   w
eZ
0
 (i) di  w
264 Z
e
 (i) di+ t

   e
375
9>=>; . (1.50)
In a second step, we combine the latter expression with Eq. (1.49), which leads to
w(()+ t) = a0  e
1
8><>:a0   w
eZ
0
 (i) di  w
264 Z
e
 (i) di+ t

   e
375
9>=>; . (1.51)
Eqs. (1.45) and (1.51) constitute two equations in two endogenous variables: e and
. By totally di¤erentiating this system of equations, we derive our results in partial
equilibrium. We show the total derivatives of Eqs. (1.45) and (1.51) in the next
section of this Appendix.
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1.5.3 Comparative Statics in General Equilibrium
In general equilibrium, we add the labor market clearing condition to our system
of equations from the previous section. By substituting Eq. (1.49) into the labor
market clearing condition in Eq. (1.33), we derive
L =
(w(() + t))e0   we00
2b0(1  e) . (1.52)
The combination of Eqs. (1.45), (1.51), and (1.52) determines the general equilib-
rium of our model. In the total derivatives, we take into account that domestic
wages are endogenously determined in the domestic labor market. For deriving the
following results, note that d
de (e0) =  e and dde (e00) =  e2. Totally di¤er-
entiating the three equilibrium conditions Eqs. (1.45), (1.51), and (1.52), with the
results written as a matrix equation, we can analyze a change in the o¤shoring cost
t as follows:2664
0 (w   w) 0

~



~

1 0  e~0
~0 w

h
()  

~
i


~

 ~00
3775
0B@
0()d ln 
td ln t
~d ln ~
wtd ln t
wd lnw
wtd ln t
1CA =
0B@ 1 2
 ~0
1CA . (1.53)
The terms 1 and 2 are dened in Eq. (1.20) and are strictly positive. Using
2 = 
00
   02 , we can show that the determinant of the coe¢ cient matrix  is
positive:
 =
nh
1   e~
i
~00 + e~
2
2
o
(w   w) 0

~

+1

~
2
w
h
()  

~
i
> 0.
(1.54)
In the following, we provide the solutions of the comparative statics exercise, which
we use in the general equilibrium part of our model.
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E¤ect on Domestic Wages:
wd lnw
wtd ln t
=
1


0 (w   w) 0

~

1
1 0  2
~0 w

h
()  

~
i


~

 ~0
 (1.55)
wd lnw
wtd ln t
=
1

n
(w   w) 0

~

e

   ~

~0 +1w

h
()  

~
i


~
o
> 0
(1.56)
E¤ect on Product Range:
0 () d ln 
td ln t
=
1


1 (w   w) 0

~



~

 2 0  e~0
 ~0 w
h
()  

~
i


~

 ~00
 (1.57)
0 () d ln 
td ln t
=   1

0@ nh(1  e) + e   ~i ~00 + e~22o (w   w) 0 ~
+

1

~

  e~0

w
h
()  

~
i


~
 1A < 0
(1.58)
E¤ect on Total Output: Totally di¤erentiating Eq. (1.50) and using information
from Eq. (1.56) yields
2b01X
wt
d lnX
d ln t
=  

   ~

 
~0

8<: (w   w
) 0

~

e

   ~

~0
+1w

h
()  

~
i


~
 9=; < 0. (1.59)
E¤ect on Cuto¤Variety:
~d ln ~
wtd ln t
=
1


0 1 

~

1  2  e~0
~0  ~0  ~00
 (1.60)
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Using again 2 = 
00
   02 , we derive the following result:
d ln ~
wtd ln t
=
1


1
00
   e
h
   ~



~

+ ~0
i
0

? 0. (1.61)
1.5.4 E¤ects of an Exogenous Change in Domestic Wages
This section keeps o¤shoring costs t constant and considers responses of the system
of endogenously determined variables in Eqs. (1.9), (1.13), (1.14), (1.16), and (1.19)
to changes in the domestic wage rate. Totally di¤erentiating this system of equations
generates the following comparative statics results. It is apparent that with falling
domestic wages total rm output will increase, i.e.
d lnX
d lnw
=   w
e0
2b01X
< 0. (1.62)
This e¤ect gets larger the more domestic varieties benet from falling wages, i.e. the
higher is 0, and the more domestic varieties are produced onshore, i.e. the higher
is e.
Changes in domestic factor prices clearly a¤ect the cuto¤variety e as it is determined
by the equality of production costs on- and o¤shore. With Home becoming a more
attractive production site, more varieties will be manufactured domestically, i.e.
d lne
d lnw
=   w
(w   w)
(e)
0
ee < 0. (1.63)
Akin to the previous result, we nd that this e¤ect gets stronger the more the cuto¤
variety benets from falling wages in terms of a higher marginal labor requirement
(e). With varieties not being perfectly di¤erentiated (i.e. e > 0), foreign scale gets
crowded out
d lnx (i)
d lnw
=
w
2b0 (1  e)x (i)
ee0
1
> 0, (1.64)
and the product range decreases as marginal varieties undergo cannibalization
d ln 
d lnw
=
eew0
1w0()
> 0. (1.65)
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Figure 1.6: Exogenous Decrease in Domestic Wages
i
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The cannibalization e¤ect becomes stronger the more domestic production benets
from falling wages (i.e. the higher e and 0). Figure 1.6 illustrates all e¤ects.
1.5.5 Numerical Example with a Linear Cost Function
In this section, we round down our analysis in general equilibrium with a numerical
simulation, where we focus on the ambiguity of the e¤ect of falling o¤shoring costs
t on the cuto¤ variety ~. For specic parameter values and a linear cost function,
Table 1.1 summarizes results for di¤erent degrees of product di¤erentiation. Results
once again underline the issue of cannibalization in this framework. We observe a
falling total rm output X and a falling product range  with rising substitutability
between varieties (higher values of e). Referring to proposition 1.8 in the main body,
it is important to mention that Table 1.1 shows a specic case where partial equilib-
rium results with respect to the cuto¤ variety e get reversed in general equilibrium,
i.e. de
dt
< 0. In this parameterization with an underlying linear cost function, we nd
more varieties being produced onshore with falling o¤shoring costs. As explained be-
fore, this result is due to the prevailing e¤ect of falling domestic wages in comparison
to the better prospects for o¤shoring.
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Table 1.1: Numerical Example with a Linear Cost Function
Product di¤erentiation e w X e  de
dt
d
dt
0:1 8:70 121:73 1:36 22:13  0:688  0:495
0:5 8:14 36:13 1:77 8:86  1:081  0:003
0:9 9:01 22:96 1:14 2:91  0:370  0:143
Notes: Parameter values are: a0 = 100, b0 = 2, LW = 20, w = 3:5, and t = 2:5.
For this calculation, we assume a linear cost function:  (i) = 0 + 1i = 1 + 0:5i.
Lemma 1.4 By assuming a linear cost function within this framework, we can show
that there is the possibility that an MPF produces even more varieties domestically
when it faces better prospects for o¤shoring.
Chapter 2
Product versus Process:
Innovation Strategies of
Multi-Product Firms
2.1 Introduction
Successful manufacturing rms continuously innovate to maintain their position in
the market and to attend consumersdemand. Recent contributions in the interna-
tional trade literature emphasize the importance of intra-rm adjustments through
innovation in explaining welfare gains from trade liberalization, besides the well-
established intra-industry gains from entry and exit of rms. This literature intro-
duces innovation as a new dimension into the relationship between exporting and
productivity: Better access to foreign markets leads to higher productivity through
R&D in more sophisticated manufacturing technologies.1 Consequently, innovation
0This chapter is based on joint work with Lisandra Flach. When working on this chapter,
we have beneted from comments by Carsten Eckel, Jennifer Poole, and participants at the IO
and Trade Seminar at the University of Munich and the Workshop "Internationale Wirtschafts-
beziehungen" in Goettingen 2014.
1Lileeva and Treer (2010) as well as Bustos (2011) reveal that following a tari¤ cut rms in-
crease their investments in technology. Lileeva and Treer (2010) use tari¤ cuts associated with the
US-Canadian free trade agreement and show that Canadian rms increased labor productivity and
used more sophisticated manufacturing technologies. Furthermore, the access to a larger market
induced rms to engage more in product innovation. For Argentinean rms, Bustos (2011) nds
an increase in innovation expenditures by 0.20 to 0.28 log points following the average reduction
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and productivity improvements within the rm account for a large fraction of pro-
ductivity gains at the industry level.2 Moreover, variety-loving consumers benet
not only from new products of entering rms but rst and foremost from product
innovation by incumbent rms.3 Therefore, understanding innovation strategies and
within-rm adjustments of multi-product rms (MPFs) is crucial for the analysis of
aggregate productivity and variety gains.
MPFs account for the majority of trade ows and are omnipresent in all industries.
In terms of innovation activities, their investments account for a large fraction of
aggregate changes in industry-level productivity and product variety (Bernard et
al. (2010), Broda and Weinstein (2010), Lileeva and Treer (2010), Bustos (2011)).
However, with the exception of Dhingra (2013) (which is discussed later in detail),
innovation in trade models happens only in one dimension, whereas in reality rms
face a trade-o¤ between investments in cost reduction and product variety. This
raises the question of how and why rms in di¤erent industries make their choices
between di¤erent types of innovation, with di¤erent implications in terms of welfare
gains within industries.
The contribution of this chapter is to investigate, theoretically and empirically, the
innovation strategies of MPFs, focusing on within-rm adjustments. We evaluate a
framework with demand and cost linkages in which rms face a trade-o¤ between
product and process innovation. Crucially, such linkages are only present in an MPF
setting. Firms may decide to expand their product range or to lower production
costs, and the net e¤ect in terms of returns to innovation is a priori unclear.
In a simple model of MPFs, we show that returns to product and process innovation
are industry-specic and uncover a mechanism related to the degree of product
di¤erentiation that explains this relation. On the one hand, by introducing new
products rms internalize demand linkages, which may reduce demand for its own
varieties. On the other hand, as a novel feature of our model, by investing in process
in Brazils tari¤s.
2Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013) show for Spanish rms that investments in R&D are the
primary source of productivity growth. Within sectors, between 65 percent and 90 percent of
productivity growth arises through intra-rm productivity enhancing activities.
3Recent evidence of US bar code data in Broda and Weinstein (2010) highlights the importance
of this channel. They show that at a four-year period, 82 percent of product creation happens within
existing rms. Therefore only 18 percent of total household expenditure is on products of entering
rms.
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innovation rms may internalize intra-rm spillover e¤ects between production lines.
To understand the role played by the degree of di¤erentiation in this mechanism,
consider two rms in sectors with di¤erent scope for product di¤erentiation. A rm
producing multiple products in a homogeneous industry has rather low returns from
investing in new products as doing so may crowd out demand for its own products.
This e¤ect is known as the cannibalization e¤ectin the literature. On the other
hand, investments in process-optimizing technologies may generate a larger return,
since the benets from spillover e¤ects across production lines are larger. With
more similar production processes, the knowledge learned in the production process
of more homogeneous products is applicable to a large fraction on the entire product
portfolio. For rms in highly di¤erentiated industries, the mechanism works exactly
the other way round.
Our theoretical model builds on Eckel and Neary (2010) and Eckel et al. (2011).
Each rm produces a bundle of products which are linked on the cost side by a
exible manufacturing technology. The latter captures the idea that - besides a core
competence - MPFs can expand their portfolio with varieties that are less e¢ cient
in production.4 However, our theory introduces several novel features. First, we
explicitly allow for two types of R&D. Therefore, we assign xed costs to additional
products to model the decision on optimal scope closer to the notion of product
innovation. Second, rms can invest in product-specic process innovation. Process
innovation is costly and reects economies of scale, such that rms invest more in
optimizing technology of large-scale varieties close to their core competence. Third,
another novel feature of our framework is to allow for spillover e¤ects between the
production processes within the rm. We relate the strength of these cost linkages to
the degree of product di¤erentiation in a sector. This occurs because products that
are closer substitutes tend to have more similar production processes (in comparison
to highly di¤erentiated products).
Our framework has important implications for understanding how rms react to
trade openness and to changes in market size. In particular, the model provides two
main testable predictions. (1) We show that, following an increase in market size,
rms invest more in innovation. As process innovation reects economies of scale,
4The idea that rms possess a core competency is also featured in models with MPFs by
Arkolakis and Muendler (2010), Qiu and Zhou (2013), and Mayer et al. (2014).
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access to a larger market promotes technology upgrading. Furthermore, access to
larger markets reduce the perceived costs of product innovation, which encourages
MPFs to extend their product scope. (2) However, in our framework, demand and
cost linkages related to the degree of product di¤erentiation determine returns to
innovation. We show that in highly di¤erentiated industries, the cannibalization
e¤ect is lower and, therefore, rms invest more in product innovation. In homoge-
neous industries, rms internalize higher intra-rm spillover e¤ects and invest more
in process innovation.
The predictions from the model are tested using detailed rm-level data, which has
two distinctive features. First, we can exploit detailed information on innovation
investments by rms in the period 1998-2000. Second, the event of a major and
unexpected exchange rate devaluation in January 1999 provides an important source
of exogenous variation. The currency devaluation made Brazilian products more
competitive at home and abroad and, therefore, the shock may be interpreted as
an increase in market size. Moreover, we are interested in how rms in di¤erent
industries reacted to the exchange rate shock, in order to test prediction (2) from
the model. To tackle this issue empirically, we use information on di¤erent types of
innovation combined with the degree of di¤erentiation of the industry.
Our empirical results reveal that rms increased their innovation e¤orts in both
product and process innovation following the exchange rate devaluation. However,
detailed information on the degree of di¤erentiation and on the types of innovation
conducted by rms allows us to evaluate di¤erential e¤ects across industries. Using
a continuous measure of the degree of di¤erentiation in an industry, we show that
rms in more di¤erentiated industries invest more in product innovation, while rms
in more homogeneous industries invest more in process innovation. Our results
are robust to di¤erent measures of the degree of di¤erentiation, hold for di¤erent
estimation strategies (we estimate the incidence of innovation using probit, linear
probability model, and seemingly unrelated regression), and remain stable when
adding several control variables.
This chapter is closely related to the literature on MPFs in international trade that
features a cannibalization e¤ect.5 Our theory builds on Eckel et al. (2011), who
5Eckel and Neary (2010) and Dhingra (2013) introduce cannibalization e¤ects. However, this
feature is not considered in many recent models of MPFs that assume monopolistic competition.
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incorporate an endogenous investment in product quality in the framework by Eckel
and Neary (2010). We abstract from investments in quality and instead focus on
investments in product and process innovation. The paper that is closest in spirit to
ours is Dhingra (2013), who also considers an innovation trade-o¤of MPFs. Dhingra
(2013) proposes a model of MPFs with intra-brand cannibalization that induces a
distinction between the returns to product and process innovation. Her framework
explains how rms react to trade liberalization in terms of innovation investments.
Following a trade liberalization, rms face higher competition from foreign rms and,
therefore, reduce investments in product innovation to mitigate internal competition
(cannibalization e¤ect). On the other hand, rms increase investments in process
innovation because of economies of scale. In contrast to her theoretical framework,
we build a framework with demand and cost linkages to evaluate heterogeneous
responses of rms in di¤erent industries. Moreover, using detailed rm-level data,
we test the predictions from the model. In terms of the way we model innovation,
the key di¤erences between our analysis and that of Dhingra (2013) are that we
(1) allow for exible manufacturing and (2) introduce cost linkages related to the
degree of di¤erentiation that generate spillover e¤ects within the rm. Therefore,
our model is able to generate novel predictions regarding the two types of innovation
depending on the degree of di¤erentiation of the industry.
This chapter is also related to the literature emphasizing the complementary be-
tween market size and innovation behavior of rms that leads to gains from trade.
Since innovation is costly, changes in market size tend to encourage rms to incur
these costs because of scale e¤ects. Models such as Grossman and Helpman (1991)
investigate the gains from trade arising from innovation investments in a setting with
homogeneous rms. At the rm-level, several papers have investigated the relation
between changes in market size and innovation. Lileeva and Treer (2010) inves-
tigate theoretically and empirically how changes in market size encouraged rms
to innovate. Using responses of Canadian plants to the elimination of U.S. tari¤s,
they nd that plants more induced by the tari¤ cuts increase more their invest-
ments in innovation. Yeaple (2005), Verhoogen (2008), Bustos (2011), and Aw et al.
(2011) assess further channels that relate market size with rm-level innovation and
within-rm adjustments.
One exception is the model proposed by Feenstra and Ma (2008).
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2.2 The Model
Our theory draws on a simple model of MPFs that choose their optimal spending on
product and process innovation. Both types of innovation are costly and, therefore,
rms weight the returns to innovation against the costs. The returns to innovation
are in the focus of this chapter and constitute the main testable predictions from the
model. First, we show that the returns to product and process innovation are higher
in a larger market. Second, we point out that rms in sectors with homogeneous
products focus on optimizing production processes while rms in more di¤erentiated
industries concentrate on innovating new products. These innovation patterns follow
from demand and cost linkages, both related to the degree of product di¤erentia-
tion in a sector. Since these linkages determine the returns to innovation, we will
introduce them at the very outset.
We begin with a detailed analysis of consumer behavior and the underlying preference
structure in section 2.2.1. In this part, we show how the demand linkages enter our
framework and relate them to the degree of product di¤erentiation in a sector. In
section 2.2.2, we present the rm side of the model. We start with the production
cost function, which is characterized by exible manufacturing. Moreover, rms
can undertake investments in process innovation to reduce production costs of a
product, which may generate spillovers between production lines. We refer to this
feature as a cost linkage and argue that its strength decreases in the degree of product
di¤erentiation. Firms consider both linkages when maximizing their prots. Finally,
section 2.2.3 derives the equilibrium of the model and establishes the main testable
predictions from the theory.
2.2.1 Consumer Behavior: Preferences and Demand
Our economy consists of L consumers who maximize their utility over the consump-
tion of a homogeneous and a di¤erentiated good. To be more specic, we assume
that consumers buy a set 
 of goods out of a potential set e
 of the di¤erentiated
product. Our specication of preferences follows Eckel et al. (2011), though we
add an additional numeraire good and assume a quasi-linear utility in the following
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form:6
U = q0 + u1, (2.1)
where q0 is the consumption of the homogeneous good. We conduct our analysis in
partial equilibrium where the outside good absorbs any income e¤ects. Utility over
the di¤erentiated variety is dened in a standard quadratic function as follows
u1 = aQ  1
2
b

(1  e)
Z
i2e
 q(i)
2di+ eQ2

, (2.2)
where a and b represent non-negative preference parameters. In this specication,
q (i) denotes per variety consumption and Q  R
i2e
 q(i)di stands for total consump-
tion of the representative consumer. The parameter e plays a very important role in
our model and describes the degree of product di¤erentiation. We assume that e lies
strictly between zero and one and dene the parameter as an inverse measure for
product di¤erentiation. This means that lower values of e imply more di¤erentiated
and hence less substitutable products. Throughout the analysis, we will distinguish
industries along the degree of product di¤erentiation. We simply refer to a homo-
geneous industry as an industry with a relatively high value of e. Accordingly, a
di¤erentiated industry means an industry with a value of e close to zero. A detailed
discussion of the role of the parameter e in our model will follow later on in the
analysis.
Consumers maximize utility subject to the budget constraint q0 +
R
i2e
 p(i)q(i)di =
I. Hence, individual income I is spent on consumption of the outside good and
the potential basket e
 of the di¤erentiated good. p (i) is the price of variety i
and the numeraire good is sold at a price p0 = 1. We assume that consumers
demand a positive amount of the outside good q0 > 0 to ensure consumption of the
di¤erentiated good. Maximizing utility and aggregating individual demand functions
yields a linear market demand:7
p(i) = a  b0 [(1  e)x(i) + eX] . (2.3)
6The preferences in Eckel et al. (2011) capture an additional component adressing the utility
which accrues from consuming goods of higher quality.
7Given the quasi-linear upper-tier utility, there is no income e¤ect, thereby implying that the
marginal utility of income  = 1.
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We dene 
  e
 as the subset of varieties which is actually consumed. x (i) de-
scribes the market demand for variety i and consists of the aggregated demand of
all consumers Lq (i) for that specic variety. X  R
i2
 x(i)di is the total volume
of consumption of all di¤erentiated goods. Furthermore, a describes the demand
intercept and b0  b
L
denes an inverse measure for the size of the market. Direct
demand of variety i is given by
x (i) =
a
b0 (1  e+ e)  
1
b0 (1  e)p (i) +
e
b0 (1  e+ e) (1  e)p, (2.4)
where  describes the measure of consumed varieties in 
. The average price of
di¤erentiated varieties in the economy is given by p = 1=
R
i2
 p (i) di.
As demand linkages will play a crucial role in our model, we conclude this section
by analyzing how the degree of product di¤erentiation a¤ects the cross elasticity
between any two varieties and the price elasticity of demand. The cross elasticity of
variety i with respect to variety j is given by "i;j  j(@x (i) =@x (j)) (x (j) =x (i))j =
ex (j) = (1  e)x (i). It is straightforward to see that "i;j is higher in more homoge-
neous sectors. For a rm this means: The closer is the substitutability between its
varieties, the more does the output of any additional variety reduce the demand for
the other products within its portfolio (i.e. the stronger are the demand linkages in
a sector).
In addition to the cross elasticities, we also compute the price elasticity of demand to
relate e to our empirical measure of di¤erentiation. The empirical part of this chap-
ter uses the Khandelwal (2010) classication as the preferred measure for product
di¤erentiation. This measure is created by evaluating changes in prices conditional
on market shares: A product is classied as more di¤erentiated if the rm can in-
crease prices without losing market shares. To connect this to our theoretical model,
we compute the price elasticity of demand and show how it responds to a change
in the degree of di¤erentiation in a sector. Given the linear demand system in Eq.
(2.3), there exists an upper bound of the price, where demand x(i) is just driven to
zero:
pmax  (1  e) a+ ep
(1  e+ e) . (2.5)
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Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), we express the price elasticity of demand as
"i 
@x (i)@p (i) p (i)x (i)
 = p (i)(pmax   p (i)) , (2.6)
by combining Eqs. (2.4) and (2.5). Inspecting the latter expression claries the
role of the degree of product di¤erentiation e in determining the demand linkages
in our model. It can easily be shown that, ceteris paribus, the choke price pmax
decreases and, therefore, the price elasticity "i increases when products become more
homogeneous.
@pmax
@e
jp;=const=    (a  p)
(1  e+ e)2 < 0. (2.7)
This implies that the parameter e in our theoretical model is closely related to the
Khandelwal (2010) measure of di¤erentiation which we use in the empirical part of
our analysis.
2.2.2 Firm Behavior: Optimal Product and Process Inno-
vation
In this section, we consider technology and optimal rm behavior. To keep the
analysis as simple as possible, we rely on the monopoly case (since we focus on
intra-rm adjustments, competition between rms plays only a second-order role).
We construct a theoretical model in which MPFs optimally choose between two types
of investment. Firstly, rms invest in new product lines and thereby extend their
product portfolio. Secondly, rms may decide for each of their products how much to
invest in the production technology. Both types of investment depend on the degree
of product di¤erentiation through the demand and cost linkages taken into account
by a rm. In the previous section, we have already introduced the demand linkages
into our model. We argue that the demand linkages in particular determine the
returns to product innovation. While deciding on the optimal number of products,
the rm considers the negative impact of the marginal good on the demand for the
rest of its products. Hence, the more similar are the products within the portfolio,
the stronger will be the cannibalization e¤ect of the marginal variety. Consequently,
we show that the optimal product range will be smaller in a homogeneous sector.
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As a novel feature of our model, we introduce cost linkages and relate them to the
degree of product di¤erentiation. In particular, the strength of the cost-linkages
determines the returns to process innovation in our model. Firms may decide for
each product how much to invest. However, we argue that there are intra-rm
spillover e¤ects between the varieties. This means that a rm can use parts of the
process R&D of one product for other products in its portfolio. To which extent
product-specic R&D is applicable to other processes depends on the similarity of
production processes and, therefore, on the degree of product di¤erentiation. Thus,
rms in homogeneous sectors will invest more in process innovation as they can
internalize more spillovers between production lines.
Production Technology Production is characterized by exible manufacturing.
We follow Eckel and Neary (2010) and assume that rms have a core competence i =
0, which denotes the product where the rm is most e¢ cient in production. Besides
the core variety, an MPF can produce additional varieties with rising marginal costs.
Production costs for variety i without investments are given by c (i) = c + c1i. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume a linear cost function, though this is not required
to derive our results.
Firms can reduce production costs through variety specic process innovation. Fur-
thermore, we allow for investment spillovers between products. To reduce produc-
tion costs of variety i, a rm undertakes process innovation k (i) which reduces
production costs at a diminishing rate. The variety specic costs savings from in-
novation are given by 2k (i)0:5. As mentioned earlier, part of the process optimiza-
tion of one variety is applicable to all other varieties, which implies that produc-
tion of variety i benets from all investments undertaken on all the other products
K i 
R

ni k (i)
0:5 di. The degree to which knowledge is applicable to other products
depends on the spillover parameter  (e) 2 (0; 1). The spillover parameter  depends
on the degree of product di¤erentiation e because of the assumption that spillovers
are larger in a more homogeneous sector. We will dene a functional form for this
parameter later on in the analysis.
Considering these aspects, production costs of variety i are given by:
c (i) = c+ c1i 
 
2k (i)0:5 + 2 (e)K i

: (2.8)
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This can be rearranged to
c (i) = c+ c1i 
 
2 (1   (e)) k (i)0:5 + 2 (e)K , (2.9)
where in analogy to X, K =
R 
0
k (i)0:5 di denotes total investment in process inno-
vation.
Prot Maximization In our setup, an MPF simultaneously chooses optimal scale
x (i) and process innovation k (i) per product as well as optimal product scope .
Process innovation is carried out at a rate rk and product innovation requires building
a new production line at a rate r. Total prots are given by:
 =
Z 
0

p(i)  c  c1i+ 2 (1   (e)) k (i)0:5 + 2 (e)K

x(i)di 
Z 
0
rkk (i) di  r.
(2.10)
Optimal Scale: Maximizing prots in Eq. (2.10) with respect to scale x (i) implies
the following rst-order condition:8
@
@x(i)
= p(i)  c  c1i+ 2 (1   (e)) k (i)0:5 + 2 (e)K   b0 (1  e)x (i)  b0eX = 0.
(2.11)
Using the inverse demand in Eq. (2.3) and solving for x (i) yields optimal scale of
variety i:
x(i) =
a  c  c1i+ 2 (1   (e)) k (i)0:5 + 2 (e)K   2b0eX
2b0(1  e) . (2.12)
Furthermore, we derive total rm scale X by integrating over x (i) in Eq. (2.12):
X =

 
a  c  c1 2

+ 2 (1   (e) +  (e) )K
2b0(1  e+ e) . (2.13)
Inspection of Eq. (2.12) reveals the two opposing linkage e¤ects arising from the
degree of product di¤erentiation in a sector. On the one hand, there is a demand
8The second-order condition is negative: @
2
@x(i)2
=  2b0 < 0.
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linkage (cannibalization) of total rms scale X on the output of a single variety
@x (i)
@X
=   e
1  e < 0, (2.14)
whereby the negative impact increases in e. On the other hand, with rising values
of e the cost linkages (spillovers) from other varieties become more prominent:
@x (i)
@K
=
 (e)
b0 (1  e) > 0. (2.15)
As a result of the underlying cost structure with exible manufacturing, optimal
scale of the core product is the largest, and output per variety diminishes with
distance to the core product. We illustrate the output scheme in Figure 2.1, where
0  indicates the di¤erence in scale between the core and marginal product in the
portfolio. The exact mathematical expression for 0  is determined later on in the
analysis.
Figure 2.1: Output Schedule
( )ix
i
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Substituting optimal scale in Eq. (2.12) into the inverse demand gives the optimal
pricing schedule, with the lowest price charged for the core product:
p(i) =
1
2

a+ c+ c1i  2 (1   (e)) k (i)0:5   2 (e)K

. (2.16)
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The latter explains why the output of the core competency is sold at the highest
scale. Finally, the price-cost margin for variety i is given by:
p (i)  c (i) = a  c  c1i+ 2 (1   (e)) k (i)
0:5 + 2 (e)K
2
. (2.17)
Optimal Process Innovation: Firms can invest in cost-reducing process innovation
for each product in the portfolio. At the optimum, direct savings through lower
production costs plus indirect savings from spillovers on other products are equal to
the rate of innovation costs rk:
@
@k(i)
= (1   (e)) k (i) 0:5 x (i) +  (e) k (i) 0:5X   rk = 0. (2.18)
Solving for optimal investments in variety i yields:9
k (i) =

(1   (e))x (i) +  (e)X
rk
2
. (2.19)
Eq. (2.19) shows that optimal investment reects economies of scale through both
per variety output x (i) and total rm output X. Given that the output of the core
variety is the highest, a rm will put most e¤ort in optimizing the production process
of this variety.10 However, the rst-order condition in Eq. (2.19) implies that the
larger the spillovers  (e) on other products within the rm, the more equally a rm
spreads investments across products. In the extreme case of  (e) = 1, investment
levels are the same across products.
Lemma 2.1 Firms concentrate investments in process innovation on their core com-
petencies, since process innovation reects economies of scale. However, the invest-
ment levels across varieties become more similar in more homogeneous sectors due
to higher spillover e¤ects.
9The second-order condition is given by: @
2
@k(i)2 =  0:5

k (i)
 1:5
(1   (e))x (i) +  (e)X

<
0, and is negative as required.
10Evidence for economies of scale at the product level can be found in Lileeva and Treer (2010).
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Finally, we substitute Eq. (2.12) into Eq. (2.19) and integrate over the expression.
This gives total rm investment in process innovation
K 
Z 
0
k (i)0:5 di =
(1   (e))

a  c  c1 22

+ 2b0( (e)  e)X
2 (b0rk(1  e)  (1   (e)) (1   (e) +  (e) )) . (2.20)
Optimal Product Innovation: Choosing optimal product scope means balancing
the benets of the marginal variety against the innovation costs. The rst-order
condition for scope is given by:
@
@
= [p()  c ()]x() +   b0ex () + 2 (e) k ()0:5X   rkk ()  r = 0, (2.21)
where c () = c + c1   2 (1   (e)) k ()0:5   2 (e)K. In our framework with both
cost and demand linkages, the marginal benet of a product is determined by the
negative externality on all other products (cannibalization) and the positive exter-
nality (spillovers in process innovation).11
[p()  c ()]x()| {z }
Revenue
+f( b0ex ())| {z }
Cannibalization
+
 
2 (e) k ()0:5
| {z }
Spillover
gX =r + rkk ()| {z }
Inn. Costs
(2.22)
In the decision to optimize the product range, an MPF takes into account that
an additional product lowers the prices consumers are willing to pay for all other
products. This aspect is captured by the term "Cannibalization" in Eq. (2.22). The
term "Spillover" in Eq. (2.22) reects the fact that there are spillovers from the
marginal product on all other varieties. Hence, at this point it seems plausible to
make a restriction on the parameter values which determines the net e¤ect of the
two linkages.
Condition 2.1 In Eq. (2.22), the net impact of the marginal variety on all other
varieties is determined by the strength of the two linkages in our model. It is plausible
to assume that the net impact of the marginal product on all varieties is negative.
11The second-order condition is given by: @
2
@2
=
h
 c1   2

b0ex ()  2 (e) k ()0:5
i
x() < 0.
To see that this condition is negative as required, consider Condition 2.1.
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Therefore, we restrict the parameters as follows:
b0rk >
2 (e) ((1   (e))x () +  (e)X)
ex ()
. (2.23)
This condition implies that the perceived cost of process innovation may not be too
low. We refer to b0rk as the perceived costs of process innovation, as this term relates
the market size to the innovation costs. Therefore, the perceived costs can fall (1)
if rk decreases or (2) if the market size L increases (recall that: b0  bL). We argue
that this restriction of parameters ensures realistic properties within our framework.
If process innovation would be too "cheap", rms would increase product scope only
to benet from spillovers from the investment in the marginal variety. The latter
does not seem to be a realistic optimal rm behavior.
In the following, we express a rms optimal scope in terms of scale of the marginal
product x (). To do so, we substitute the output of the marginal variety from
Eq. (2.12) and its respective price-cost margin from Eq. (2.17) into the rst-order
condition for scope (2.21):
x () =
s
rkk () + r   2 (e) k ()0:5X
b0 (1  e) . (2.24)
Considering again Figure 2.1, the latter expression can be interpreted as follows:
The lower is the output of the marginal variety , the larger is the product range
o¤ered by the rm.
To provide some further insights into our model, we combine the rst-order condi-
tions for scale and scope in Eqs. (2.12) and (2.24), to derive an alternative expression
for optimal scale:
x (i) =
c1 (   i) + 2 (1   (e))
 
k (i)0:5   k ()0:5
2b0(1  e) +
s
rkk () + r   2 (e) k ()0:5X
b0 (1  e) .
(2.25)
It is straightforward to see that this expression boils down to Eq. (2.24) by setting
i =  for the marginal variety. Furthermore, we can use this expression to calculate
the di¤erence in scale of the core (i = 0) versus the marginal variety , illustrated
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in Figure 2.1:
0  =
c1
2

b0(1  e)  (1 (e))2
rk
 . (2.26)
Since the underlying technology is exible manufacturing, the di¤erence in output
increases in the product range . The larger is the distance to the core product, the
lower will be the e¢ ciency of the marginal product. The latter e¤ect is magnied
for higher values of c1, as this variable determines how much marginal costs increase
with rising distance to the core product. Moreover, 0  decreases in the strength
of the spillovers  (e). As stated in Lemma 2.1, rms concentrate their investment
in process R&D on the core varieties. However, if spillover e¤ects are large, the
marginal varieties benet more from the investments in the high-scale core varieties.
Lemma 2.2 The di¤erence in scale between the core and the marginal variety is
determined by the di¤erence in production costs of the two varieties. The productivity
of the marginal product falls with distance to the core product and rises in the degree
of spillovers.
2.2.3 Comparative Statics
In the previous section, we established the baseline theoretical framework. In the
next step, we derive the main predictions that we test in the empirical section. To
start with, we analyze the e¤ects of an increase in the market size L (lower values
of b0) on optimal investment levels. Furthermore, we investigate optimal investment
strategies in sectors with di¤erent degrees of product di¤erentiation. To derive our
results, we follow the solution path in Eckel and Neary (2010), and express the
equilibrium equations in terms of X and  only. Moreover, as already mentioned,
we dene a functional form for the spillover parameter  (e):
 (e) = e. (2.27)
Figure 2.2 illustrates this functional form and the role of  in determining the
strength of spillovers.
Since e 2 [0; 1]; lower values of  translate into a stronger spillover e¤ect. In the
extreme case of  = 0, the total investment in one variety is applicable on all
CHAPTER 2. PRODUCT VERSUS PROCESS INNOVATION 60
Figure 2.2: Spillover Parameter
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varieties within the rm. Obviously, we derive the same result in an industry with
no product di¤erentiation (i.e. e = 1). Letting  grow large decreases the importance
of spillovers within the rm.
Equilibrium In this section, we derive the equilibrium equations of the model
applying the functional form of spillovers in Eq. (2.27). Combining Eqs. (2.13) and
(2.20), we derive total rm scale as:
X =

 
a  c  c1 2

2

b0(1  e+ e)  (1 e+e)2
rk
 . (2.28)
The term (1 e
+e)2
rk
reects cost-savings from process innovation, which induces
a rm to increase total rm scale X. Clearly, the strength of the latter e¤ect is
mitigated by the costs for process innovation rk. Plugging Eq. (2.28) back into Eq.
(2.20) yields total process innovation as:
K =
(1  e + e)
rk
X. (2.29)
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The parameter  determines the strength of spillovers, where total process innovation
is the largest for  = 0. Inspecting Eqs. (2.28) and (2.29) in detail reveals that
investments in process innovation decrease with rising levels of , i.e. @K
@
< 0.
Furthermore, process innovation K reects economies of scale as it depends on total
rm scale X. Using information from Eqs. (2.19), (2.28), and (2.29) together with
Eq. (2.12), we can express optimal scale per variety as:
x (i) =
a  c  c1i  2

b0e  e(2(1 e)+e)
rk

X
2

b0(1  e)  (1 e)2
rk
 . (2.30)
Within our framework, we have two opposing e¤ects of total scale X on per variety
output. On the one hand, rising total output induces the rm to invest more in
process innovation, which increases per variety output. On the other hand, rising
total scale intensies cannibalization within the portfolio. The latter e¤ect reduces
per variety output. However, Condition 2.1 stated in Eq. (2.23) guarantees that the
spillover e¤ect cannot dominate the cannibalization e¤ect, i.e. @x(i)
@X
< 0.
Finally, substituting from Eq. (2.19) into Eq. (2.24), we express the rst-order
condition for scope as:
x () =
vuuut r   (eX)2rk
b0 (1  e)  (1 e)2
rk
 . (2.31)
The formal derivation of this expression is presented in the Appendix. Eq. (2.31)
implicitly denes product scope  in terms of the output of the marginal variety.
Solving for  gives the explicit expression for product scope:
 =
a  c  2
r
b0 (1  e)  (1 e)2
rk

r   e2X2rk

  2

b0e  2e(1 e)
rk

X
c1   2e2Xrk
 . (2.32)
Eqs. (2.31) and (2.32) reveal that higher costs for product innovation r decrease
the optimal product range. The latter implies a higher output of the marginal
variety  (see Eq. (2.31)). Referring to Figure 2.1, this characterizes a variety closer
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Figure 2.3: Equilibrium
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to the rms core competence. Inspecting the term 2
p in Eq. (2.32) reveals the
multiplicative structure of the inverse measure for market size (b0  b
L
) and the cost
for product innovation r. This structure translates an increase in the market size
L into lower perceived costs of product innovation for the rm.
Inspecting the previous equations indicates that the equilibrium in our model can
be characterized in terms of two endogenous variables:  and X. In Figure 2.3,
Eq. (2.28) is labeled by "Scale: X ()" and describes a positive relationship between
total rm output X and scope . Through adding additional products, an MPF
can increase its total output. Eq. (2.32) establishes a negative relationship between
X and . The downward-sloping curve "Scope:  (X)" illustrates that rising rm
output intensies the cannibalization e¤ect of the marginal variety. Therefore, an
MPF reduces its product scope when its total output increases.In the intersection
of both curves in Figure 2.3, the two equilibrium conditions for scale and scope are
satised.12 Once we have determined the equilibrium values of  and X, we compute
the equilibrium value of process innovation K. In the next step, we derive the main
testable predictions from the model.
12A proof that the two curves intersect is provided in the Appendix. We show that the deter-
minant of the coe¢ cient matrix is always positive. This ensures that the equilibrium is unique and
stable.
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The E¤ects of a Larger Market Size We are interested in the e¤ects of global-
ization on product and process innovation. We follow Krugman (1979) and interpret
globalization as an increase in the number of consumers L. As we analyze the behav-
ior of a single MPF, we neglect the competition e¤ect of globalization. This modeling
choice is motivated by the nature of our empirical analysis, where we investigate the
e¤ect of a devaluation of the Brazilian real. For Brazilian exporters, a devaluation
means improved access to foreign markets since products become cheaper. There-
fore, Brazilian rms can gain foreign market shares without losing domestic market
shares.
An increase in the market size L reduces the slope b0 of the demand function in Eq.
(2.3). In the Appendix, we derive the total derivatives of the equilibrium conditions
in terms of scale X (Eq. (2.28)) and scope  (Eq. (2.32)), which lead to the following
results.
We show that increases in the market size lead to higher total rm output X. Three
di¤erent intra-rm adjustments lead to this result. The rst adjustment comes from
the increased demand in the larger market. The second and third adjustments come
from the impact of product and process innovation on total rm scale X. We show
that despite cannibalization is intensied through the larger X, a rm will invest
in new products in a larger market. In Figure 2.3, both curves "Scale: X ()" and
"Scope:  (X)" are shifted to the right, though "Scope:  (X)" shifts more. The
cannibalization e¤ect of increasing rm scale X on scope  can be visualized by
comparing the product range before and after the shift of "Scale: X ()". Tech-
nically the increase in product scope is caused by the fact that in Eq. (2.32) the
costs for product innovation r enter multiplied by the parameter b0. As explained
earlier in the text, a larger market size reduces the perceived innovation costs for
the rm. Finally, we analyze the impact of the market size on process innovation
K. As discussed earlier, process innovation is subject to economies of scale as in
a larger market innovation costs can be spread over more units. From inspection
of Eq. (2.29), we see that the rise in  and X causes more spending in process
innovation. Captured by the term (1 e
+e)2
rk
in Eq. (2.28), the process innovation
e¤ect contributes to the rise in rm scale X. We summarize the market size e¤ect
on optimal rm behavior in the following proposition and test these results in the
empirical section.
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Proposition 2.1 A larger market size L increases total scale X and induces rms
to invest more in both product  and process innovation K, i.e.
d lnX
d lnL
> 0,
d ln 
d lnL
> 0, and
d lnK
d lnL
> 0. (2.33)
The mathematical derivation of these results is presented in the Appendix. Further-
more, we show the e¤ects of a change in the demand intercept a on the optimal
behavior of the rm. The latter comparative static yields qualitatively the same
results.
Sectors with Di¤erent Scope for Product Di¤erentiation We derive a sec-
ond testable prediction of our model with respect to the degree of product di¤erentia-
tion in a sector. A simple comparison between brick production and the automotive
sector makes it clear that there is a lot more scope for di¤erentiation in the lat-
ter sector. We argue that the degree of di¤erentiation is crucial in explaining the
innovation behavior of rms. Recall, that degree of di¤erentiation determines the
strength of the two linkages within our framework. A low degree of di¤erentiation
(high e) causes high cannibalization and high spillover e¤ects and, therefore, pro-
motes process innovation. One can think again of our example of an MPF producing
bricks that are slightly di¤erentiated. It is plausible to assume that a large fraction
of the investment in the production line of one specic brick is applicable to the
production of all other bricks produced by the same rm. However, introducing one
further brick will have a strong cannibalizing impact on the initial portfolio. Di¤er-
entiating Eq. (2.29) with respect to the degree of product di¤erentiation e keeping
rm size xed conrms our intuition:
@ lnK
@ ln e
=
e (   1)
(1  e + e) > 0. (2.34)
Let us now assume the other extreme case of a highly di¤erentiated industry, in our
example the automotive sector. Assuming that cars are more di¤erentiated than
bricks, optimizing the production process for one specic car will have positive but
lower spillovers on the other cars in comparison to the case of (more homogeneous)
bricks. The more di¤erentiated two cars are, the lower will be the number of identical
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parts used in production and, therefore, the lower will be the spillovers in produc-
tion. However, for a rm producing multiple cars, the negative externality of adding
an additional car declines the higher is the degree of di¤erentiation (i.e. the lower
is the cannibalization e¤ect). Again, we hold rm size xed and di¤erentiate Eq.
(2.32) with respect to the degree of product di¤erentiation e. There are two opposing
channels at work when considering the e¤ect of the degree of product di¤erentiation
on the product range . On the one hand, the marginal product cannibalizes, on
the other hand, all initial products benet from process-spillovers from the marginal
product. Di¤erentiating Eq. (2.32) with respect to e leads to a cumbersome expres-
sion, which is presented in the Appendix. Here we show the solution for the case of
the strongest spillover e¤ects. The following derivative reveals that even in this case
the cannibalization e¤ect dominates, which conrms our intuition.
lim
!0
@ ln 
@ ln e
=  b
0e (2X   x ())
c1   2Xrk


< 0 (2.35)
The derivation of this expression and further discussion are presented in the Appen-
dix.
We summarize the e¤ect of the degree of product di¤erentiation on optimal inno-
vation behavior in the following proposition and test the results in the empirical
part.
Proposition 2.2 Conditional on rm size, rms in sectors with a large (low) scope
for product di¤erentiation will invest more in product (process) innovation. This
behavior is caused by the lower (stronger) demand- and lower (stronger) cost-linkages
in a di¤erentiated (homogeneous) sector.
2.3 Data
We test the main predictions of the model using Brazilian rm-level data for the
period 1998-2000. Firm-level data are matched using the unique rm tax number
and come from two main sources: (i) SECEX (Foreign Trade Secretariat), which
provides information on the universe of products exported by Brazilian rms and
(ii) Innovation survey from PINTEC (Brazilian Firm Industrial Innovation Survey).
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We combine rm-level data with industry-level data to investigate how di¤erent
industries react to a trade shock in terms of their investments in innovation.
A distinctive feature of the data is the availability of highly detailed information
on rm-level innovation investments, including several dimensions of product and
process innovation. A further distinctive feature of the data is the event of a major
and largely unexpected exchange rate shock in the period under analysis. The de-
valuation made Brazilian products more competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets and, therefore, increased incentives for rms to innovate (due to scale ef-
fects). However, rms react in di¤erent ways to the trade shock depending on the
degree of product di¤erentiation of the industry: While more homogeneous indus-
tries have higher incentives to invest more in process innovation because of spillover
e¤ects, di¤erentiated industries have higher incentives to invest in product innova-
tion because of lower cannibalization across products. To tackle this issue, we use
information on di¤erent types of innovation combined with the degree of product
di¤erentiation of the industry.
2.3.1 Innovation Variables
The innovation survey provides detailed information on innovation investments of
3,070 manufacturing exporters for which we can exploit time-varying information.13
The main questions used in our study for product and process innovation are: 1. Did
the rm introduce a new product in the period? (product innovation) and 2. Did
the rm introduce new production processes in the period? (process innovation).
For changes in product, we create a variable Productf = 1 if a rm f in industry
i reported important e¤orts to do product innovation. For changes in process we
create a variable Processf = 1 if the rm reported changes in process.
Product innovation does not necessarily mean an increase in product scope (sug-
gested by our theory), since rms could simultaneously add and drop varieties or
change the attributes of existent varieties. Therefore, in order to get closer to our
theoretical mechanism, we use a further question from the survey related to product
scope: 3. Importance of the innovation to increase product scope, Scopef . This
13The PINTEC (2000) survey provides information for a total of 3,700 rms. However, for 630
of them information for many variables of interest is only available for the year 2000.
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categorical variable (with four degrees of importance) relates innovation to changes
in product scope.
For process innovation, the variable Processf may also not be directly related to
the mechanism we propose in the theory (that some rms internalize spillover e¤ects
and, therefore, invest more in process innovation). Thus, to evaluate the importance
of spillover e¤ects, we use information related to changes in the exibility of the
production process. In particular, we use the following question from the survey:
4. Importance of the innovation to increase production exibility, Flexibilityf .
Flexibilityf is a categorical variable (with four degrees of importance) related to
the ability of the rm to make the production process more exible and increase
the spillover e¤ects among production lines. Therefore, it is consistent with the
mechanism of the theoretical model, predicting that rms may internalize intra-rm
spillover e¤ects. The description of variables is found in Table 2.14 in the Appendix.
The data has the disadvantage of not capturing di¤erences in the intensity of innova-
tion across rms (variables are at most categorical, but not continuous). However, for
the purposes of our study, we are able to capture the relevant mechanism, referring
to the variation in innovation e¤orts across industries.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the baseline indicators of innovation.14
About half of the rms reported changes in process and 42 percent changes in prod-
uct.15 The interest of the study is to provide more information on the innovation
choices of rms in di¤erent industries.
Table 2.1: Percentage of Firms by Innovation Status in the Year 2000
Product innovation Process innovation Product and process innovation
42% 48% 28%
14Values are based on a sample of 3,070 rms, for which we can exploit time-varying information
(sample used in this chapter).
1542 percent of rms conducted product innovation and 14 percent reported only product inno-
vation (no process innovation). 48 percent of rms conducted process innovation and 20 percent
only process innovation. 28 percent of the rms reported both product and process innovation.
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2.3.2 Degree of Product Di¤erentiation
For the analysis across rms, we create measures of the degree of product di¤eren-
tiation across sectors ((1   e)s, for a sector s). For that, we match the rm-level
innovation survey with information on the degree of product di¤erentiation using
(1) the Khandelwal (2010) classication of product di¤erentiation and (2) the Rauch
(1999) classication of goods, as follows.
Khandelwal (2010) Classication of Product Di¤erentiation Khandelwal
(2010) classies sectors and products according to the degree of product di¤erentia-
tion and characterizes products as long and short quality ladders. The paper uses
nested logit estimations to infer product quality from price and quantity information
of products exported to the United States: The quality of a product increases if its
price can rise without losing market share. Quality ladders for each product are
constructed from estimated qualities, calculated as the di¤erence between the max-
imum quality (MAXp ) and minimum quality (
MIN
p ) within a product p, as follows:
p = 
MAX
p   MINp . In this specication, p denotes the di¤erence between the
minimum and maximum of the estimated quality pct of country cs exports to the
United States at time t in product p. The higher p, the higher the degree of prod-
uct di¤erentiation, such that the variation in market shares conditional on product
prices is higher. Therefore, the mechanism proposed by Khandelwal (2010) is closely
related to the mechanism we derive in the theory section (see Eqs. (2.6) and (2.7)).
We use the Khandelwal (2010) product classication of the ladder length available
at the 4-digit SIC1987 classication. This measure is mapped to the 2-digit IBGE
classication of sectors and industries and generates a ladder length s, as the average
ladder over all products exported in sector s.
Rauch (1999) Classication of Goods Rauch (1999) classies trade data into
three groups of commodities: w, homogeneous (organized exchange) goods, which
are goods traded in an organized exchange; r, reference priced goods, not traded
in an organized exchange, but which have some quoted reference price, such as in-
dustry publications; and n, di¤erentiated goods, without any quoted price. Using
this classication at the 4-digit SITC product classication (issued by the United
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Nations), we create a measure of the share of products from a rm classied as
di¤erentiated goods: ShDiffs =
Nproductss;n
Nproductss;(w+r+n)
, where ShDiffs is the share of
products produced by sector s classied as di¤erentiated goods. Also in this case,
we map the Rauch (1999) classication of goods to the 2-digit industry classica-
tion of di¤erentiation from IBGE. Moreover, as an alternative measure, we estimate
ShSaless =
Salesn
TotalSales(w+r+n)
, where ShSaless is the share of sales of di¤erentiated
products in comparison to total sales in a sector s.16
We use s as our benchmark measure, since s provides higher variation in compar-
ison to ShDiffs: While s is created from a continuous variable (product ladder),
the Rauch (1999) classication is created from a binary variable (products classied
as di¤erentiated or non-di¤erentiated goods). Thus, ShDiffs may be inaccurate
and subject to measurement error. We keep the Rauch (1999) classication for ro-
bustness checks. Summary statistics for both measures of di¤erentiation are shown
in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Degree of Product Di¤erentiation by Industry
Measures of (1  e)s Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
s 3,070 1.73 0.21 1.10 2.27
ShDiffs 3,070 0.73 0.12 0.33 1
2.3.3 Industry-specic Exchange Rates
In January 1999, the Brazilian government announced the end of the crawling peg,
allowing the real to free oat, with a consequent depreciation of the real by 25
percent (within a month). Figure 2.4 shows the evolution of the exchange rate in
this period. While the size of the devaluation did not vary across di¤erent bilateral
currencies, it varied across industries depending on the degree of openness to trade
of the industry. We exploit the variation across time in exchange rates for industries
with di¤erent degrees of exposure to global markets using trade-weighted industry-
specic exchange rate shocks. In this way, we can empirically test the theoretical
16However, we believe that the share of di¤erentiated products measured by the number of
products (ShDiffs) is a better measure to infer the degree of di¤erentiation in comparison to
the sales of products. Estimations using the share of sales (ShSaless) remain signicant (results
available upon request).
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Figure 2.4: Monthly Real Exchange Rates for Brazil, 1996-2001
prediction that rms innovate more following an increase in market size (an increase
in L in the model). Crucially, since all rms in our sample are permanent exporters,
we expect them to react to the shock in a similar way.
Industry-specic exchange rates are constructed using yearly bilateral trade data
from NBER-UN coded by Feenstra et al. (2005) and bilateral exchange rate data
from the International Monetary Fund. The underlying idea of the industry-specic
exchange rate shock is to study how the movements in di¤erent bilateral exchange
rates with respect to the real a¤ected di¤erent industries, depending on how much
they trade with other countries. The bilateral trade data from NBER-UN provides
information on bilateral trade ows at the 4-digit SITC level. The SITC classication
is combined with the Brazilian CNAE industry classication using publicly available
concordance tables up to 4-digit CNAE.17 Following Goldberg (2004) and Almeida
and Poole (2013), we calculate the industry-specic exchange rates as follows:
TRERit =
X
c

0:5
XictP
cXict
+ 0:5
MictP
cMict

 rerct

, (2.36)
17Concordance tables are publicly available at:
http://econweb.ucsd.edu/muendler/html/brazil.html#brazsec.
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Figure 2.5: Industry Variation in Trade-weighted Real Exchange Rates for Firms in
Industries with High and Low Degrees of Product Di¤erentiation
where i is industry, c is country, and t is time, such that the bilateral real exchange
rate rerct, measured by the Brazilian currency real with respect to the trading part-
ner c, is weighted by the industry-specic trade shares. The industry-specic shares
are time-varying import shares ( MictP
c
Mict
) and export shares ( XictP
c
Xict
) by industry
and bilateral country pair.
Figure 2.5 shows the trade-weighted industry-specic exchange rates for rms above
and below the mean of product di¤erentiation (high or low mean s). Two impor-
tant facts must be mentioned. First, Figure 2.5 illustrates a substantial heterogeneity
across industries in the trade-weighted exchange rates. Second, the gure shows that
in both groups of rms/industries the distribution of TRERit is very similar, imply-
ing that there is no clear correlation between the degree of product di¤erentiation
and the openness of the industry.
Figure 2.6 in the Appendix reports changes in trade-weighted exchange rates over
time. The right and left panels reveals that changes in TRERit are similar for both
groups of industries (with high and low degree of di¤erentiation, according to the
Khandelwal (2010) classication).
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2.3.4 Correlation between the Main Variables of Interest
The theoretical model predicts that rms in more di¤erentiated industries will do
more product and less process innovation in comparison to less di¤erentiated in-
dustries. Table 2.3 shows the correlation between the innovation variables and our
main variables for the degree of di¤erentiation (1   e)s: s and ShDiffs. We
present the correlations in terms of product and process innovation (Productf and
Processf ) as well as in terms of our alternative measure of innovation: While
Scopef is related to product innovation (rms introduce new varieties and increase
product scope), Flexibilityf is related to the ability of the rm to increase the
spillover e¤ects among production lines.
Table 2.3: Correlation between (1  e)s and the Innovation Variables
(1  e)s Productf Processf Scopef Flexibilityf
s 0.249*** -0.108** 0.054*** -0.085***
ShDiffs 0.048*** -0.029** 0.016** -0.031*
Note: *** indicates 1% signicance, ** 5% signicance, and * 10% signicance.
We show that variables related to product innovation (Productf and Scopef)
are positively correlated with the degree of product di¤erentiation. On the other
hand, variables related to process innovation (Processf and Flexibilityf) are
negatively correlated with the degree of product di¤erentiation. Therefore, results in
Table 2.3 are consistent with the predictions from the theoretical model. Moreover, in
the section on robustness checks, we show that these correlations are not restricted to
the data we use. We combine rm-level data from the World Bank with information
on product and process innovation with industry-level data for Brazilian rms. The
correlations between s and innovation (Productf and Processf ) conrm our
results.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
Our goal in the empirical part of this chapter is to test the predictions from the model
regarding investment e¤orts of rms in industries with di¤erent scope for product
di¤erentiation, following a trade shock. To achieve identication, we estimate the
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incidence of changes in the innovation investments If as a function of the degree
of di¤erentiation (1  e)s in the sector s in which the rm operates. To investigate
the degree of di¤erentiation (1  e)s, we use two di¤erent measures: s according to
Khandelwal (2010) and ShDiffs following Rauch (1999), as described in the data
section. We are interested in the di¤erential e¤ects for industries with di¤erent de-
grees of trade openness, measured by changes in time-varying trade-weighted shocks,
TRERi, as follows:
Pr(If = 1) = F (1TRERi+2TRERi  (1  e)s+1Xf +s+"f ), (2.37)
where f indexes the rm, i indexes the industry, s indexes the sector, and Xf
is a vector of rm-level time-varying control variables, as described in Table 2.14
in the Appendix. Initially, we include only changes in rm size, then subsequently
we add further control variables. "f is a moving-average error term. s are sector
xed e¤ects, such that we can interpret results within industries in a given sector.18
If refers to innovation changes conducted by the rm, with If = Processf
or Productf . In alternative specications, If = Scopef or Flexibilityf . For
simplicity, we omit subscripts for.  refers to the di¤erence between years t (2000)
and t0 (1998), t;t0.
In the theoretical model, we state that when market size grows (L increases), the
increase in market size generates incentives for rms to innovate because of scale
e¤ects. Empirically, we test changes in market size using a major and unexpected
exchange rate shock from 1999 as a source of variation (rms face varying degrees
of exposure to foreign markets, and hence, in the access to foreign markets). We
exploit this event using industry-specic exchange rate shocks computed over time,
TRERi. Following the predictions from the theoretical model, we expect 1 > 0:
An exchange rate devaluation increases incentives for rms to innovate (because of
18Note that in the theory we have used the words sector and industry interchangeably. In the
empirics it is important that TRERi and (1 e)s have di¤erent levels of aggregation, such that the
interaction term provides the relevant variation. Therefore, the fact that both variables come from
di¤erent classication of goods/industries and are aggregated at di¤erent levels is an advantage
in our approach. Moreover, there is no clear correlation between (1   e)s and between TRERi
or (1   e)s and TRERi, as we show in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. If the correlation was high, the
interaction term could capture non linearities between innovation and the independent variables.
Using the continuous measure of di¤erentiation, s , we nd no statistically signicant correlation
between s and TRERi:
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better access to foreign markets), in particular in industries more open to interna-
tional trade.
On top of that, detailed information on the degree of di¤erentiation ((1   e) in
the model) and on the type of innovation allows us to evaluate di¤erential e¤ects
across industries and sectors. The di¤erential e¤ects are shown by 2, our main
coe¢ cient of interest. 2 captures the di¤erential impact of the trade shock on
rms in di¤erentiated sectors relative to more homogeneous sectors. In response
to the shock, scale e¤ects create natural incentives for rms to expand innovation
investments. In more di¤erentiated sectors, cannibalization is lower such that rms
invest more in product innovation, while in homogeneous sectors spillover e¤ects from
innovation are higher such that rms invest more in process innovation. Therefore,
2 > 0 in case the dependent variable is Productf , i.e. rms in sectors with a high
degree of product di¤erentiation invest more in product innovation, and 2 < 0 when
the dependent variable is Processf (rms in more di¤erentiated sectors invest less
in process innovation in comparison to rms in more homogeneous sectors).
Our main empirical equation is tested in a rst-di¤erences model. Concerning the
functional form, we estimate our empirical model using probit and linear probability
models, which have di¤erent advantages and disadvantages. The linear probability
model has the advantage of being easy to estimate and to interpret the coe¢ cients.
However, though unbiased, it poses important disadvantages. For instance, the
assumption that the error term has unlimited range is not correct, causing problems
for hypothesis testing. Moreover, the tted probabilities may be outside the zero-
one boundaries and the marginal impact of 2 does not exhibit diminishing returns,
which would be otherwise expected from the nature of probabilities (the marginal
impact should decrease as the independent variable increases). To deal with the
concerns with the linear estimation, we estimate the random e¤ects probit model,
where F (:) is the normal cumulative distribution function. Finally, we also conduct
robustness checks using seemingly unrelated regressions - SUR, to allow the error
terms across equations to be correlated (equations with Processf or Productf
as dependent variable).
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2.5 Results
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present the main empirical results from our analysis. In Table 2.4,
we rst investigate whether changes in market size lead to more innovation. As pre-
dicted by the theoretical model, when the market size grows (L increases) incentives
to innovate increase for all rms and all types of innovation (1 > 0). Columns (1)
to (4) in Table 2.4 conrm that 1 > 0 for product and process innovation, meaning
an increase in the predicted probability of innovation: Following an industry-specic
exchange rate devaluation (TRERi > 0), rms have higher incentives to invest
in product and process innovation. Results are statistically signicant using LPM
and Probit, shown in the odds and even columns, respectively. Unless otherwise
stated, results reported for Probit in the tables include the coe¢ cients, their stan-
dard errors, and the value of the likelihood function. To better quantify the results
in Table 2.4, we estimate the marginal e¤ect computed at means of all variables
(means are reported in Tables 2.2 and 2.13), keeping in mind that probit implies
diminishing marginal magnitudes depending on the values of dependent variables.
At mean values, the average marginal e¤ect is around 0.27 for product and 0.31 for
process innovation, with a p-value of 0.001 in both cases, meaning that the e¤ect is
signicant.
Table 2.4: E¤ect of TRERi on Innovation
Dependent variable: Processf Productf
Probit LPM Probit LPM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TRERi 0.768*** 0.296*** 0.703*** 0.259***
(0.221) (0.0819) (0.218) (0.0778)
Constant yes yes yes yes
logNworkersf yes yes yes yes
Sector s xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
Log-pseudolikelihood -1895.239 -1776.380
Pseudo R-squared 0.010 0.039
R-squared 0.104 0.146
Observations 3,070 3,070 3,070 3,070
However, the main interest of our analysis refers to the di¤erential e¤ects across sec-
tors and industries. The di¤erential e¤ects using our main measure of di¤erentiation
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s are shown in Table 2.5. Results conrm the main predictions from our theoretical
model. Following an exchange rate devaluation (TRERi > 0), rms in industries
with a high degree of product di¤erentiation invest more in product innovation rel-
ative to other rms (2 > 0 when If = Productf), while rms in industries with
a low degree of product di¤erentiation invest more in process innovation relative to
other rms (2 < 0 when If = Processf). Results hold for both estimation
strategies (Probit and LPM).
Table 2.5: E¤ect of TRERi on Innovation for Firms in Di¤erent Industries
Dependent variable: Processf Productf
Probit LPM Probit LPM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
s TRERi -0.316*** -0.124*** 0.278*** 0.106***
(0.0840) (0.0331) (0.0412) (0.0154)
TRERi 0.868*** 0.329*** 0.553** 0.199**
(0.224) (0.0810) (0.218) (0.0773)
Constant yes yes yes yes
logNworkersf yes yes yes yes
Sector s xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
Log-pseudolikelihood -1892.544 -1775.112
Pseudo R-squared 0.011 0.040
R-squared 0.104 0.147
Observations 3,070 3,070 3,070 3,070
For probit, results in Table 2.5 columns (1) and (3) report the coe¢ cients. To eval-
uate magnitudes, we compute the di¤erence in probabilities depending on di¤erent
values of TRERi and s, since the value of the interaction e¤ect changes upon
the value of the continuous predictor variable. At mean values of all variables, the
marginal e¤ect of TRERi is 0.21 for product and 0.34 for process innovation. For
the interaction term, the marginal e¤ect is 0.10 for product and -0.12 for process
innovation, evaluated at mean values. Marginal e¤ects are in all cases statistically
signicant at the one percent level. Therefore, we conrm that rms in more ho-
mogeneous sectors are signicantly more likely to do process innovation following
the shock, whereas rms in more di¤erentiated sectors are more likely to do product
innovation. Columns (2) and (4) report results for the LPM. If we evaluate mean
values of TRERi and s, a decrease in s by two standard deviations leads to an
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increase in the probability to do process innovation by roughly two percent, with
this value being higher for rms in sectors with higher initial s. For product inno-
vation, an increase in s by two standard deviations leads to an increase in product
innovation by roughly four percent.
One may argue that the measures of product and process innovation used in Ta-
ble 2.5 are disconnected from the theoretical model. Changes in process innovation
(Processf) may reect an innovation not directly related to internalization of
spillovers. We address this concern using an alternative measure of innovation re-
lated to spillover e¤ects, Flexibilityf . Results presented in Table 2.6 reveal that
estimations are robust to this alternative measure of process innovation.
A similar concern refers to the mechanism related to product innovation (Productf).
Investments in product innovation may reect changes in an already existent prod-
uct rather than the creation of an additional variety. We address this concern using
an alternative measure of innovation related to changes in product scope, Scopef .
Results shown in Table 2.6 are consistent with the baseline estimations from Table
2.5.
Table 2.6: E¤ect of TRERi on Product Scope and Production Flexibility
Dependent variable: Scopef Flexibilityf
Probit LPM Probit LPM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
s TRERi 0.195*** 0.0497*** -0.164*** -0.0614***
(0.0620) (0.0123) (0.0527) (0.0196)
TRERi 0.594*** 0.303*** 0.745** 0.272**
(0.194) (0.0548) (0.314) (0.114)
Constant yes yes yes yes
logNworkersf yes yes yes yes
Sector s xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
Log-pseudolikelihood -567.767 -1255.563
Pseudo R-squared 0.050 0.019
R-squared 0.094 0.069
Observations 3,070 3,070 1,971 1,971
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2.6 Robustness Checks
Rauch (1999) Measure of Product Di¤erentiation We use ShDiffs as an
alternative measure to s and replicate the interaction e¤ects from Table 2.5. Results
are shown in Table 2.7 columns (1) and (3). While smaller in magnitudes, the e¤ect
conrms the expected coe¢ cients for 1 and 2.
Degree of Di¤erentiation: Firm-level Measure As a further alternative mea-
sure to s, we build a rm-level ladder f starting from the 10-digit product classi-
cation, made available by Khandelwal (2010). This measure allows us to exploit the
degree of di¤erentiation at the rm-level, since we have information on all 6-digit
products exported by Brazilian rms. Thus, we combine these data and create the
mean ladder at the rm level f corresponding to the average ladder of the prod-
ucts exported by the rm, as follows: f =
P
fp fp
N
, where N is the initial number
of products exported by the rm in the year 1998. f provides higher variation in
comparison to s: While s has a standard deviation of 0.21, f has a standard
deviation of 0.6. The means are very close, 1.73 for s and 1.75 for f .
Results using f are shown in Table 2.7 in columns (2) and (4) and are consistent
with our predictions. However, data at the rm and product-level on the degree of
di¤erentiation are not essential to our argument and may be subject to endogeneity
once we exploit time variation.19 Therefore, our preferred empirical specication
uses information at the sector and industry-level.
Asymmetries across Firms One important concern with our baseline estima-
tions refers to rms that do both types of innovation. Many rms invest simultane-
ously in product and process innovation following the exchange rate shock. There-
fore, we evaluate asymmetries across di¤erent groups of rms. In particular, we
evaluate the e¤ects for rms that do only one type of innovation.
While the baseline estimations using If = Processf or Productf consider all
rms that reported process and product innovation e¤orts, respectively, here we
19For instance, if rms invest in product innovation they may increase the degree of di¤erenti-
ation of the products they o¤er over time. However, at the industry level this e¤ect is less severe
and does not a¤ect our main predictions.
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evaluate the e¤ect for rms that reported only one or the other type of innova-
tion. Process_onlyf = 1 for rms that reported only process innovation, zero
otherwise. Similar for product innovation (Product_onlyf). Estimations with
Process_onlyf and Product_onlyf as dependent variables reveal that results
are in general larger in magnitudes for rms reporting only one type of innovation
(results in columns (1) to (4) from Table 2.8). We interpret this result as follows:
Firms in the extremes of the distribution of product di¤erentiation have lower in-
centives to invest in both types of innovation. Imagine rms producing bricks versus
rms producing luxury watches (a highly homogeneous and a highly di¤erentiated
product, respectively). While rms in the middle of the distribution will have higher
incentives to allocate part of their resources to each type of innovation, rms in
the extremes of the distribution such as watches and bricks have higher returns to
innovation when they allocate resources in only one type of innovation.
Results Adding further Firm-level Control Variables We add several rm-
level variables to the main specication and show that results remain stable. The
stability of results suggest that omitted variables might not be a major concern.
The variables we add relate to rm initial characteristics in year 1998, Xf;t=0. Firms
that are larger, foreign-owned, and with a more skilled labor force are in general
more innovative. Therefore, we investigate the stability of our results when adding
the following rm initial conditions: Number of workers as a proxy for rm size
(logNworkersf;t=0), foreign ownership dummy (FDIf;t=0), share of workers with
tertiary education as a proxy for worker skills (Skillsf;t=0), the number of products
exported by the rm (logNproductsf;t=0), and the number of destinations of exports
(logNdestinationsf;t=0). The description of variables and the associated means and
standard deviations are reported in Table 2.13.
Results are shown in Table 2.9. As expected, all coe¢ cients are positive and statis-
tically signicant, meaning that larger, foreign-owned, and rms with a higher share
of skilled workers do more innovation. Crucially, as shown in Table 2.9, the interac-
tion term shown by 2 remains signicant and stable through all specications. In
results available upon request, we also add the change in these same variables over
the period. While the point estimates are in many cases not statistically signicant
(since the period is relatively short), the signs are informative and consistent with
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the literature.
Results Using SUR We check whether our results remain robust to further es-
timations strategies. In the baseline results, we have estimated LPM and Probit
separately for product and process innovation. To allow the error terms of the two
equations to be correlated, we estimate a seemingly unrelated regressions model
(SUR). Results reported in Table 2.11 reveal that coe¢ cients are the same in com-
parison to the LPM (as expected), but the error terms are slightly higher when we
allow them to be correlated. Results remain signicant in all cases.
Exchange Rate Shock: Alternative Measures We conduct several robustness
checks to evaluate the stability of our results with respect to alternative measures
of TRERi.
First, we look at lagged exports. One concern with the estimations using TRERi
is endogeneity between trade and the exchange rate. We avoid this concern using
lagged import shares ( Mic;t 1P
c
Mic;t 1
) and lagged export shares ( Xic;t 1P
c
Xic;t 1
). Columns (1)
and (2) in Table 2.10 show that results remain robust when we use lagged exports.
Second, instead of using industry-specic import shares ( MictP
c
Mict
) and export shares
( XictP
c
Xict
) to construct TRERit, we construct an alternative measure using only ex-
port shares, as follows: XTRERit =
P
c

XictP
c
Xict
 rerct

. The advantage of using
export shares separately is to separate export shocks from import shocks. One con-
cern with the estimations using TRERi is that an exchange rate shock may mean
increases in market size for some industries but not for others (depending on input
intensity, among others). Using the exchange rate shock separately for imports and
exports, we exploit whether factors unrelated to market size are driving our results.
Results are reported in Table 2.10 in columns (3) and (4). Also in this case our main
hypotheses remain robust.
Results Using Innovation Data from the World Bank One could argue that
the correlation we nd between s and product/process innovation is specic to
our data. To overcome this concern, we use rm-level innovation data from the
World Bank (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS))
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for Brazil in the year 2003. The innovation survey contains information on in-
vestments in product and process innovation. We build the following variables for
product and process innovation. Product_WBf = 1 if the rm answered yes to
the following question: "Initiative undertaken in last 3 years: new product line?",
otherwise Product_WBf = 0. Process_WBf = 1 if the rm answered yes to the
following question: "Initiative undertaken in last 3 years: new technology?", other-
wise Process_WBf = 0. We combine the World Bank data with the Khandelwal
(2010) measure of di¤erentiation using the Brazilian industry classication available
at the World Bank.
The World Bank data do not allow us to fully test our model. However, we can calcu-
late the correlation between s and innovation (Product_WBf and Process_WBf)
and compare with the correlations we nd using the PINTEC (2000) data. Results
shown in Table 2.12 conrm the correlations presented in Table 2.3 using the PIN-
TEC (2000) rm-level data.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter is inspired by growing evidence on the importance of within-rm ad-
justments in explaining gains from trade. A recent strand of the literature in in-
ternational trade emphasizes that innovating rms account for a large fraction of
the productivity and variety gains within sectors. In this chapter, we provide a new
model of MPFs, allowing for endogenous investments in both product and process
innovation. Following an increase in the market size, we show how rms increase in-
vestments of both types. The focus of this model, however, is on an industry-specic
trade-o¤between the two types of innovation, which arises through demand and cost
linkages specic to MPFs. Both linkages are related to the degree of product di¤er-
entiation in a sector, leading to heterogenous returns to the two types of innovation
across industries.
Our model shows that rms in sectors with a high scope for di¤erentiation invest
more in product and less in process innovation. In a highly di¤erentiated industry,
returns to product innovation are high as cannibalization e¤ects within the rm
are low. Returns to process innovation, however, are lower in a di¤erentiated sec-
tor as more di¤erentiated products are associated with more dissimilar production
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processes. Therefore, in more di¤erentiated sectors, process innovation is highly
product-specic and is not applicable to the whole range of products within the
rm. Obviously, for rms in homogeneous industries, the mechanism works exactly
the other way round.
Our model provides novel predictions, which are tested using Brazilian rm-level
data. We combine detailed information on the two types of innovation featured in
our theory with an unexpected exchange rate devaluation as an exogenous source of
variation to test the e¤ect of market size on innovation. For Brazilian exporters, the
currency devaluation improves foreign market access without losing domestic market
shares. We nd that, given the larger market, rms reoptimize their investments and
increase spending in both types of innovation. Moreover, we are able to evaluate
di¤erential e¤ects across industries. Using several measures for the degree of product
di¤erentiation in a sector, we show that rms in di¤erentiated sectors focus on
product innovation while rms in more homogeneous sectors innovate more in better
processes.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Derivation of Eq. (2.31)
Combining Eqs. (2.19) at i =  and (2.24) yields:
b0rk (1  e)x ()2 = ((1   (e))x () +  (e)X) ((1   (e))x ()   (e)X) + rrk.
(2.38)
The rst expression on the right-hand side can be rewritten as: ((1   (e))x ())2 
( (e)X)2. Solving for x () yields the expression in Eq. (2.31).
2.8.2 Market Size E¤ect - Proposition 2.1
We totally di¤erentiate the two equilibrium conditions for scale and scope in Eqs.
(2.28) and (2.32) and write the results in matrix notation."
rk
 
a  c  c1 2
  2  b0rk(1  e)  (1  e)2 x () 
(eb0rk   e (2 (1  e) + e))  e2Xx()

2X (rkc1   2e2X) 
#

"
d lnX
d ln 
#
=  
"
2X(1  e+ e)
((1  e)x () + 2eX)
#
b0rkd ln b0 +
"

1
#
rkad ln a (2.39)
To derive this matrix, we use information from Eqs. (2.28), (2.30), and (2.31). The
determinant  of the system is always positive. The fact that  > 0 ensures a
unique and stable equilibrium. Condition 2.1 stated in Eq. (2.23) ensures that
(eb0rk   e (2 (1  e) + e))  e2Xx()

> 0. To proof the latter result, we compute
an alternative expression for total rm scale by integrating over per variety scale in
Eq. (2.25):
X =
c1

2
2

2

b0(1  e)  (1 e)2
rk
 + x () . (2.40)
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Combining the latter expression with the condition in Eq. (2.23) yields:
eb0rkx () > 2e (1  e)x ()+e2x ()+e2X+e2
c1

2
2

2

b0(1  e)  (1 e)2
rk
 , (2.41)
and ensures that  > 0.
E¤ect on Firm Scale X: The e¤ect of an increase (decrease) in L (b0) on total
rm size can be expressed as follows:
d lnX
d ln b0
=
1

  2X(1  e+ e)b0rk  2
 
b0rk(1  e)  (1  e)2

x () 
  ((1  e)x () + 2eX) b0rk (rkc1   2e2X) 
 < 0.
(2.42)
As the sign of the matrix is clearly negative, an increase in the market size in-
creases total rm size X. An increase in the demand intercept a, leads to the same
qualitative result:
d lnX
d ln a
=
1

 ark  2
 
b0rk(1  e)  (1  e)2

x () 
ark (rkc1   2e2X) 
 > 0. (2.43)
E¤ect on Optimal Scope : The e¤ect of an increase (decrease) in L (b0) on
optimal scope can be expressed as follows:
d ln 
d ln b0
=
1

 rk
 
a  c  c1 2
  2X(1  e+ e)b0rk
(eb0rk   e (2 (1  e) + e))  e2Xx()

2X   ((1  e)x () + 2eX) b0rk
 < 0.
(2.44)
Note that the sign of the matrix b0 can be dened unambiguously as:
b0 =  
(  
b0rk(1  e+ e)  (1  e + e)2

((1  e)x ())
+2X

(2e (1  e)  e (1  e2) + (1  e) e2) + (1  e+ e) e2X
x()
 ) < 0.
(2.45)
Therefore, an increase in the market size clearly induces the rm to increase its
optimal product range. Again, we derive the same qualitative result for an increase
CHAPTER 2. PRODUCT VERSUS PROCESS INNOVATION 85
in a:
d ln 
d ln a
=
1

 rk
 
a  c  c1 2

ark
(eb0rk   e (2 (1  e) + e))  e2Xx()

2X ark
 > 0. (2.46)
The sign of the matrix a is clearly positive as:
a =

b0rk(1  e)  1 + e (2  e) + e
2X
x ()

2Xark > 0. (2.47)
E¤ect on Process Innovation K: After having determined the market size ef-
fects on scale X and scope , identifying the market size e¤ect on process innovation
K is trivial. Totally di¤erentiating Eq. (2.29) yields the following results:
rkK
d lnK
d ln b0
= (1  e + e)Xd lnX
d ln b0| {z }
<0
+ eX
d ln 
d ln b0| {z }
<0
< 0, (2.48)
and
rkK
d lnK
d ln a
= (1  e + e)Xd lnX
d ln a| {z }
>0
+ eX
d ln 
d ln a| {z }
>0
> 0. (2.49)
The result clearly shows that an increase in the market size L or the demand intercept
a will induce the rm to invest more in better processes.
2.8.3 E¤ect of the Degree of Product Di¤erentiation - Propo-
sition 2.2
Di¤erentiating Eq. (2.32) with respect to e and substituting information from Eq.
(2.31), gives:
@ ln 
@ ln e
=  ((2X   x ()) (eb
0rk   2e (1  e))x ()  2e2X (2 (   1)x () +X))
(c1rk   2e2X)x ()  .
(2.50)
For very strong (weak) spillovers, i.e. low (high) values of  holds: lim!0 @ ln @ ln e < 0
and lim!1 @ ln @ ln e < 0. For intermediate values of spillovers, the sign of the derivative
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in Eq. (2.50) depends on the perceived costs of process innovation b0rk (see discussion
of Condition 2.1). If costs for process innovation are su¢ ciently high, then: @ ln 
@ ln e
< 0.
Furthermore, we can take the derivative of Eq. (2.32) with respect to e and evaluate
it at e = 0:
@
@e
je=0=  b
0 (2X   x ())
c1
< 0. (2.51)
The latter implies that even in the case of perfectly di¤erentiated products, a small
increase in e will reduce the optimal product range .
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2.8.4 Robustness Checks
Table 2.7: E¤ect of TRERi on Innovation Using Alternative Measures of Di¤er-
entiation
Dependent variable: Processf Productf
ShDiffs f ShDiffs f
LPM LPM LPM LPM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ShDiffs TRERi -0.0649*** 0.0857***
(0.0180) (0.0177)
f TRERi -0.140*** 0.129***
(0.0459) (0.0127)
TRERi 0.301*** 0.414*** 0.252*** 0.259***
(0.0808) (0.158) (0.0768) (0.0778)
Constant yes yes yes yes
logNworkersf yes yes yes yes
Sector s xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.104 0.104 0.146 0.147
Observations 3,070 3,070 3,070 3,070
Table 2.8: E¤ect of TRERi for Firms that Do only One Type of Innovation
Dependent variable: Only process Only product
innovation innovation
Probit LPM Probit LPM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
s TRERi -0.657*** -0.179*** 0.509*** 0.102***
(0.154) (0.0421) (0.123) (0.0245)
TRERi 1.895*** 0.512*** 0.942*** 0.201***
(0.543) (0.153) (0.279) (0.0720)
Constant yes yes yes yes
logNworkersf yes yes yes yes
Sector s xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
Log-pseudolikelihood -1343.687 -1051.554
Pseudo R-squared 0.084 0.086
R-squared 0.109 0.121
Observations 3,070 3,070 3,070 3,070
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Table 2.10: E¤ect on Innovation Using Alternative Measures of TRERit
LPM
Dependent variable: Processf Productf Processf Productf
(1) (2) (3) (4)
s TRERi;t 1 -0.118*** 0.0903***
(0.0438) (0.0147)
TRERi;t 1 0.295*** 0.194**
(0.0829) (0.0901)
s XTRERi -0.276*** 0.163***
(0.0425) (0.0386)
XTRERi 0.359*** 0.414***
(0.0794) (0.158)
Constant yes yes yes yes
 logNworkersf yes yes yes yes
Sector s xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.105 0.147 0.104 0.149
Observations 3,041 3,041 3,070 3,070
Table 2.11: E¤ect of TRERi on Innovation Using SUR
SUR 1 SUR 2
Dependent variable: Processf Productf Processf Productf
(1) (2) (3) (4)
s TRERi -0.124*** 0.106***
(0.0334) (0.0155)
TRERi 0.296*** 0.259*** 0.329*** 0.199**
(0.0907) (0.0896) (0.0920) (0.0899)
Constant yes yes yes yes
logNworkersf yes yes yes yes
Sector s xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.104 0.146 0.107 0.149
Observations 3,070 3,070 3,070 3,070
Table 2.12: Correlation between (1  e)s and Innovation Using World Bank Data
(1  e)s Process_WBf Product_WBf
s -0.0893 0.0105
Notes: For the estimations we have used 1397 rms for which we could combine rm-level data with the
Khandelwal (2010) classication of goods. The World Bank Survey for Brazil was conducted in year 2003.
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2.8.5 Data Appendix
Table 2.13: Summary Statistics of Main Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
FDIf;t=0 3,070 0.184 0.388
Skillsf;t=0 3,070 0.120 0.130
logNdestinationsf;t=0 3,070 1.543 1.036
logNproductsf;t=0 3,070 1.476 1.167
logNworkersf;t=0 3,070 5.503 1.180
 logNworkersf 3,070 0.039 0.463
s 3,070 1.73 0.21
f 3,070 1.74 0.60
ShDiffs 3,070 0.73 0.12
TRERi 3,070 0.256 0.076
TRERit 6,140 0.608 0.138
Figure 2.6: TRERi for Industries with Di¤erent Degrees of Product Di¤erentiation
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Chapter 3
Multi-Product Firms, Endogenous
Sunk Costs, and Gains from Trade
through Intra-Firm Adjustments
3.1 Introduction
In 1942, Joseph Schumpeter argued that innovation activity is carried out by large
rms, for whom R&D is endogenous. R&D projects often go hand in hand with high
development costs and, therefore, a su¢ ciently large scale of rm sales is required
to cover these costs. Trade liberalization increases the e¤ective size of the market,
which induces innovation activities through economies of scale. These ndings are
validated by recent empirical studies. For Canadian and Argentinian rms, Lileeva
and Treer (2010) and Bustos (2011) document that reductions in tari¤s lead to
investments in productivity-enhancing activities by exporting rms. After trade
liberalization, exporters who benet from the larger market are more technology-
intensive than nonexporters.
Recent contributions in international trade emphasize the fact that most industries
0When working on this chapter, I have beneted from comments by Carsten Eckel, Swati
Dhingra, Florian Unger, and participants at the IO and Trade Seminar at the University of Munich,
the Workshop "Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen" in Goettingen 2013, and the European
Trade Study Group in Birmingham 2013.
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are dominated by rms that produce more than one product.1 In this chapter, I
address the R&D portfolio of a multi-product rm (MPF), whereby the focus is to
analyze separately di¤erent types of research. Firms may invest in product innova-
tion and product di¤erentiation, besides investments in production processes. Un-
bundling these di¤erent strands of innovation helps to distinguish between di¤erent
welfare channels. In contrast to models with single-product rms, where gains from
trade originate at the industry-level through entry or exit of rms and "between-
rm" reallocations of market shares, I highlight intra-rm adjustments as a source
for welfare improvements.
Globalization increases the market but also reinforces competition in these markets.
The large literature on heterogeneous rms has shown that the latter e¤ect dominates
for low-performing rms. I consider large MPFs, therefore, I focus on the market
size e¤ect of globalization. Rising sales volumes in a larger market raise the returns
to the di¤erent types of innovation through economies of scale. In my model, a rm
weighs the marginal benet of each type of innovation against the xed up-front
development costs and as the marginal benet of innovating is increasing in the
market size, more investments are encouraged.
A main element of my theory are demand linkages stressed in recent contributions to
the international trade literature on MPFs (see for instance: Eckel and Neary (2010)
and Dhingra (2013)). In these papers, rms internalize a cannibalization e¤ect when
introducing additional varieties to their product portfolio. This means, if varieties
within an MPF are horizontally di¤erentiated, adding a new product will create a
negative demand externality on all other products of this rm. In my framework,
the innovating rm can dampen this negative externality of product innovation by
investing in the degree of product di¤erentiation. It is natural to assume that the
strength of the cannibalization e¤ect depends on the substitutability of products
within the product range of a rm. Adding products di¤ering only slightly from
each other, will have a strong cannibalizing impact on existing varieties. However, a
product range that spans products which are highly di¤erentiated is less susceptible
to cannibalization. To avoid cannibalization among products, rms can invest in new
1Bernard et al. (2010) report the dominance of MPFs. Although MPFs represent a minority
of 39 percent of rms, these rms account for 87 percent of output. In a trade context, Bernard et
al. (2007) document for the year 2000 that rms that export multiple products account for 99.6
percent of export value.
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blueprints or product specic attributes such as di¤erences in functional features
or design. Furthermore, promotion activities such as advertisement or marketing
campaigns help to showcase the di¤erences between products. All these measures
come along with xed costs, however, they are implemented to satisfy the consumers
desire to choose from a broad and diversied product range.
The key result of the model is that a larger market or trade cost reductions enhance
the prot maximizing product range of an MPF and optimal spending in both prod-
uct di¤erentiation and process innovation. An MPF that widens its product range
loses market shares of its existing products through cannibalization. This makes
additional spending in product di¤erentiation worthwhile. Furthermore, sunk costs
for product di¤erentiation and process innovation are determined endogenously and
depend on the level of investment and not on scale and scope of production. Thus,
a rising market size enables rms to exploit economies of scale in innovation and
gives rise to increasing optimal investment levels as investment costs can be spread
over more units of output. Beyond this, I show that returns to both product dif-
ferentiation and process innovation do not just depend on the size of the market
but also on the e¢ ciency of research input utilization. The Global Innovation Index
(2013) reports disparities and persistent innovation di¤erences among regions.2 This
is indicative of di¤erences in the scope for product di¤erentiation and the opportuni-
ties to reduce production costs between rms in di¤erent industries or in developed
and less developed countries. The more e¢ cient research input is transformed into
research output, the higher will be the equilibrium investment levels and the larger
will be the adjustments to globalization. This insight is important to keep in mind
when discussing consumerswelfare in the context of my model.
On the demand side, I specify quadratic preferences à la Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
and compute the indirect utility function as an appropriate measure for welfare. Con-
sumers benet from more variety (love of variety), lower prices, and, notably, from
the degree of product di¤erentiation. I refer to this property of the utility function
as love of diversity. The latter means that consumers value a given product range
more when products are more di¤erentiated or rephrasing it, the marginal utility of
2The Global Innovation Index is published by the business school INSEAD and the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized agency of the United Nations. It ranks
141 economies on the basis of their innovation capabilities and results.
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each newly introduced product is increasing in the degree of product di¤erentiation.
Having disentangled these three individual welfare channels, I discuss the gains from
trade liberalization arising from intra-rm adjustments. Globalization induces an
MPF to enlarge and diversify its product range. Given the love of variety and love
of diversity properties of the utility function, this improves consumer welfare. Fur-
thermore, a larger market is associated with technology upgrading. The resulting
cost savings are passed on to consumers, leading to welfare gains from lower prices.
However, as indicated above, I show that the gains from trade depend on the e¢ -
ciency of the investments. Conducting the thought experiment of rms innovating
in two di¤erent scenarios - a developed and a less developed country -, I argue that
trade liberalization will lead to larger welfare improvements when innovation input
is converted e¢ ciently in valuable output.
This model is related to the growing trade literature on MPFs with quadratic pref-
erences for di¤erentiated varieties. In Eckel et al. (2011), MPFs invest in the quality
of their products. Because of the assumption of exible manufacturing, rms will
invest most in their core product which is sold at the largest scale. Dhingra (2013)
analyzes the impact of trade policy on product and process innovation, keeping the
degree of product di¤erentiation exogenous. Similar to my model, economies of scale
increase optimal spending for process innovation. Separating between internal and
external competition, she shows that, in response to trade liberalization, rms will
reduce their product range to dampen the cannibalization e¤ect. Firms in my model
also try to mitigate cannibalization, however, as I allow for investments in product
di¤erentiation, the channel stressed here is a di¤erent one.
To model investments in product di¤erentiation, I build on recent contributions with
single-product rms by Lin and Saggi (2002), Rosenkranz (2003), and Bastos and
Straume (2012). These authors also assume quadratic preferences and derive optimal
investment strategies for single-product rms.3 Firms invest to horizontally di¤er-
entiate their products from those produced by their rivals. Therefore, the motive for
the investment is di¤erent in comparison to the multi-product framework presented
in this chapter. Lin and Saggi (2002) explicitly point out that in a framework with
3Ferguson (2011) proposes a model with monopolistic competition and CES preferences. In
his model, single-product rms invest in horizontal product di¤erentiation to di¤erentiate their
product from the products of their rivals. Similar to my model, the author investigates how the
size of the market a¤ects the extent of endogenous product di¤erentiation.
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two single-product rms, investing more in product di¤erentiation also has a nega-
tive strategic e¤ect. From a consumers perspective, also the rivals product seems
more di¤erentiated when a rm increases its spending for product di¤erentiation.
The resulting increase in the other rms output hurts the investing rm. Having
the same two products produced by one MPF, the MPF internalizes the externality
from the investment and, therefore, will di¤erentiate its products more to avoid can-
nibalization.4 In a multi-product Dixit-Stiglitz framework, Lorz and Wrede (2009)
endogenize the degree of product di¤erentiation.5 In a notably di¤erent theoretical
setup, these authors also evaluate how rms respond to globalization in terms of
product variety and diversity. However, the focus of my model is di¤erent, as I split
up the R&D portfolio of an MPF to disentangle the welfare gains from globalization.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In the next section, I present
the theoretical model where I start with the optimal consumer behavior in section
3.2.1. Section 3.2.2 introduces the second stage of the model, where a rm decides
on its optimal scale and scope of production. In the rst stage in section 3.2.3, a rm
chooses optimal spending in both product di¤erentiation and process optimization.
I assume that the rm perfectly anticipates the outcome of the second stage. In
section 3.2.4, I conduct a comparative statics exercise where the focus is on the
e¤ects of globalization. Finally, in section 3.2.5, I disentangle the implications of
globalization on consumer welfare. Section 3.3 concludes and summarizes results. I
provide all mathematical derivations in the Appendix of this chapter in section 3.4.
3.2 The Model
In this part of the model, I introduce a two stage framework of MPFs. In the rst
stage, an MPF chooses its spending on product di¤erentiation and process innova-
tion, anticipating the e¤ects on optimal scale and scope in the following stage. By
investing in process innovation, an MPF can simply lower its variable production
4In the Appendix of this chapter, I provide a formal analysis for this result. In a simplied
version of the main model, I show how the incentives to innovate in product di¤erentiation di¤er
between single-product rms and MPFs.
5In the related industrial organization literature, Lambertini and Mantovani (2009) develop a
dynamic model of MPFs and investigate whether there exists complementarity or substituability
between investments in product and process innovation.
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costs. As I have already noted in the introduction, investments in product di¤eren-
tiation imply investing in new blueprints for distinct product features and designs
or marketing expenses. These investments make sure that from a consumers point
of view the product portfolio o¤ers a huge variety of unique products. From a rms
perspective, however, these investments are made to reduce cannibalization within
its own product range. Both types of investments are costly and require up-front
endogenous sunk costs. In the second stage, the rm simultaneously chooses the
quantity produced of each good and the number of products produced. Production
incurs variable costs and a xed capacity cost for each new production line.
The economy under consideration involves a homogeneous goods industry and a
di¤erentiated goods industry. Production in the homogeneous industry is subject to
constant returns to scale with a unit cost requirement and there is no contingence
of R&D. For the sake of simplicity, I characterize the di¤erentiated industry by one
active monopoly MPF.6
I begin this section with the analysis of consumer preferences and derive optimal
demand. Then, the focus is on the optimal behavior of an MPF in the di¤erenti-
ated industry. Solving the two-stage model via backwards induction, I start deriving
optimal scale and scope of the rm. Subsequent, in the rst stage of the game, I
derive two conditions for optimal spending in product di¤erentiation and process
innovation. In a comparative statics exercise, the focus is on the e¤ects of global-
ization on optimal R&D expenditures. In particular, I investigate how decreasing
transport costs or an increasing market size a¤ect optimal rm behavior. The model
is rounded down by a section on the gains from trade arising from the within-rm
adjustments. For that purpose, I derive the indirect utility function associated with
the underlying preference structure and discuss consumer welfare.
6I focus on intra-rm adjustments, so competition between rms plays only a second-order
role. For an extension of a similar framework to oligopoly, the interested reader is referred to the
Appendix in Eckel et al. (2011).
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3.2.1 Consumer Behavior: Preferences and Consumer De-
mand
In the economy under consideration, L consumers maximize their utility dened
over the consumption of a homogeneous and a di¤erentiated product. Within the
di¤erentiated sector, I further assume that consumers buy a set 
 out of a potential
set e
 of the di¤erentiated product. The preference structure of a representative
consumer follows a quasi-linear specication:7
U = q0 + u1, (3.1)
where q0 is the consumption of the homogeneous good, which is sold at a price
p0 = 1. The latter serves as numeraire and absorbs any income e¤ects. Therefore,
the following analysis occurs in a partial equilibrium setting. u1 denes utility in the
di¤erentiated sector and displays a standard quadratic form:
u1 = aQ  1
2
b

(1  e (s))
Z
i2e
 q(i)
2di+ e (s)Q2

. (3.2)
In this specication, a and b represent non-negative preference parameters and q(i)
denotes per variety consumption with i 2 e
. Total consumption by the representa-
tive consumer is given by Q  R
i2e
 q(i)di. The parameter e (s) 2 [0; 1] is an inverse
measure of product di¤erentiation and is of central interest, as it can be chosen en-
dogenously by a rm. The value of e (s) is determined by the level of investment s
that an MPF spends on product di¤erentiation. Further assumptions on e (s) will
be discussed later on in the model. At this point, however, it is important to notice
that lower values of e (s) imply that products are more di¤erentiated and hence less
substitutable. The extreme case of e (s) = 1 denotes that consumers have no taste
for diversity in products and demand depends on aggregate output only.
Consumers maximize utility subject to the budget constraint q0 +
R
i2e
 p(i)q(i)di =
I, where p (i) denotes the price for variety i and I is individual income. Utility
7These preferences combine the continuum quadratic approach to symmetric horizontal product
di¤erentiation of Ottaviano et al. (2002) with the preferences in Neary (2009).
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maximization yields the following linear inverse individual demand function
p(i) = a  b [(1  e (s))q(i) + e (s)Q] , (3.3)
where  is the marginal utility of income, the Lagrange multiplier attached to the
budget constraint. Given the quasi-linear upper-tier utility, there is no income e¤ect,
thereby implying that  = 1. Market-clearing imposes that an MPF faces a market
demand x(i) that consists of the aggregated demand of all consumers Lq(i) for variety
i. For the inverse market demand, I derive
p(i) = a  b0 [(1  e (s))x(i) + e (s)X] , (3.4)
where a is the consumersmaximum willingness to pay, b0  b
L
is an inverse measure
for the market size, and nally, X  R
i2
 x(i)di represents total demand in the
di¤erentiated industry. Eq. (3.4) reveals the price p (i), a consumer is willing to pay
for variety i, as negatively dependent on a weighted average of the sales of variety
i and total output of all available varieties. From Eq. (3.4), I derive direct demand
for variety i as
x (i) =
a
b0 (1  e (s) + e (s) )  
p (i)
b0 (1  e (s)) +
e (s) p
b0 (1  e (s) + e (s) ) (1  e (s)) ,
(3.5)
where  describes the mass of consumed varieties in 
. The average price of di¤er-
entiated varieties in the economy is given by p = 1=
R
i2
 p (i) di.
In the model I present hereafter, a rm can invest in the degree of product di¤er-
entiation, which a¤ects the cross elasticity between any two varieties. The cross
elasticity of variety i with respect to any other variety j is given by:
"i;j 
 @x (i)@x (j) x (j)x (i)
 = e (s)(1  e (s)) x (j)x (i) . (3.6)
It is straightforward to see that investments in the degree of product di¤erentiation
(lower values of e (s)) reduce the cross elasticity "i;j and hence weaken the strength of
the cannibalization e¤ect within a rms portfolio. The lower is the substitutability
between varieties, the less does the output of any additional variety reduce the
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demand for the other products within the portfolio.8 From a demand perspective,
this is the reason why MPFs will invest in the degree of product di¤erentiation in
my model.
Lemma 3.1 By investing in the degree of product di¤erentiation, an MPF can lower
the magnitude of the cannibalization e¤ect through a lower cross elasticity of demand
between varieties.
To conclude this section on preferences, I follow Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and
derive the indirect utility function associated with the quadratic preferences as an
appropriate measure for welfare
U = I +

2b (1  e (s) + e (s) ) (a  p)
2 +

2b (1  e (s))
2
p. (3.7)
The term 2p =
1

R 
0
(p (i)  p)2 di represents the variance of prices. The demand
system exhibits "love of variety", as welfare increases in the product range , holding
p and 2p constant. Furthermore, welfare decreases in the average price and increases
in the variance of prices. In section 3.2.5, further important properties of Eq. (3.7)
are discussed in detail.
3.2.2 Firm Behavior: Optimal Scale and Scope
I start analyzing the optimal rm behavior at the second stage of the model. The
rms objective in this section is to maximize prots by choosing both the scale and
scope of production. By doing this, a rm considers R&D investments as given. I
assume a cost function c (i; k) for producing variety i, which depends on the tech-
nology level k the rm has chosen. I further suppose that each MPF has access to
a continuum of potential varieties, however, due to a xed cost for new production
8Furthermore, investments in the degree of product di¤erentiation also a¤ect the price elasticity
of demand. Referring to Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), I express the price elasticity of demand as
"i  j(@x (i) =@p (i)) (p (i) =x (i))j = p (i) = (pmax   p (i)), where pmax  (1 e(s))a+e(s)p(1 e(s)+e(s)) is the choke
price of the linear demand system. Investments in the degree of product di¤erentiation a¤ect
the choke price and, thus, the price elasticity. For a given average price p and product range ,
investments in product di¤erentiation reduce the price elasticity and hence relax the rmsinternal
"competition" between varieties as: @p
max
@e jp;=const=   (a p)(1 e(s)+e(s))2 < 0.
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lines it does not necessarily produce all of them. Denoting the scope of the product
portfolio by , total prots are given by
 =
Z 
0
[p(i)  c(i; k)  t]x(i)di  r, (3.8)
where t is a uniform trade cost payable by the rm on all the varieties it sells. r
represents the xed cost the rm has to pay for each new production line. Firms
simultaneously choose the quantity produced of each good (optimal scale) and the
mass of goods produced (optimal scope).
Optimal Scale Maximizing prots in Eq. (3.8) with respect to x (i) implies the
rst-order condition for scale:
@
@x(i)
= p(i)  c(i; k)  t  b0 [(1  e (s))x(i) + e (s)X] = 0, (3.9)
which leads to the optimal output of a single variety
x(i) =
a  c(i; k)  t  2b0e (s)X
2b0(1  e (s)) , (3.10)
with X  R 
0
x (i) di denoting total rm scale.9 The negative impact of total rm
scale X on the output of a single variety displays the cannibalization e¤ect:
@x(i)
@X
=   e (s)
(1  e (s)) < 0. (3.11)
The strength of the cannibalization e¤ect depends on the substitutability of the
varieties within the product portfolio of the rm, i.e. the parameter e (s). It is easily
veried, that the magnitude of the cannibalization e¤ect in Eq. (3.11) is increasing
in the value of e (s).
For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, I impose symmetry on the
9The second-order condition for this maximization problem is given by: @
2
@x(i)2
= @p(i)@x(i)  
b0 (1  e)  b0e @X@x(i) < 0.
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production costs: c (i; k) = c (j; k) = c (k).10 Therefore, I rewrite Eq. (3.10) as:
x =
a  c (k)  t
2b0 (1  e (s) + e (s) ) . (3.12)
Total rm output is then simply given by:
X =
 (a  c (k)  t)
2b0 (1  e (s) + e (s) ) . (3.13)
Note that total output X in Eq. (3.13) rises in the product range , however, output
of each variety x is decreasing in  due to the cannibalization e¤ect. Put it di¤erently,
the relationship between total rm output X and the product range  is a concave
function, whereby the slope depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation e (s).
Assuming perfectly di¤erentiated products, i.e. e (s) = 0, the relation turns out to
be linear.11
To derive the optimal price, I combine Eq. (3.12) with the inverse demand function
Eq. (3.4) and get:
p =
a+ c (k) + t
2
. (3.14)
Prices are increasing functions of both production and transportation costs.
Optimal Scope I proceed and consider the rms choice of its prot maximizing
product range. Besides the xed costs r, the extension of the product portfolio is
also limited through the additional cannibalization associated with the launching of
further products. I rewrite total prots in Eq. (3.8) as follows
 =
 (a  c (k)  t)2
4b0 (1  e (s) + e (s) )   r, (3.15)
10Eckel and Neary (2010) assume a technology that embodies exible manufacturing. A rm
possesses a core competence and marginal costs for any other variety rise in the distance to the
core product. The idea that rms posses one core product is also featured in recent models by
Arkolakis and Muendler (2010), Qiu and Zhou (2013), and Mayer et al. (2014).
11Total rm output X is an increasing function of the product range  as: @X@ =
(1 e(s))(a c(k) t)
2b0(1 e(s)+e(s))2 > 0. The second derivative is negative:
@2X
@2
=   e(s)(1 e(s))(a c(k) t)
b0(1 e(s)+e(s))3 < 0,
which implies a concave relation between the variables X and .
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where operative prots must be positive, i.e.
r <
(a  c (k)  t)2
4b0 (1  e (s) + e (s) ) . (3.16)
Maximizing Eq. (3.15) with respect to  implies the respective rst-order condition
for scope:12
@
@
=
(1  e (s)) (a  c (k)  t)2
4b0 (1  e (s) + e (s) )2   r = 0. (3.17)
From Eqs. (3.12) and (3.13), it follows that per variety output decreases but total
rm output increases in additional products. An MPF optimally solves this trade-o¤
and adds new varieties until the marginal return of an additional variety equals the
xed cost r of an investment in additional capacity. From inspection of Eq. (3.17),
it is straightforward to see that the marginal return of new varieties is decreasing in
the number of products . Solving for the optimal product range yields:
 =
(a  c (k)  t)
r
(1 e(s))
b0r

  2 (1  e (s))
2e (s)
. (3.18)
The condition on r stated in Eq. (3.16) ensures that the product range takes positive
values. The optimal product range rises with falling xed costs r and falling variable
costs c (k). Furthermore, I am interested in the e¤ects of globalization on the product
range of an MPF. In my model, globalization is captured through falling trade costs
t or a rising market size L (i.e. lower values of b0  b
L
). Inspecting Eq. (3.18)
reveals the multiplicative structure of the xed costs for product innovation r and
the inverse measure for the market size b0. Therefore, an increase in the market size
L has the same e¤ect as decreasing xed costs r. I interpret the term b0r as the
perceived costs of product innovation which are lower in a larger market.
In the rst stage of the model, the rm can invest in the degree of product di¤er-
entiation. Therefore, it is of further interest how this investment a¤ects the optimal
product range of an MPF. It can be shown that a larger scope for product di¤erentia-
tion induces the rm to enlarge its product range . The reason for this is that lower
12The second-order condition is given by: @
2
@2
=   e(s)(1 e(s))(a c(k) t)2
2b0(1 e(s)+e(s))3 < 0:
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values of e(s) imply more investments in blueprints for product specic features or
marketing, which reduce cannibalization among varieties. These investments create
a broader spectrum of technological opportunities within a rm can establish more
varieties. I summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 Lower values of trade costs t or a larger market size L increase
the prot maximizing product range of an MPF, i.e.
d
dt
< 0 and
d
dL
> 0. (3.19)
Furthermore, a rising degree of product di¤erentiation (lower values of e (s)) dampens
the cannibalization e¤ect and, hence, induces an extension of the product range, i.e.
d
de
< 0. (3.20)
All derivatives are presented in the Appendix.
3.2.3 Firm Behavior: Optimal R&D Portfolio of an MPF
In this section, I discuss the rst stage of the model. I assume that the rm correctly
foresees how output levels and product range are determined in the second stage.
Firms can invest in cost-reducing process optimization and in a more di¤erentiated
product range. To derive the rms prot function in this stage, I combine the
optimal product range in Eq. (3.18) with the gross prots e in Eq. (3.15) and come
up with the following expression:
 = e   krk   srs; (3.21)
where
e = (a  c (k)  t)

(a  c (k)  t)  2p(b0r (1  e (s)))
4b0e (s)
. (3.22)
Recall that k is the level of investment in process optimization and s denotes the
investment in product di¤erentiation. Process R&D is conducted at a rate rk and
investing in product di¤erentiation is carried out at a rate rs. By investing k units
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in process innovation, a rm can lower its production costs c (k), following the as-
sumptions:
@c
@k
 c0 (k) < 0 and @
2c
@k2
 c00 (k) > 0. (3.23)
The level of product di¤erentiation e (s) is determined by:
@e
@s
 e0 (s) < 0 and @
2e
@s2
 e00 (s) > 0, (3.24)
where e (0) = 1 and e (1) = 0. To ensure interior solutions, I further assume that
e0 (0) = c0 (0) =  1 and e0 (1) = c0 (1) = 0. I do not impose any specic functional
forms of Eqs. (3.23) and (3.24) to keep the analysis as general as possible. However,
the curvatures of c (k) and e (s) are of special interest as they capture the innovation
e¢ ciency of rms. To clarify this issue, I determine the elasticity of c(k) and e (s)
with respect to innovation inputs k and s as: "c(k)  jd ln c=d ln kj 
c0 (k) kc(k) 
and "e(s)  jd ln e=d ln sj 
e0 (s) se(s) . According to that, the percentage change
of c (k) and e (s) following an one percentage point increase in k or s, respectively,
will be larger, the larger are je0 (s)j and jc0 (k)j. Having this in mind, I can discuss
the implications of di¤erences in the ability to innovate between rms in di¤erent
countries or industries at a very general level.
Figure 3.1: Di¤erences in the Ability to Innovate
1
0 s
)(se
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the response of the di¤erentiation parameter e on the invest-
ment level s. It is natural to assume that there are di¤erences in the scope for
product di¤erentiation between rms, for example, in less developed and developed
countries. A certain level of development is necessary to create blueprints for a broad
and highly di¤erentiated product range. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1, where the
solid line represents a developed country and the dashed line represents a less devel-
oped country. The message from the graph is straightforward: Firms in a developed
country are more e¢ cient in innovation leading to a higher degree of product di¤er-
entiation for a given level of investment s.13 Furthermore, the steeper slope (larger
je0 (s)j) of the solid line indicates that a marginal unit of innovation input will be
transformed into more innovation output in the developed country.14 I will revisit
this point when I study the impact of trade liberalization on the innovation choices
and the consequent welfare analysis.
In the rst stage, the rm maximizes Eq. (3.21) both with respect to k and s. The
rst-order conditions for this maximization problem read as follows:
@
@s
=
@e
@e
e0 (s)  rs = 0, (3.25)
and
@
@k
=
@e
@c
c0 (k)  rk = 0, (3.26)
where
@e
@e
< 0 and
@e
@c
< 0. (3.27)
Operating prots are rising in the degree of product di¤erentiation (lower values of
e (s)) as this reduces cannibalization and, therefore, lowers competition between the
products within the portfolio. Moreover, it is straightforward that operating prots
are increasing in lower production costs. The exact expressions for @e
@e
and @e
@c
, and
13The Global Innovation Index 2013 ranks countries according to their innovation e¢ ciency.
Innovation e¢ ciency is calculated as the ratio of the innovation output over innovation input in a
country.
14Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) argue that even if all countries have access to the same set of
technologies, there will be large cross-country di¤erences because of varying economic conditions.
Their argument is the skill scarcity in developing countries which makes skill-complementary tech-
nologies inappropriate. This technology-skill mismatch leads to di¤erences in the e¢ ciency how
countries transform innovation inputs into innovation outputs.
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a proof that these terms are negative is provided in the Appendix. Furthermore, I
provide a simplied version of the model, where I investigate the di¤erences in the
incentives to innovate in product di¤erentiation between MPFs and single-product
rms.
Eqs. (3.25) and (3.26) suggest that the marginal benets of the two investments
essentially consist of two elements. The rst element is the direct e¤ect of a change
in the degree of product di¤erentiation or the cost parameter on the operating protse demonstrated in Eq. (3.27). Most importantly, the magnitude of the direct e¤ect
depends on the rm size. This is related to early ndings by Schumpeter, who
argued that only rms with su¢ ciently large sales can cover the high xed costs
associated with R&D projects. The second element embodies the responsiveness of
the di¤erentiation and the cost parameter with respect to investments: e0 (s) and
c0 (k). According to this, the marginal benet of an investment also depends on the
e¢ ciency of transforming research input into output. The larger je0 (s)j and jc0 (k)j,
respectively, the greater is the impact of the marginal unit of investment.
Lemma 3.2 The marginal benet of an investment depends on (i) the total rm size
(determined by scale and scope) and (ii) the e¢ ciency of research input utilization.
The rst-order conditions in Eqs. (3.25) and (3.26) suggest that it is optimal to invest
in process innovation and product di¤erentiation, respectively, until the marginal
benets equal the marginal costs of the investment.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the optimal behavior for the case of investments in product
di¤erentiation. The shape of the marginal benet curve is concave due to the as-
sumptions made on e (s). The optimal investment level s is determined at the
point where the slope of the investment cost curve is just equal to the slope of the
marginal benet curve. In this point, total prots  are maximized. Furthermore,
it can be seen in the graph that the equilibrium investment levels s and k in-
crease in the responsiveness of the functions e (s) and c (k), i.e. in their respective
slopes e0 (s) and c0 (k). Eqs. (3.25) and (3.26) implicitly determine the equilibrium
levels of product di¤erentiation s = s (k; rs; t; r; b0) and process innovation
k = k (s; rk; t; r; b0). In the next section, I present comparative statics results
with respect to the variables in brackets.
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Figure 3.2: Optimal Degree of Product Di¤erentiation
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3.2.4 Comparative Statics
Having characterized the equilibrium R&D levels, I derive several comparative statics
results of the model. I start with the e¤ects of an exogenous change in the investment
costs (rs and rk) and the capacity costs r, followed up with the cross-e¤ects of
process innovation on product di¤erentiation and vice versa. Afterwards, the focus is
on the e¤ects of economic integration on the equilibrium R&D e¤orts. As mentioned
above, globalization can be captured by both an increase in market size L and a
reduction in transportation costs t.
To derive the comparative statics results, I totally di¤erentiate Eqs. (3.25) and
(3.26). The explicit mathematical expressions for all derivatives are provided in the
Appendix. In the following subsections, I will employ the graphical tool provided in
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Figure 3.2 and discuss the results intuitively.
Change in Investment Costs and Capacity Costs It is straightforward to
determine the e¤ects of rising innovation costs on the equilibrium levels of s and k.
Rising rates rs and rk increase the costs of R&D and, therefore, reduce equilibrium
levels of both process innovation and product di¤erentiation. In Figure 3.2, this can
be illustrated by a rising slope of the investment cost curve in the upper part of the
diagram. Consequently, the optimal investment level is shifted to the left hand side.
The e¤ects of varying capacity costs r on the investment levels can be interpreted
like the e¤ects of a changing product range. From Eq. (3.18), it follows that rising
capacity costs r will reduce the prot maximizing product range. The latter reduces
total rm size. Keeping this coherence in mind, it is obvious that rising xed costs
r reduce both the optimal levels of product di¤erentiation and process innovation
as the gains from these investments are reduced. More precisely, investments in
di¤erentiation are cut back, as within a smaller product range, the cannibalization
e¤ect is less erce. Furthermore, due to a lower rm-level output, the benets from
a better technology level are reduced, leading to less process innovation. Expressed
in Figure 3.2, this means a lower slope of the marginal benet curve, which again
shifts the optimal investment level to the left hand side. I summarize these ndings
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2 Rising investment costs (rs and rk) and capacity costs (r) reduce
optimal levels of investment in both product di¤erentiation and process innovation,
i.e.
ds
drs
< 0;
dk
drk
< 0, (3.28)
and
ds
dr
< 0;
dk
dr
< 0. (3.29)
Cross - E¤ects In the next step, I investigate the interaction between process
innovation and product di¤erentiation. As in the related industrial organization lit-
erature with single product rms (see for example Lin and Saggi (2002)), I nd a
two-way complementarity in which the investment in one branch of research makes
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the other more attractive. On the one hand, Eq. (3.18) shows that a better tech-
nology induces an MPF to add more products to its portfolio. The latter intensies
cannibalization and incentivizes a higher level of product di¤erentiation. On the
other hand, more di¤erentiated products enable a higher sales volume and, there-
fore, enhance the incentives to invest in a better technology.
Proposition 3.3 Firms invest more in product di¤erentiation when they can un-
dertake process innovation and vice versa, i.e.
ds
dk
> 0 and
dk
ds
> 0. (3.30)
Globalization I conclude this section with inspecting the e¤ects of trade liberal-
ization on the R&D e¤orts of MPFs. In my framework, globalization is modelled
as a reduction in trade costs t or alternatively, following Krugman (1979), as an
increase in the market size L (recall: the demand parameter b0  b
L
is an inverse
measure of market size which is decreasing in the number of consumers). Consider-
ing proposition 3.1, I know that a larger market encourages a rm to add additional
products to its portfolio. An MPF which widens its product range cannibalizes
market shares of its existing products. This makes additional spending on product
di¤erentiation attractive. At the same time, total rm output X rises after trade
liberalization, which raises investments in both product di¤erentiation and process
innovation through economies of scale. In Figure 3.3, this is illustrated through a
steeper marginal benet curve, which leads to a higher equilibrium spending on prod-
uct di¤erentiation s1.
15 Economic integration can also be interpreted as a process
of reducing trade costs. Similar to an increase in market size, lower transportation
costs enlarge total rm output and induce higher equilibrium investments in both
types of R&D.
The fact that investments of rms are positively correlated to the market size is in
line with recent contributions in the literature. Lileeva and Treer (2010) and Bustos
(2011) underline how rising revenues after trade liberalization induce exporters to
invest in better technologies. Concerning the investment in product di¤erentiation,
my ndings are related to models with endogenous investments in quality, such as
15The same graph could be drawn for process innovation.
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Figure 3.3: Economies of Scale in Innovation
( )se
e
'
~
¶
¶p
p~,P
R&D
Costs
s*
srs ´
s
s
P
s*1
Antoniades (2012) for single-product rms and Eckel et. al (2011) for MPFs. In
these papers, spending in quality is an endogenous sunk cost and is increasing in
rm scale. Firms choose expenditures subject to the size of the market as with more
consumption the investment costs can be spread over more units of output.
Studying the impact of trade liberalization on the equilibrium investment levels
reveals a coherence between the magnitude of the e¤ects and the e¢ ciency of the
investment input utilization. The more e¢ cient are rms in a country or an industry
in transforming innovation inputs into innovation outputs, i.e. the larger are je0 (s)j
and jc0 (k)j, the larger is the magnitude of the e¤ects of globalization. I summarize
these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4 Rising market size L and falling trade costs t enhance the equilib-
rium levels of both types of investments, i.e
ds
dL
> 0;
dk
dL
> 0, (3.31)
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and
ds
dt
< 0;
dk
dt
< 0. (3.32)
The magnitude of these e¤ects is amplied when innovation inputs are in e¢ cient
use.
3.2.5 Welfare
This section builds on the comparative static results concerning globalization and
studies the impact on consumer welfare. Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008),
the indirect utility stated in Eq. (3.7) serves as an appropriate measure for welfare.
In the simplied model setup with symmetric varieties, indirect utility is reduced as
follows:
V = I +

2b (1  e (s) + e (s) ) (a  p)
2 . (3.33)
I start the welfare analysis by discussing important properties of the indirect utility
function in Eq. (3.33). By doing this, I identify the distinct channels through
which innovation a¤ects consumerswelfare. Having unbundled the di¤erent welfare
channels, I focus again on the variables concerning globalization and discuss the
welfare gains from trade liberalization.
Properties of the Indirect Utility Function At a rst glance and not strik-
ingly, welfare is higher the lower is the price level p. Furthermore, as already men-
tioned, the indirect utility function displays "love of variety", i.e.
@V
@
jp;e=const= (1  e (s))
2b (1  e (s) + e (s) )2 (a  p)
2 > 0: (3.34)
For a given price and degree of product di¤erentiation, consumer welfare is increasing
in the number of available products . As the degree of product di¤erentiation is
endogenously chosen by a rm in my model, I am interested in the role of product
di¤erentiation for consumer welfare. It is straightforward to show that the marginal
utility of an additional product is increasing in the degree of product di¤erentiation:
@V
@@e
=  (2  e (s))    (1  e (s))
2b (1  e (s) + e (s) )3 (a  p)
2 < 0. (3.35)
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Furthermore, I can show that for a given product range , utility is increasing when
products are more di¤erentiated:16
@V
@e
jp;=const=    (   1)
2b (1  e (s) + e (s) )2 (a  p)
2 < 0. (3.36)
I call this attribute of the utility function "love of diversity". In addressing the
question to what extent globalization matters for consumer welfare in my frame-
work, this property of the utility function is central. From previous discussion, it is
obvious that consumers value a given product range more when products are more
di¤erentiated.
Lemma 3.3 Welfare increases in the number of available products ("love of vari-
ety"), the degree of product di¤erentiation ("love of diversity"), and decreases in the
price level.
Welfare Gains from Trade With the properties of the welfare function fully
characterized, I proceed discussing some of the key implications of the theory. In
the previous section, I have analyzed the impact of trade liberalization on the product
range and the endogenous choice of R&D expenditures. I recap the key comparative
statics results and highlight their implications for consumer welfare.
My theoretical model suggests an extension of the product range following an in-
crease in the market size or alternatively lower trade costs. Qualitatively, this result
is in line with trade models with single-product rms such as Krugman (1980) and
Melitz (2003) where the transition from autarky to trade induces entry of rms.
Firm entry increases the number of available products in the market, which gives
rise to gains from trade through the well-known "love of variety" nature of the util-
ity function. However, worthwhile to mention at this point is the di¤erent source
of gains from trade in this model stemming from adjustments within the rm in
contrast to entry of rms at the industry level.
16Welfare gains have diminishing returns with respect to product di¤erentiation: @V
2
@2e jp;=const=
(a p)2( 1)2
b(1 e(s)+e(s))3 > 0. Substituting information from Eqs. (3.4) and (3.12) in the
indirect utility Eq. (3.33), I compute the total derivative as follows: dVde =
(a c(k) t)2
8b([(1 e(s)+e(s))])2
 
(1  e (s)) dde    (   1)

< 0. Recall from proposition 3.1 that dde < 0.
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The endogenous choice of investment levels in product di¤erentiation and process
innovation is the key element of this theory. Trade liberalization enables rms to
exploit economies of scale in innovation and increases incentives to invest in R&D
as in a larger market xed investment costs can be spread over a larger scale of
output. Therefore, my formal analysis reveals increasing spending in both types of
investments after trade liberalization. This enhances welfare via two separate chan-
nels. The central welfare channel in this model is what I called "love of diversity".
Given the opportunity to serve a larger market, an MPF will spend more resources
on research for new blueprints or product specic attributes. For the consumer, this
increases welfare as it leads to products with new functional features or a new design
and thus the opportunity to choose from a broader product range. Technically, a
higher degree of product di¤erentiation enlarges the marginal utility of each new
product and thus enhances welfare. Furthermore, consumers enjoy lower prices as
MPFs increase investments in better processes. As rm size grows in a larger market,
a better technology becomes more valuable. The resulting cost savings are passed
on to consumers, leading to welfare gains from lower prices (compare Eq. (3.14)).
To unbundle the di¤erent channels analytically, I substitute Eqs. (3.4) and (3.12)
into Eq. (3.33) and rewrite the indirect utility function as follows:
V = I +
 (a  c (k)  t)2
8b [(1  e (s) + e (s) )] . (3.37)
By totally di¤erentiating Eq. (3.37), I identify the three distinct channels which were
discussed above. The following expression represents the gains from trade induced
by an increase in the market size L:17
dV
dL
=
(1  e (s)) bx2
2L2
d
dL| {z }
>0: Love of variety
 2b (   1) (a  c (k)  t)X
L
e0 (s)
ds
dL| {z }
>0: Love of diversity
 X
2L
c0 (k)
dk
dL| {z }
>0: Lower prices
> 0.
(3.38)
Inspection of Eq. (3.38) clearly reveals that consumers in a larger market are better
o¤. It highlights three distinct channels of gains from trade and shows how trade
liberalization a¤ects welfare through within-rm adjustments. I derive the analogous
17To determine the sign of the derivative in Eq. (3.38), recall that e0 (s) < 0 and c0 (k) < 0:
Furthermore, it follows from proposition 3.1: ddL > 0 and from proposition 3.4:
ds
dL > 0 and
dk
dL > 0.
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expression for falling trade costs t in the Appendix.
Preceding discussion suggested that consumers in a larger market or in a market with
lower trade costs, ceteris paribus, are better o¤. The magnitude of the gains from
trade naturally depends on the increase of investment levels after trade liberalization.
Furthermore, inspection of Eq. (3.38) reveals that the welfare gains also depend on
the e¢ ciency of research input utilization determined by e0 (s) and c0 (k). If trade
induced investments (i.e. ds
dL
and dk
dL
) do not generate more di¤erentiated products or
a better production technology because of ine¢ cient innovation (low values of je0 (s)j
and jc0 (k)j), the welfare gains from an increase in the market size will be low. The
latter implies that gains from trade will be larger in a developed country where due
to better technological conditions the marginal benet of each unit of investment is
higher. I summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5 Table 3.1 summarizes the welfare gains from trade integration
through the di¤erent elements of the welfare function. Economies of scale after trade
liberalization lead to larger welfare gains in countries where the technological stage
of development allows an e¢ cient use of research input.
Table 3.1: Welfare E¤ects of Globalization
E¤ects of L " or t #: Welfare channel:
Product range:  " Love of variety
Product di¤erentiation: s "; e (s) # Love of diversity
Process innovation: k "; c (k) # Lower prices
3.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I focus on the gains from trade associated with intra-rm adjust-
ments. There is indeed recent evidence that innovating rms account for a large
fraction of the productivity and variety gains at a sector-level. To distinguish be-
tween the di¤erent welfare channels, I construct a multi-product framework in which
a rm invests in di¤erent types of research. Trade liberalization provides welfare
gains, which originate at the rm-level because rms exploit economies of scale in
CHAPTER 3. INTRA-FIRM ADJUSTMENTS AND GAINS FROM TRADE 116
innovation. An MPF weighs the marginal benet of each type of innovation against
the xed up-front development costs. The market size e¤ect of globalization accom-
panied by rising sales volumes raises the returns to the di¤erent types of innovation.
Consumers benet from a larger product portfolio (love of variety) of more di¤er-
entiated products (love of diversity). Furthermore, a larger rm output encourages
technology-upgrading. Consumers benet from the investment in a cost-reducing
technology through lower prices.
The key element of this theory is the investment in the degree of product di¤eren-
tiation and the consequent welfare gains through more di¤erentiated products. In
most studies, product di¤erentiation is a main component of the industry struc-
ture, which is treated as an exogenous variable. By endogenizing the degree of
product di¤erentiation, I highlight an additional channel in which globalization may
a¤ect product variety. I show that adding additional products in a larger market
encourages MPFs to invest in a more diversied product range. In contrast to single-
product rms, MPFs have higher incentives to invest in product di¤erentiation in
order to reduce the cannibalization e¤ect. Consumers enjoy additional gains as the
marginal benet of any new variety rises in the degree of product di¤erentiation.
This implies that consumer welfare is not only determined by the absolute number
of available products but by the individual product features that distinguish these
varieties. Consumers value choosing from a broad and diversied product range.
Therefore, investments in the diversity of the available products is an important
aspect when analyzing consumer welfare. Finally, I have shown that welfare im-
provements through economies of scale depend on the e¢ ciency of innovation input
utilization. The better research input is transformed into research output, the higher
will be the equilibrium investment levels and the larger will be the gains from trade
through intra-rm adjustments.
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3.4 Appendix
3.4.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
In the model presented above, globalization is captured by lower trade costs t or a
larger market size L (lower values of b0). Though it is straightforward to see the
e¤ects of globalization on rm scope in Eq. (3.18), I present the derivatives for
completeness. Di¤erentiating Eq. (3.18) with respect to t and b0 yields:
d
dt
=  
r
(1 e(s))
b0r

2e (s)
< 0, (3.39)
and
d
db0
=  
(a  c (k)  t)
r
(1 e(s))
b0r

4b0e (s)
< 0. (3.40)
The second part of proposition 3.1 considers the e¤ect of the degree of product
di¤erentiation on the optimal product range. Di¤erentiating Eq. (3.18) with respect
to e (s) yields:
2
d ln 
d ln e
=  
 
(a  c (k)  t)
2
s
1
b0r (1  e (s))

+ 2 (   1)
!
< 0. (3.41)
3.4.2 Optimal Firm Behavior in the First Stage
Maximizing Eq. (3.21) with respect to s and k leads to the rst-order conditions
in Eqs. (3.25) and (3.26). The explicit expressions for @e
@e
and @e
@c
in Eq. (3.25) are
given by
@e
@e
=  (a  c (k)  t)
 
   1
2

2e (s)
s
r
b0 (1  e (s))

< 0, (3.42)
and
@e
@c
=  (a  c (k)  t) 
p
(b0r (1  e (s)))
2b0e (s)
< 0. (3.43)
To derive Eq. (3.42), di¤erentiate e in Eq. (3.22) with respect to e (s) and substitute
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information from Eq. (3.18).
3.4.3 Comparative Statics
In this part of the Appendix, I provide all analytical results for section 3.2.4. To
derive my results, I totally di¤erentiate the following rst-order conditions:
@
@s
=  
(a  c (k)  t)

(a  c (k)  t)  (2  e (s))
r
b0r
(1 e(s))

4b0e (s)2
e0 (s)  rs = 0,
(3.44)
and
@
@k
=  (a  c (k)  t) 
p
(b0r (1  e (s)))
2b0e (s)
c0 (k)  rk = 0. (3.45)
Throughout the analysis, I apply the following second-order conditions:
@2
@s2
=
@2e
@e2
e0 (s) +
@e
@e
e00 (s) < 0, (3.46)
and
@2
@k2
=
@2e
@c2
c0 (k) +
@e
@c
c00 (k) < 0. (3.47)
To determine the signs of the following derivatives, recall that e0 (s) < 0 and c0 (k) <
0.
Proof of Proposition 3.2 The following derivatives show how equilibrium invest-
ment levels s and k respond to changes in investment and capacity costs.
Change in Investments Costs:
ds
drs
=
1
@2
@s2
< 0 (3.48)
dk
drk
=
1
@2
@k2
< 0 (3.49)
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Change in Capacity Costs:
ds
dr
=  
(a  c (k)  t)

(2  e (s))
r
b0
r(1 e(s))

8b0e (s)2 @
2
@s2
e0 (s) < 0 (3.50)
dk
dr
=   1
4e (s) @
2
@k2
s
(1  e (s))
b0r

c0 (k) < 0 (3.51)
Proof of Proposition 3.3 To determine the interaction between process inno-
vation and product di¤erentiation (cross-e¤ects), I totally di¤erentiate Eq. (3.44)
with respect to k and Eq. (3.45) with respect to s. I combine the derivatives with
information from Eq. (3.18) to show the positive signs.
ds
dk
=   e
0 (s) c0 (k)
2b0e (s) @
2
@s2
 
(a  c (k)  t)
2e (s)
+
s
b0r
(1  e (s))

   1
2
!
> 0 (3.52)
dk
ds
=   e
0 (s) c0 (k)
2b0e (s) @
2
@k2
 
((a  c (k)  t))
2e (s)
+
s
b0r
(1  e (s))

   1
2
!
> 0 (3.53)
Proof of Proposition 3.4 Globalization is captured by an increase in the size of
the market L (recall: b0  b
L
) or by falling trade costs t. The following derivatives
show how equilibrium values of s and k respond to changes in these parameters.
Change in Market Size: Again, I totally di¤erentiate Eq. (3.44) and then substi-
tute information from Eq. (3.18) to show that the sign of the following derivative is
clearly negative:
ds
db0
=  (a  c (k)  t)
4b02e (s) @
2
@s2
 
(a  c (k)  t)
2e (s)
+ 
s
b0r
(1  e (s))
!
e0 (s) < 0. (3.54)
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From inspection of Eq. (3.22), I know that the following expression is clearly nega-
tive:
dk
db0
=  2 (a  c (k)  t) 
p
(b0r (1  e (s)))
4b02e (s) @
2
@k2
c0 (k) < 0. (3.55)
Change in Trade Costs:
ds
dt
=   e
0 (s)
2b0e (s) @
2
@s2
 
((a  c (k)  t))
2e (s)
+
s
b0r
(1  e (s))

   1
2
!
< 0 (3.56)
dk
dt
=   c
0 (k)
2b0e (s) @
2
@k2
< 0 (3.57)
3.4.4 Welfare
In the main body of this chapter, I present the disentangled welfare gains of an
increase in the market size L. For the sake of completeness, I also present the
explicit expression for a change in the trade cost parameter t.
dV
dt
=
(1  e (s))x2b
2L2
d
dt| {z }
<0: Love of variety
 2b (   1) (a  c (k)  t)X
L
e0 (s)
ds
dt| {z }
<0: Love of diversity
 X
2L

1 + c0 (k)
dk
dt

| {z }
<0: Lower prices
< 0
(3.58)
3.4.5 A Benchmark Model with Two Products and Endoge-
nous Product Di¤erentiation
In this part of the Appendix, I formulate a simplied version of the model with only
two varieties being produced. These varieties are o¤ered by either two single-product
rms that compete in a Cournot fashion or by one MPF. Using this simple model, I
want to show how the incentives to innovate in the degree of product di¤erentiation
di¤er according to whether the two products are o¤ered by one MPF or by two single-
product rms. As the focus is on innovation in product di¤erentiation, I abstract
from the two other strands of R&D considered in the main model. The following
executions will be held rather scarce as the model presented here is based on the
CHAPTER 3. INTRA-FIRM ADJUSTMENTS AND GAINS FROM TRADE 121
model in the main body.
Preferences As in the main model, the preference structure of a representative
consumer follows a quasi-linear specication:
U = q0 + a (q1 + q2)  1
2
b
 
q21 + q
2
2 + 2e (s) q1q2

, (3.59)
where e (s) 2 [0; 1] and q0 is the consumption of the homogeneous good. The spec-
ication in Eq. (3.59) is the two goods case equivalent to the preference structure
in the main model. Utility maximization gives rise to the following market demand
system:
p1 = a  b0 (x1 + e (s)x2) and p2 = a  b0 (x2 + e (s)x1) , (3.60)
where market-clearing imposes that: x1  Lq1 and x2  Lq2. As I am not interested
in market size e¤ects, I assume in the following that b = L = 1.
Optimal Firm Behavior I consider two scenarios in this section. In the rst
scenario, two rms, each producing one variety, invest in the degree of product
di¤erentiation. In the second scenario, an MPF produces the two varieties and
conducts the investment. In both scenarios, the marginal cost of production equals
c and r denotes the xed capacity cost. As in the main model, rm i can invest
s units in the degree of product di¤erentiation e (s). The investments follow the
assumptions made in Eq. (3.24). Again, investments in the degree of product
di¤erentiation are conducted at a rate rs.
As it has already been pointed out by Lin and Saggi (2002), for Cournot rms,
investments in the degree of product di¤erentiation have two conicting e¤ects on
prots. For the prots of rm i, this means
di
dsi
=
@i
@e
e0 (si)| {z }
Direct e¤ect: >0
+
@i
@xj
dxj
@e
e0 (si)| {z }
Indirect e¤ect: <0
. (3.61)
The direct e¤ect in Eq. (3.61) is positive. It captures the increase in the demand
for the own product following investments in the degree of product di¤erentiation.
However, there is also a negative indirect e¤ect from the investment. This strategic
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e¤ect occurs because also rm j benets from the investment of rm i. The resulting
increase in the output of the competing rm j hurts the innovating rm i. The latter
e¤ect displays the crucial di¤erence to the case of an MPF. An MPF internalizes the
strategic e¤ect as it produces both varieties. Therefore, it will invest more in product
di¤erentiation as, on the one hand, it can increase output of both varieties and, on
the other hand, the cannibalization e¤ect across the two varieties is dampened.
Obviously, the positive e¤ect of investments in product di¤erentiation on product
innovation that was mentioned in proposition 3.1 cannot occur here as the number
of products is exogenously given.
Equilibrium Investment Levels in the Two Scenarios In the case of two
single-product rms, prots of rm i in the second stage are given by
i = (pi   c)xi   r. (3.62)
The demand system in Eq. (3.60), implies the following equilibrium prots under
Cournot competition:
i =

(a  c)
(2 + e (s))
2
  r. (3.63)
In the R&D stage, total prots of rm i are given by:
i = i   sirs. (3.64)
The respective rst-order condition for this maximization problem is
@i
@si
=
@i
@e
e0 (si)  rs = 0, (3.65)
where @i
@e
=   2(a c)2
((2+e(s)))3
< 0 and e0 (si) < 0.
In the second scenario, the two products are o¤ered by one MPF. The prots of the
rm in the second stage are given by:
 = (p1   c)x1 + (p2   c)x2   2r. (3.66)
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Calculating the equilibrium prots yields:
 =
(a  c)2
2 (1 + e (s))
  2r. (3.67)
In the R&D stage, the rm maximizes the following prot function
 =    srs, (3.68)
with respect to an optimal investment level s. The rst-order condition is given by
@
@s
=
@
@e
e0 (s)  rs = 0, (3.69)
where @
@e
=   (a c)2
2((1+e(s)))2
< 0.
Figure 3.4: Optimal Degree of Product Di¤erentiation: MPF vs. SPF
1
0 s
)(se
*
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*
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Eqs. (3.65) and (3.69) implicitly determine the optimal investments for the two
scenarios. From inspection of these equations, one observes that an MPF will invest
more in the degree of di¤erentiation as
@
@e

MPF
>
@
@e

SPF
. Since ((2 + e (s)))3 >
4 ((1 + e (s)))2 for all e (s) 2 [0; 1], it follows that the marginal benet for prod-
uct di¤erentiation is higher for MPFs. The latter implies that in the optimum:
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je0 (s)jMPF < je0 (s)jSPF . Figure 3.4 illustrates again the properties of the function
e (s) and helps with the interpretation of the result.
Lemma 3.4 Even in the case of an exogenous product range of two products, MPFs
will invest more in the degree of product di¤erentiation than single-product rms.
For a single-product rm, the marginal benet of the investment is lower, as the
investment is accompanied by a negative strategic e¤ect. An MPF internalizes this
e¤ect as it produces both varieties. Therefore, it will invest more in product di¤er-
entiation as, on the one hand, it can increase output of both varieties and, on the
other hand, the cannibalization e¤ect across these two varieties is dampened.
Conclusion
This thesis aims to contribute to the novel literature on MPFs in international trade.
It was motivated by recent empirical observations which document the dominant role
of MPFs in both domestic and international businesses. An overwhelming share of
international activity is performed by large rms which manufacture a broad variety
of products. For these rms, the trend towards more integrated world markets gives
rise to new opportunities. The main focus of this thesis was in particular on two
issues: O¤shoring and the positive impacts of larger markets on innovation activity.
Both aspects have received a lot of attention in the international trade literature,
however, almost exclusively in the context of models considering single-product rms.
Therefore, the aim of my thesis was to establish novel results on the o¤shoring and
innovation behavior of MPFs, which I hope, will contribute to a better understanding
of how rms behave in global markets.
Whilst writing this thesis, I tried to focus on explaining issues which are specic to
MPFs and, therefore, cannot be explained in models based on single-product rms.
This conclusion is not a place where I want to repeat all ndings, however, I will
draw some inferences that are common to all three chapters. In all three essays,
I emphasized changes in the product range of a rm as an important margin of
adjustment to globalization. Since the seminal work of Krugman (1979), product
variety has played a central role in many models belonging to the new trade theory.
In several passages of this thesis, I have stressed the importance of within-rm prod-
uct expansion for the total number of available varieties in an economy. Therefore,
analyzing the product range of MPFs and understanding the determinants, which
may have an inuence on it, is a crucial aspect to have in mind when analysing the
variety gains from international trade.
One of the main results of Chapter 1 was that o¤shoring has a positive impact on
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the product range of a rm. A rm which has the opportunity to relocate entire
production lines of labor-intensive products will extend its portfolio by new products.
Importantly, these varieties are produced in the o¤shore destination and would not be
o¤ered by the rm in the case of solely domestic production. This type of o¤shoring
brings forth novel labor market implications (the cannibalization e¤ect of o¤shoring),
however, it was shown that even with endogenous factor prices and lower domestic
wages following a reduction in o¤shoring costs, the positive impact of o¤shoring
on the product range remains stable. This points to a so far unexplored channel
through which globalization can increase product variety and thus stimulate welfare.
Therefore, this chapter may also be a springboard for future empirical research that
could quantify the e¤ects of o¤shoring on the product portfolio of rms.
Chapters 2 and 3 focused on the innovation behavior of MPFs in global markets.
Using Brazilian rm-level data, Chapter 2 reveals that rms have increased their
investment e¤orts in product innovation following an increase in the market size.
In the underlying theoretical model, this result was explained by economies of scale
and the lower perceived costs of product innovation in a larger market. Facing a
larger market potential, rms are willing to spend more on R&D, which increases
their product o¤ering. A further result of this chapter was that the returns to prod-
uct innovation are determined by the degree of product di¤erentiation in a sector.
Empirically, we found that rms in industries with a low scope for product di¤er-
entiation will invest less in new products. Our theoretical framework revealed one
reason for this behavior. It was shown that due to the stronger cannibalization e¤ect
in a homogeneous sector, the incentive to invest in new products is lower. Chapter
3 picked up this idea and provided a framework in which an MPF could increase the
returns to product innovation by investing in the degree of product di¤erentiation
within its portfolio. By endogenizing the degree of product di¤erentiation, Chapter
3 highlights an additional channel in which globalization may a¤ect product variety.
Allowing for this kind of investment provides novel insights into the welfare gains
from variety. On the one hand, additional investments in the degree of di¤erentia-
tion mitigate the cannibalization e¤ect and, therefore, increase the optimal product
range of a rm. On the other hand, consumer welfare is not only determined by the
absolute number of available products but by the individual product features that
distinguish these varieties. Consumers value choosing from a broad and diversied
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product range. Therefore, investments in the diversity of the available products is
an important aspect when analyzing consumer welfare.
Of course, the adaptation of rms to globalization has many di¤erent dimensions and
I cannot provide a comprehensive picture of all possible channels in this dissertation.
Moreover, the frameworks presented throughout the di¤erent chapters rely on several
simplifying assumptions, which help to focus on the central issues and, at least partly,
are made to keep the analysis tractable. However, I hope that my thesis contributes
to a better understanding of how rms adjust to globalization and promotes further
research onMPFs in the international trade literature. With the availability of better
and better rm-level data as well as further theoretical proceedings, this strand of
research can be expected to generate many new and interesting insights into the
microeconomic behavior in global markets.
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